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ABSTRACT
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration have
convened a series of meetings to create a voluntary code of conduct for the commercial
use of facial recognition technology. This research asks and answers three questions
related to the creation of the voluntary code of conduct: 1) How is the regulatory regime
of FRT emerging in the U.S.? 2) What are the roles of the various stakeholders in shaping
the commercial regulation of FRT? 3) How does FRT challenge our current conceptions
of privacy? Data has been gathered to answer these questions using participant
observation and semi-structured interviews. The data was analyzed via mediated
discourse analysis. Findings of the research include: the highly sensitive nature of the
biometric data that facial recognition technology collects, the data’s ability to be linked
across multiple databases, the surreptitious way the data can be collected, the potential
chilling effect the technology can have on the First Amendment, and the various threats
the technology poses to privacy.

Keywords: Privacy, Facial Recognition Technology, Multistakeholder, and Biometric
Data
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Privacy is currently at the center of a major U.S. controversy. On February 12,
2014, Kentucky Republican Senator Rand Paul filed a class action lawsuit against
President Barack Obama, Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency
(NSA), James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and James Comey, Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Paul contended that the warrantless and
suspicionless data collection of American citizens, which had been performed by the
government, was illegal under the Fourth Amendment (Fuller, 2014). Paul’s concerns
reflect a wide-spread public feeling of uneasiness with the government’s access to private
online data. According to the Pew Research Internet Project, 68% of Internet users
believe the privacy laws do not provide enough protection and 50% are worried about the
amount of their personal information available online (Rainie, Kiesler, Kang, and
Madden, 2013). Other citizens cite laws such as the Patriot Act to argue that the
collection of users’ private data is necessary for the security of the country. Facial
Recognition Technology (FRT), a relatively new form of data collection technology
possesses the powerful ability to link data about individuals, further invading personal
privacy and threatening the general anonymity, the ability to be anonymous in public a
majority of the time that Americans currently enjoy.
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The ability to scan an individual’s face and recognize it, which is within the
capacity of FRT, further exacerbates the public debate on Internet privacy. Joseph Atick
(2011), a pioneering scientist of modern FRT, defined facial recognition as a computer’s
ability to recognize faces in photos and appropriately identify separate individuals. FRT
is the essential hardware to record or scan an image, as well as the software to process the
algorithms required for recognition or verification. In the following work, FRT is used as
a blanket term to include the hardware and software necessary for face recognition,
identification, and verification. The International Biometrics & Identification
Association (IBIA) draws a distinction between photographs, which it does not view as
biometric identifiers, the ability to uniquely identify a person by a distinguishing
biological feature, and a faceprint, the digital code extracted from a photograph, that can
be matched against other databases (Atick, 2011; Rouse, 2008). Faceprints can be
thought of similarly to fingerprints, as both are unique individual identifiers.
There are three stages in the application of FRT, beginning with face detection.
Face detection can be accomplished using memoryless systems, which do not “extract,
store or utilize faceprints; they simply detect the presence of a human face” (Atick, 2011,
p.1). Although unnerving in its own right, the current privacy controversy concerns the
systems that store such information, rather than simply acknowledge it. The other two
stages in FRT application include facial recognition identification and facial recognition
verification. Identification is the process of comparing a singular faceprint to a database
of multiple faceprints to determine who the individual is. Verification, on the other hand,
provides process reliability by ensuring that a person is who he says he is.
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Recently, the commercial use of FRT has gained popularity. Internet companies
like Facebook and Google have made noticeable use of the technology through
“tagging”1 and Google Glass2 respectively. Many retailers are adopting the technology to
combat shoplifters. Most notably, FRT was deployed during the 2001 Super Bowl to
search individuals against a mug shot database in an effort to identify wanted criminals
(McCullagh, 2001).
This dissertation explores the evolution of the regulatory regime of FRT. First,
the focus is the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
multistakeholder (MSH) process for the development of a regulatory regime for FRT; this
is a unique process which involves stakeholders who previously participated in an earlier
MSH process convened by the NTIA. This process began February 6, 2014 and
continues as of this writing (June 2015). The meetings were primarily followed via the
webcast posted on the NTIA website. In all ten meetings have been recorded. Issues
discussed in the meetings include but are not limited to: notice, transparency, reverse
engineering of data, First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights, and surveillance.
Through the discourse analysis of video transcripts and interviews conducted for
the study, as well as tracking the development of the regulatory regime for FRT, this
researcher demonstrates how the stakeholders view the concept of privacy and the
various methods they have constructed to regulate FRT. Interviews have been conducted
with members from each stakeholder group: academics, government officials, business
members, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A discussion on the merits and

1

Refers to a feature on Facebook where an individual can assign a name to an individual in a photograph.
Eyewear that allows an individual to Google search and perform other tasks on objects in their range of
sight.
2
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the deficits of creating a voluntary code of conduct to regulate this technology has been
provided. This dissertation demonstrates that the flexibility of a code of conduct allows
for continued innovation of the technology. Alternatively, the voluntary nature of the
code of conduct provides little protection to consumers if companies do not agree to sign
on. This dissertation illustrates the positions of various stakeholder groups and their
advocacy goals for outcomes to the voluntary code of conduct. The primary focus of the
process is to protect United States consumers and their privacy; however, many of the
businesses represented in the process are international in nature. References to
international standards or laws are done for the sake of business entities involved in the
process but the primary focus remains on the United States consumer.
Several assumptions have been made while conducting this research. The first
assumption made is the adoption of the liberal notion of privacy. As Anita Allen (1998)
notes: “The liberal conception of privacy is the idea that government ought to respect and
protect interests in physical, informational, and proprietary privacy” (p. 723). The liberal
notion of privacy is similar to liberal notions of property; privacy is associated with
things we own such as our home, body, and affects (Allen, 1998). This notion of privacy
is primarily concerned with inaccessibility to either our person or our information. Also,
this notion places a premium on individual choice and autonomy over our lives. This
view of privacy has been challenged by business interests represented in the
multistakeholder process.
Another assumption of this research is the primacy of business or economic
interests over the liberal notion of privacy and democracy. During the course of
observing the meetings, business and economic interests have trumped the privacy of
4

individuals. It is clear that corporate power has trumped that of the individual and
appears to challenge a few pillars of American democracy namely the First and Fourth
Amendments.
Finally, privacy is a concept without strict agreement as to its definition or scope,
nor is there uniform appreciation for privacy amongst the public. Privacy varies in
importance to individuals subjectively and in the context of a given situation. As such, it
is very difficult for the academic community to make statements and conceive of privacy
as a static definition. Therefore, the academic community has provided narrow
conceptions of privacy including: physical, informational, or cognitive; and dealt with
specific facets of privacy. The dissertation demonstrates how FRT blurs the distinctions
the academic community has previously made. As such, I propose that privacy needs to
be reconceptualized. Privacy scholars should conceive of privacy as interference. The
interference concept accounts for privacy’s subjective and contextual nature while, more
importantly, not adding an additional definition of privacy, which is common in academic
literature. This work aims to explain why this conception works and why it will be
beneficial to privacy scholars.
Several research questions have been asked and answered by this dissertation.
The first question the dissertation answers is: How is the regulatory regime for FRT
emerging in the U.S.? This regime is being developed via a unique MSH format to
protect consumer privacy. The second question addressed by the dissertation is: What are
the roles of the various stakeholders in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT? In
other words, what consumer safeguards are being implemented to protect privacy from
the challenges posed by FRT. Finally, this project addresses the question of: How does
5

FRT challenge our current conceptions of privacy? The project has concluded that
privacy must be re-conceived because of the capabilities of FRT.
This dissertation employs multiple research methods to answer the above stated
questions. Data has been collected by conducting interviews with participants involved
in this process as well as through participant observation. Discourse analysis has been
conducted on the data to determine which texts have contributed to the development of a
code of conduct for FRT. Multiple research methods have been employed to enhance the
reliability of the findings.
This dissertation contributes new knowledge to the fields of new media, privacy,
and the regulation of communication technology. FRT is a new medium through which
communication can be conducted, as such it poses new challenges as well as benefits to
the way humans communicate. It is argued in this dissertation that FRT poses new and
unique challenges to current conceptions of privacy; as such, new understandings of
privacy are needed in light of the development of FRT. Finally, this project contributes
to current understandings of the regulation of communication technology. This project
argues that there is a field of technology regulation despite the term scantly appearing in
the academic literature.
There are limitations to all research projects and this dissertation is no exception.
Limitations include:


The debate and creation of a voluntary code of conduct are incomplete. The
original timeline for the process was to begin in February and end in June with
a scheduled re-convening of the group in September, this timeline was
adopted by this dissertation.
6



The novelty of this technology is another limiting factor of this dissertation.
There is scarce theoretical literature available about the technology.



Not all stakeholders who were reached agreed to provide an interview.
Important stakeholder voices are missing from this dissertation.



Novelty of the evolving regulatory regime for FRT being created via a MSH
process.

1.1. Chapter Descriptions
Chapter two contains a detailed case description of the evolving regulatory regime
for FRT. The meetings arose out of trade complications with the European Union (EU)
and the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) (2012). The case is discussed in
reference to relevant documents and previous processes convened dealing with FRT.
While the NTIA MSH meetings represent the first regulatory regime for FRT there were
other “best practices3” issued previously by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). A
description of the venue, participants, and proceedings of the meetings is also presented.
The third chapter is a description of how FRT actually works. FRT has multiple
uses and different modalities. The chapter discusses the differences between recognition,
authentication, and identification. There are several different ways to conduct a facial
scan, each with their own merits and deficits. These various scanning methods are
discussed, including how they are used to identify or authenticate an image. Also, in this
chapter, a discussion of accuracy rates, thresholds and their uses, as well as hybrid uses of
the technology are provided.

3

The FTC has issued a staff report containing best practices for the commercial use of FRT.
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Chapter four discusses the theoretical underpinnings of this research. The
dissertation employs the social constructivist paradigm and shows how this case study fits
under it. This research relies on three primary theoretical concepts: privacy, regulation of
technology, and multistakeholder collaboration. Presented in the chapter are the
historical, legal, theoretical, and varied conceptualizations of privacy. This chapter
shows that the regulation of technology is a field of study, though the term is not used in
the academic literature. Also presented are the historical approaches to the regulation of
communication technologies as well as contemporary theories of technology. Finally, a
discussion on the history and merits of the multistakeholder approach to creating
regulation is provided. The discussion focuses on the advantages of collaboration as it
relates to the case as well as regulating the technology.
The fifth chapter is best described as a research methods chapter. In this chapter a
discussion of the case study design, its rationale for being chosen, and the strengths and
weaknesses of the design are provided. This dissertation employs multiple methods for
collecting data including participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and
discourse analysis. Strengths of these data collection methods as well as the benefit of
using multiple data collection methods to triangulate results are discussed as well.
Chapter six is a discussion and comparison of the U.S. and EU data protection
laws, specifically focusing upon their differences. In many ways, this analysis is
necessary because of tensions between the U.S. and the EU, primarily in terms of each
country’s stance on data protection. Edward Snowden’s revelations concerning the NSA
spying scandal strained U.S. EU commerce relations due to Safe Harbor violations. Lack
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of data protection on the part of the U.S. needs to be understood in order to comprehend
why the CPBR was created and what its goal is.
Chapter seven contains analysis of the first research question of the dissertation
(Please see section 5.5. for a more detailed review of the research questions): How is the
regulatory regime for facial recognition technology emerging in the U.S.? This MSH
process was preceded by an earlier process regarding mobile application transparency.
The mobile application transparency process was concerned with the notice that users
receive about their data and privacy protections when downloading and using a mobile
application or “app.” This carryover of stakeholders is a unique situation as most
stakeholders are new to each process. Furthermore, the previous process was largely
described as unpleasant and unproductive. Next, a discussion of how the voluntary code
of conduct is emerging for FRT is provided. Participants in the current MSH process
have adopted new communicative strategies and alternative decision making methods to
achieve positive outcomes. The strengths and weaknesses of these new decision making
methods are discussed as well. A discussion is also provided on stakeholder
relationships, participant influence on the MSH process, as well as representation in the
meetings.
Chapter eight primarily concerns how the technology itself is regulated, which is
an ongoing process. Here the research question: “What are the roles of the various
stakeholders in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?” is answered. A discussion is
provided on data security, as it was the initial matter discussed during the MSH meetings
after the group had learned about the technology. Further detail is provided about the

9

sensitivity of the data collected, best practices for securing said data, and the different
privacy implications attached to each modality of FRT.
In chapter nine the central question of this research is answered, which is how
privacy should be reconceptualized because of this technology. Initially, data on how
stakeholders conceive of privacy are presented. Understanding how stakeholders
conceive of privacy is important in determining the development of a voluntary code of
conduct for FRT. Next, the many conceptions of privacy are briefly discussed as well as
how FRT blurs the distinctions privacy scholars have previously made. An argument is
provided for the merits conceptualizing privacy as interference without creating
additional definitions of privacy, which would only serve to further cloud the waters of
academic study.
Chapter ten acts as the final chapter of this dissertation, where a summary of the
major findings from this research, limitations to the research, and areas for future inquiry
are all presented. The MSH process for FRT is ongoing, and, as such, conclusions are
limited as to what language will be contained in the code of conduct as well as the
consumer protections to privacy may provide. An argument for further research
concludes this chapter.

10

CHAPTER 2
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXTUAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE FACIAL
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY MEETINGS
In the United States, facial recognition technology has been under development
for decades4, funded primarily through government agencies. One of the first times FRT
entered the public debate was the December 2011 Federal Trade Commission workshop
on FRT. The workshop brought together diverse participants to discuss a variety of
issues surrounding the increasingly likely commercial use of FRT. The FTC in October
of 2012 issued a staff report entitled Facing Facts: Best Practices for Common Uses of
Facial Recognition Technologies. The best practices included privacy consideration, the
sensitivity of FR data, and security measures (Federal Trade Commission, 2014).

FTC Staff Report
10/2012

FTC Workshop
12/2011

Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights
2/2012

First NTIA MSH
Meeting on FRT
2/2014

Figure 1. Timeline for facial recognition technology entering the public debate

4

Please see section 3.3. History and Development
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The National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) The
NTIA multistakeholder meetings for facial recognition technology began with the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) in, February of, 2012). The White House
intended the CPBR to protect consumer’s privacy by describing broad privacy protecting
principles that consumers should expect from companies that handle personal
information. The CPBR is
[P]art of a comprehensive blueprint to protect individual privacy rights
and give users more control over how their information is handled. This
initiative seeks to protect all Americans from having their information
misused by giving users new legal and technical tools to safeguard their
privacy. (White House, 2014)
The CPBR tasks the Department of Commerce’s NTIA with convening a series of
multistakeholder (MSH) meetings, including Internet companies, consumer advocates,
trade associations, businesses, and governments on a variety of privacy issues (including
the use of facial recognition technologies). The goal of the MSH meetings is to create
enforceable codes of conduct that comply with the CPBR and that can be enforced by the
FTC. The Obama Administration has also pledged to work with Congress to enact
comprehensive privacy legislation. 5

5

The current 2013-2014 113th Congress is on track to be the least productive Congress ever, passing just
142 bills as of July (Murray, 2014). According to the Pew Research Center, have just a 28% favorable
view of Congress, 69% disapprove (Pew Research Center, 2014). Additionally, just 44% of the American
public approve of the President according to Pew Research Center (Tyson, 2014). The administration has
pledged to work with Congress to pass the privacy principles in the CPBR but has also urged advocates and
the private sector to work together to implement the principles outlined in the CPBR. Given the current
political realities, it seems unlikely that the President and Congress will enact these privacy protections
legislatively. Codes of conduct represent an alternative way forward toward the goal of protecting
consumer privacy by developing voluntary codes of conduct that comply with the privacy principles and
can be enforced by the FTC.
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The Obama Administration directed the NTIA Privacy MSH Process: FRT to
produce codes of conduct. This MSH framework allows interested parties to participate
and work within their areas of expertise. As it is explained by the White House,
“Multistakeholder processes can provide scalable, flexible means of developing codes of
conduct that simplify companies’ compliance obligations” (White House, 2012, p. 2). To
a certain extent, business is dependent on consumer trust and confidence. It is anticipated
that businesses, that chose to adopt a voluntary code of conduct, will enjoy an extra level
of consumer trust. Adoption and compliance with a code of conduct, once created, could
provide businesses with a competitive advantage (Bowie & Jamal, 2006, p. 339).
Another National Telecommunications and Information Administration driven
process was held prior to the current one on FRT, in July of 2012, concerning Mobile
Application (app) Transparency. Some stakeholders from the current FRT process
described the mobile app process as frustrating, as some stakeholders were deliberately
disruptive rather than working towards an agreeable end, disruptive stakeholders likely
had the goal of avoiding the creation of new regulation. Not all of the stakeholders from
the FRT process were involved in the mobile app process, but those who were may have
approached the current situation with a skeptical view. Prior experience with a MSH
process allowed the NTIA to conduct a more coherent debate of the FRT uses,
stakeholders expressed opinions that the FRT process proceeded with less confrontation,
which they largely attributed to the moderator, John Verdi, who skillfully facilitated the
debate.6

6

John Verdi was a former advocate at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) before being hired
at the NTIA. Verdi sees his role in the process as a facilitator, nothing more or less. He was very specific
about his role as facilitator, so as to not influence the process but to simply facilitate it. Some stakeholders
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The following key principles of the CPBR provide important context for the
group’s interaction and the code of conduct created (White House, 2012) Individual
control, or consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data companies
collect from them and how they use it. Transparency is the right consumers have to
easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security practices.
Respect for context concerns consumers having a right to expect that companies will
collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in
which consumers provide the data. Security is a right consumers have to secure and
responsible handling of their personal data. Access and accuracy is a right to access and
correct personal data in usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity
of the data and the risk of adverse consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate.
Collection concerns consumers having a right to reasonable limits on the personal data
that companies collect and retain. Finally, accountability is a principle where personal
data is handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to
the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Whitehouse, 2012).
These privacy principles were based on the National Institute for Standards and
Technology’s (NIST) Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), originally included in
the Privacy Act of 1974 (NSTIC, 2014). The above principles were specifically designed
with generalizability in mind in order to promote flexibility in company implementation.
The Obama Administration hopes that the flexibility of the general principles in the
CPBR will lead to innovation that creates better consumer and business outcomes.

have had a previous relationship with Verdi and others have not. Stakeholders have not articulated a
negative opinion of John or his facilitation of this process.
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2.1. Key Parameters of the Facial Recognition Debate Case
The MSH meetings on FRT that the NTIA convenes, facilitates the stakeholder
debate on how to protect consumer privacy from the commercial use of the technology.
The NTIA is an executive branch agency that primarily advises the President on matters
of information and telecommunications policy. One of the chief concerns of the NTIA is
enhancing access to broadband Internet; however, the NTIA also focuses on copyright,
online privacy, online security, and the Internet economy. The NTIA handles domestic
and international telecommunications activities.
The NTIA MSH meetings concerning FRT began February 6, 2014. These
meetings were announced on the NTIA website in advance to encourage interested
parties to join the mailing list for the process. Each of the meetings were scheduled once
a month from February to December of 2014, with each meeting lasting, four hours. This
dissertation was designed to follow the stated timeline and is one of the reasons this
research ends ahead of the completion of a code of conduct for FRT. The meetings were
open to the public (a notification was published on the NTIA website December 3, 2013
announcing the upcoming meetings) and convened at the boardroom of American
Institute of Architects in Washington D.C.; they were also made available via a webcast
on the NTIA website, providing interested parties the opportunity to dial in to the
conference call. One business interviewee (whose anonymity has been protected) has
described the process as “radically transparent.” A timeline for the 2014 meetings is as
follows:

15

Figure 2. Timeline of 2014 multistakeholder meetings.
2.1.1. Venue
The desks in the boardroom are arranged in a two tiered horseshoe shape. The
room is capable of seating around 70 individuals. The seats are all provided with
microphones so that stakeholders can be heard in both the room and on the webcast (See
Figure 3.)
The stakeholder collaboration is facilitated by a projector located in the center of
the room so that the participants can see and work on documents collaboratively. Three
cameras in the room ensure observation via the webcast and allow individuals to see the
documents, as well as the speakers.
Figure 3. Display of American Institute of Architects Boardroom, NTIA MSH Venue
Adapted from “American Institute of Architects’ Website” (American Institute of Architects,
2014)
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Figure 3. Display of American Institute of Architects Boardroom, NTIA MSH Venue.
Adapted from “American Institute of Architects’ Website” (American Institute of
Architects, 2014)
2.1.2. Participant Groups
Representatives from four broad groups of stakeholders were present at the
meetings: academics, government, business, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). The following provides more details on the representatives: Academics from
varied institutions have made presentations, some institutions represented include but are
not limited to: Rutgers University, Carnegie Mellon University, and UCLA. Government
representatives include the NTIA, the FTC, some elected official representatives, and the
Information and Privacy Commissioner’s Office of Ontario. Business representatives
include but are not limited to International Biometrics and Identification Association
(IBIA), Interactive Marketing Researchers, Kairos, Pacaso, NetChoice, Motorola, and
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others7. The last major stakeholder group is NGO participants that are comprised of
advocacy groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Center for
Digital Democracy (CDD), Common Sense Media, Consumer Federation of America,
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT), and others.8 The following is a brief description of the stakeholders who attained
high visibility through participation. These descriptions are included to provide the
reader an idea of the advocacy goals of the most vocal participants involved in the
process.


The American Civil Liberties Union was one of the most vocal participants
throughout the process.9 Throughout this MSH process the ACLU was
concerned about protecting the privacy rights of individuals.



Common Sense Media, an advocacy group, was primarily concerned with
FRT being used to take pictures of or sell products to children. In later
meetings, the group also urged the other stakeholders to include the term
“facial profiling” into the definitions list.10

7

Private sector participants were harder to track because not all of them have been vocal participants

8

It is not always clear who is monitoring the meetings as stakeholders can call in to the meetings or follow
along on the webcast without identifying themselves or their respective organizations. Stakeholders may
have various motivations for monitoring the meetings and not participating.
According to the ACLU’s website, “The ACLU is our nation’s guardian of liberty, working daily in
courts, legislatures and communities to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties that the
Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee everyone in this country” (ACLU, 2014).
9

According to the Common Sense Media website, “Common Sense is dedicated to helping kids thrive in
a world of media and technology. We empower parents, teachers, and policymakers by providing unbiased
information, trusted advice, and innovative tools to help them harness the power of media and technology
as a positive force in all kids’ lives” (Common Sense Media, 2014).
10
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Consumer Federation of America is a non-profit organization protecting
consumer rights, was often in opposition to the interests of commercial
companies11.



The Center for Digital Democracy (CDD)12 advocated for increased learning
and education during the meetings when other members of the group felt they
had sufficient facts. CDD protested and challenged the validity of the MSH
process.



The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)13 provided technical
expertise and occasionally voiced their opinion on matters they are invested
in, most notably data encryption and the definition of encryption as it relates
to FRT.



NetChoice was also actively involved in the process.14 The organization has
been involved in helping draft the definitions that the group will work with
and use on the code of conduct.



The International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA) has also been an
active participant in the NTIA MSH meetings on FRT.15

“The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is an association of non-profit consumer organizations that
was established in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy, and education.
Today, nearly 300 of these groups participate in the federation and govern it through their representatives
on the organization’s Board of Directors” (Consumer Federation of America, 2014).
12
“CDD has been at the forefront of research, public education, and advocacy on protecting consumers in
the digital age. It has helped foster widespread debate, educating a spectrum of stakeholders, and creating a
legacy of government and self-regulatory safeguards across a variety of Internet and digital media
platforms” (Center for Digital Democracy, 2014).
13
“CDT is a champion of global online civil liberties and human rights, driving policy outcomes that keep
the Internet open, innovative, and free” (Center for Democracy and Technology, 2014).
14
“NetChoice is a trade association of eCommerce businesses and online consumers all of whom share the
goal of promoting convenience, choice, and commerce on the net” (NetChoice, 2014).
15
“The International Biometrics & Identification Association (IBIA) is a trade association founded in
September 1998 in Washington, DC that promotes the effective and appropriate use of technology to
11
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Motorola, represented by an attorney in the FTR proceedings, is a leading
mobile device manufacturer. It remains unclear to this researcher exactly
what Motorola was advocating for during the meetings but the organization
led the risks/harms committee by way of use cases to provide actual FRT use
examples. The group worked alongside the Definitions Committee but has an
important role in determining what some of the ultimate uses of FRT may be
via the code of conduct. Motorola also represented a potential key
stakeholder as some technologists have already shown that facial recognition
(FR) is possible using mobile devices and off the shelf software.

2.1.3. Meeting Phases
The FRT MSH collaborative process progressed in phases from February to
December 2014. The researcher observed the following three major phases in the MSH
process based on stakeholder interaction and the agenda set by the moderator.
1. February-April: was the information collection stage marked by expert
presentations and stakeholder debates. This provided stakeholders with a
baseline of knowledge on several different areas. With the possible exception
of certain technologists, stakeholders were learning about how the technology
works, how different companies use the technology, and what the technology
may be able to do in the future. Initially, the Microsoft representative was a
vocal contributor at the meetings. She gave a brief presentation about how
their Xbox Connect technology worked, which provides a large consumer use
of FRT and technologies similar to FRT. The first four meetings were reliant
determine identity and enhance security, privacy, productivity, and convenience for individuals,
organizations, and governments” (International Biometrics and Industry Association, 2014a).
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on presentations from companies, technologists, and advocates for more fact
finding. The initial stage of the process started with consensus building,
where stakeholders developed a common understanding of terminology,
technology capabilities, and agreement about the scope of the process. This
consensus building continued throughout the process and was prominently
seen again at the end when the codes of conduct were drafted and a consensus
was reached in terms of appropriate actions to include in the code.
A major source of contention in the initial meetings, and a lingering point of
frustration, was the scope of the code of conduct. With the National Security
Agency (NSA) revelations from Edward Snowden, the stakeholders at the
meeting were increasingly concerned about government’s use of the
technology, specifically related to surveillance, personal privacy, and freedom
of speech.
2. May-July: In the case collection stage the stakeholders were utilizing their
knowledge about the technology to identify potential risks/harms. The
participants were also looking at examples of best practices, previous debate,
and the technology being deployed in the physical environment to create a
code of conduct. In the second stage, the actual work on a code of conduct
began. Committees were formed to create a common language (definitions
committee) and to discuss applications (risks/harms committee). This led the
participants to consider which uses of the technology they were uncomfortable
with, and opinions often varied. Discussing cases of the application of the
FRT led the group to compile a list of use cases that became the Risks/harms
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Committee. These use cases challenged the participants to create solutions or
guidelines to the use of the technology in specific situations. Terminology
quickly became a problem for the group which often led to
misunderstandings.
The definitions committee focused on creating a common language that the
stakeholders could use to avoid terminology confusion. For example,
stakeholders were confused about what a “user” of FRT was. Did a user
describe the person operating FRT or the person the technology was being
applied to? Terminology issues such as these were identified and corrected
by the Definitions Committee.
3. November-December: The drafting stage was marked by stakeholders coming
together to decide on a final code of conduct. In this stage the capacity
building potential of the MSH process is demonstrated as the stakeholders
used their “accumulated social, intellectual, and political capital” to make
decisions (Antonova, 2011, p. 433). At this final stage the participants who
drafted the code of conduct expressed two varying positions. The privacy
protection advocates argued for a more limited scope for the use of FRT,
which was contrary to the industry advocates’ perspective. Industry advocates
suggested a wider scope of FRT uses. Where the code applies to the scope,
use, and varied capabilities of the technology remain to be seen. The final
stage proceeded based on topics of consensus within the group. The first issue
that received broad consensus from the stakeholders was security. Agreement
was achieved that FR data should receive strong protection in order to make
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the data as secure as possible. Recent data breaches occurring at Target and
Home Depot were discussed during the meetings and encouraged stakeholders
to treat data security seriously. It was believed that stakeholders coming to
consensus on “low hanging fruit” items, such as security, provided the group
with momentum and good will so that more contentious items could be agreed
upon later.

Information
Collection 2/6/14

Drafting Stage
11/6/14

Case Collection
4/29/14
Figure 4. Timeline for major stages of MSH meetings on FRT.
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CHAPTER 3
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
Facial recognition technology applies algorithms to process photos of an
individual. This evaluation can recognize the presence of a face, authenticate an
individual for access to a privilege, or identify an unknown individual. Facial recognition
technology collects unique biometric data that cannot be changed or replaced if exploited.
3.1. Biometric Data
Biometric data are based on personal unique biological traits such as finger prints.
The term biometrics is now commonly used to describe the technology that allows for the
collection and examination of biometric data. Biometric data are increasingly being used
by consumers, and commercial, as well as government, uses abound (Wood, 2014).
Biometrics offer the possibility of making daily transactions and interactions safer, as it is
hard to copy or fake DNA or similar biological traits. Apple iPhone users, for instance,
can now use their fingerprint to unlock the device or use a scan of their face. This
eliminates the worry of stolen or compromised passwords which ultimately leads to
unwanted access of protected data. It also facilitates convenience of use by eliminating
the need to remember multiple passwords; instead a device can be accessed by simply
presenting one’s face or scanning one’s finger.
Despite the common belief that biometrics enhance security and provide
convenience to the user, some experts have expressed concerns: an individual’s biometric
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data are very difficult, if not impossible, to change. Should biometric data be
compromised, there is no way to change the data, as one would if their password was
compromised. For these reasons, biometric forms of authentication are often a secondary
form of authentication, or, if used as a primary form, are typically coupled with another
secondary form of authentication, like a pin number or smart card (Atick, 2014).
FRT is one mode of obtaining biometric information about a person. Other
methods include iris scans, hand telemetry, fingerprints, and DNA. Facial recognition
technology is unusual because it does not require the consent of the person whose picture
is being taken; photography is a First Amendment protected activity (Schauer, 1981). Iris
scans and hand telemetry devices would require the individual to consciously interact
with the system. The faceprint, the biometric information created from an image, can be
taken surreptitiously from a distance or even at night if using infrared FRT (Kong, Heo,
Abidi, Paid, & Abidi, 2005). This technology mimics a human skill, recognizing faces.
In contrast, humans cannot identify someone based on a casual observation of their
fingerprint or the size of their hand. The other major difference is the scalability of the
technology; FRT can scan and store potentially endless numbers of images, while
humans are capable of remembering up to 10,000 faces, according to some estimates
(Radford, 2004).
Facial recognition technology is applied to an image or a series of images of a
person. The images often reveal additional information about the person besides
allowing the technician to extract a face template. Many digital cameras capture what is
called Extended File Information (EXIF). EXIF data contains information about the
camera that took the photo, such as file name, size, date, camera make, camera model,
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resolution, flash usage, focal length, and Jpeg process (Alvarez, 2004, p. 2). Apple’s
iPhone is also capable of embedding precise geo-coordinates with photos and videos
taken with the device (Friedland & Sommer, 2010, p. 1). Also unique to FR is its ability
to easily fix a person in place and time. The fact that more information can be collected
about an individual from their faceprint, which can be gleaned from a photo, raises
concerns about privacy expectations, particularly who is collecting the information.
3.2. Modalities of Facial Recognition
Facial recognition technology usually operates in a predictable manner, however,
not all systems perform identification. The initial process is face detection. The system
must first look through the image or video to determine whether or not there is the
presence of a human face. Applications for face detection may include face counting to
determine traffic in a store. During this process there is no additional information
collected about the person and no comparisons are made about the individual.
Face detection is not completely innocuous, however, because the system or
operator may be capable of making other determinations about the individual. The
system may be able to recognize race, gender, and even an individual’s age range.
Operators may be able to draw conclusions about the wealth or relative health of an
individual based on other factors present in the picture, such as clothing or medical
devices.
Another cause for concern about face detection is whether the system is capable
of recognizing the same face. During this process, the system may collect face data and
store it for a period of time without identifying it. Imagine someone who is an alcoholic
and frequents the local liquor store. The system may not know who the individual is, or
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anything about the individual, but it may be able to determine that the same individual
visits the store on a daily basis. This example seems innocuous unless their face is
identified and enrolled in a separate system that can be linked to the liquor store. From
there, the individual could be dropped from his/her health insurance or even denied an
organ transplant. The rise of “big data,”16 including vast consumer dossiers full of
transactional, demographic, and financial data could be more easily linked thanks to FRT.
After a face has been detected, the system may or may not be capable of
performing a more detailed analysis. The next step is authentication, sometimes used
interchangeably with verification. During the authentication stage the (FR) system is
trying to determine if the person who is presenting himself as John Doe is in fact John
Doe. Payroll systems commonly deploy this type of technology. Employees often
present their faces as a way to clock into and out of work. During the authentication
process, the system compares the face and identity that is presented with a stored
(enrolled) identified image in a database. The system extracts the face template from the
individual in front of it and compares it with the identified template stored in the system.
During this process there are two types of errors that could occur. A type I error
is the acceptance of a false positive. The FR system matches the individual to a stored
identity incorrectly. In other words, the system believes that there is a match when in fact
there is no match. The systems can be altered according to a threshold rate, which
equates to how willing the operator is to experience false positives. Therefore, if a
system has a false accept rate of .1 for every 1000, then there will be one false positive

16

The ability of society to harness information in novel ways to produce useful insights or goods and
services of significant value” and “…things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller one,
to extract new insights or create new forms of value (Press, 2014 par. 10).
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identification per 10,000 individuals that attempt access. The rate corresponds with the
size of the database. For every 100,000 there will be 10 false positives, for 1,000,000
there will be 100 and so on (Vaillant, 2014)
A type II error refers to a false reject; this occurs when an individual with correct
credentials is present and the system mistakenly fails to allow the individual access. An
example of this would be if an ATM machine failed to allow an individual access to their
bank account.
These two types of errors impact the end user in completely different ways.
When a type II error occurs, as with the ATM example, an authorized user is denied
access to a system or privilege to which they should have access. Continuing the ATM
example, the user becomes annoyed that they do not have access to their account, and
may have to employ another authentication method, including entering a pin number or
physically visiting the bank to present the appropriate credentials, in order to access their
money. However, if a type I error is made, then an unauthorized user will gain access to
another individual’s bank account, which could lead to fraud or theft. This is why the
threshold false accept rate of the system becomes critically important.
The threshold rate can be raised or lowered depending on the needs of the system.
For critical access applications, such as a bank account, the threshold can be very high,
which will lower, or maintain, the false accept rate. However, the two errors have an
inverse relationship. As the threshold is raised, the false accept rate stays low but the
false reject rate increases. In banking matters, most customers are willing to accept a
higher false reject rate and deal with the annoyance rather than have an unauthorized
individual gain access to personal bank accounts. Of course, the bank can collect more
28

images of the individual or higher quality images to improve both the accuracy of the
system and the experience of the customer. In other applications where less sensitive
access is on the line, the threshold can be lowered (Vaillant, 2014).
Experts suggest that the most difficult process to complete is that of identification.
This is where the FR system performs a one to many match. Here the system tries to find
the identity of an unknown individual by extracting their faceprint and comparing it with
a database of templates. This type of application is common in law enforcement
communities trying to match criminals to identified mug shots. In these systems, the
threshold false reject is usually lowered. Law enforcement is willing to accept more false
positives in order to find the criminal. Often a system will return multiple images that an
analyst will then review in order to determine a match. Mug shots follow a standard
format in terms of face orientation, distance, and lighting in order to increase the
likelihood of finding a match.
3.3. History and Development
Facial recognition technology can be traced back to the 1880s when Alphonse
Bertillion, a police officer working in Paris, became concerned with identifying
criminals. Bertillion decided to record body images of criminals and took their mug
shots under controlled lighting. Standardized images and mug shots thus became
standard practice in police work until there were too many images to search effectively.
Despite FRT’s criminological beginnings, the technology is not associated as strongly
with criminality as is fingerprinting. Eventually, innovations in computing technology
led researchers to try to teach computers to read faces (Morozov, 2012), thus began the
work of modern FRT.
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Some of the earliest digital work on facial recognition began in the 1960s. After
spending several years working on pattern recognition, Woody Bledsoe, along with
Helen Chan and Charles Bisson, began developing a way for computers to recognize
faces. However, much of this early work was not published, though, “Because the
funding was provided by an unnamed intelligence agency that did not allow much
publicity” (Ballantyne, Boyer, & Hines, 1996, p. 10). The project originally involved
matching a photograph of an individual to a data set containing many images, essentially
matching a photograph from a book of mug shots. The results were expressed as a ratio
between the number of images the program felt were matches to the original number of
images selected. However, the technology faced many challenges, namely the rotation
and tilt of the head (face), lighting, angle, facial expression, and aging (Ballantyne, et al.,
1996).
The technology employed by Bledsoe located several coordinates on the face used
to perform accurate facial measurements. These measurements include the inside and
outside corners of the eyes, the location of the pupils, the width between the eyes and
pupils, and the point of widow’s peak (hairline). The technology also accounted for the
various angles and rotations of the images by “normalizing” these measurements. In all
20 distances were recorded and the technology was capable of processing 40 pictures per
hour. The research was advanced by Peter Hart at the Stanford Research Institute, where
the computer consistently outperformed human recognition on a database of 2000
images, marking one of the first successful uses of the technology (Ballantyne, et al.,
1996).
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In the 1970’s, scientists were unable to make major progress in the development
of FRT for several reasons. The quality of the images was not high enough for the
systems to perform more accurate recognition. More sophisticated algorithms were also
needed to process the images. Finally, computing power was either insufficient or too
expensive (Morozov, 2012).
The 1980’s saw the formation of a new industry. Academia and corporations
came together to work on “automated person identification,” which would later become
the biometrics industry. In 1992, the research division of the NSA convened a meeting of
a biometrics group. Intelligence and defense agencies, which funded most of the FRT
projects, allowed the technology to progress significantly (Morozov, 2012).
The use of FRT garnered much public attention in 2001 when it was utilized to
compare Super Bowl attendees against a mugshot database (McCullagh, 2001). Cameras
were fixed at the turnstiles to surveil fans as they entered the venue, which resulted in the
most public and most highly criticized use of FRT’s capabilities (ACLU, 2003).
Accuracy has now greatly improved as well. One industry test showed that the 2006
algorithms were ten times more accurate than those available in 2002 and more than a
hundred times more accurate than those in 1995 (Morozov, 2012) and yet FRT
technology is still evolving. FRT systems are now capable of skin texture analysis,
where a segment of skin is converted to mathematical segments of space. Infrared scans
which are capable of performance in the dark, are also often utilized and can detect vein
structure under the face, another biometric identifier (Kong et al., 2005; Morozov, 2012).
Face “hallucination” is another developing technique for FR where computers guess what
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a low resolution face may look like from a large collection of high resolution faces (Liu,
Shum, & Freeman, 2007).
3.4. Techniques for the Acquisition of Face Data
Facial recognition techniques can be broadly categorized into three areas based on
the acquisition of face data: intensity (color) images, video sequences, and 3D
information or infrared imagery (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009). A discussion follows on how
each of these techniques work.
3.4.1. Intensity Images
Face recognition derived from intensity images fall into two main categories:
feature-based and holistic. Feature-based approaches identify, extract, and measure
features of the face, including, but not limited to, the eyes, mouth, nose and other fixed
markings. These markings are then used to create a geometric relationship where,
statistical pattern recognition techniques can match faces (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).
However, it is unfair to say the system functions automatically “In general, current
algorithms for automatic feature extraction do not provide a high degree of accuracy and
require considerable computational capacity” (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009, p. 43). This is to
say that the process is not automatic; technicians are often needed to locate the
geographic areas (widow’s peak, chin, pupil spacing, etc.) that allow FR to work.
Another features-based approach is Elastic Bunch Graph Matching. This
technique creates a graph from hand selected fiducial points on the face. Fiducial points
are reference points on the face; for example, the pupils of the eyes are considered
fiducial points. Each fiducial point then becomes part of a complete graph. The distance
from the points are measured to create a series of graphs called a face bunch graph.
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Graphs for new faces can be compared to the original and matches are made by
determining the highest similarity value between graphs (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).
Features-based approaches offer several advantages. Since the features are
extracted before matching an image, they are resistant to inaccuracy created by position
changes of the face. These approaches offer relatively compact representations of the
face, which aid in the matching process and can be performed with relative speed.
However, automation of feature detection has proven difficult and requires greater time
for data gathering. Individuals employing these techniques make arbitrary decisions on
facial features. If the selected features cannot be discriminated from, matching will prove
difficult (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009). Therefore, the chosen features are important to the
matching process as some features offer greater accuracy than others. Other methods
focus on the entirety of the face and not simply facial features.
Holistic methods, based on the entire image of the face also fall into two main
subcategories: statistical and artificial intelligence (AI). The simplest statistical approach
draws data from a two dimensional representation of the color values of a face. A direct
comparison can then be made between the original face and other faces. This technique
has been shown to work, but its usability is rather limited by alterations in lighting, pose,
and expression. Remedies to these shortcomings include infrared images and 3D images
(Hiremath & Hiremath, 2013).
Unlike statistical methods, AI uses intensity images to conduct FR. AI is a
complex way of conducting FR, “AI approaches utilize tools such as neural networks and
machine learning techniques to recognize faces” (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009, p. 48). Neural
networks mimic the way the human brain works. In the brain, there are interconnected
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neurons to allow for thought processing. Neurons, which comprise neural networks,
respond to input signals and allow the machine to “think” (Russell, 1991). A popular
example of an AI application is Facebook’s AI system “Deep Face.” Deep Face uses AI
technology known as deep learning to match faces. It is just slightly less accurate than
humans, it correctly matches faces 97.25% of the time. whereas humans are 97.53%
accurate (O’Toole, 2014).
3.4.2. Video Sequences
FRT is popularly used for security purposes, often applied to security video
recordings. Video sequences are examined by the technology in stages, “A video-based
face recognition system typically consists of three modules: one for detecting the face; a
second one for tracking it; and a third one for recognizing it” (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009, p.
51). To offer security, FRT needs to be able to recognize faces in real time and identify
them. Frames are selected from the video that offer the best chance of performing a
match and then a recognition technique is applied to the intensity image. Methods for FR
in video sequences vary from Difference of Gaussian filtering, “an illumination pretreatment,” to skin color modeling (Wang, Li, Wang, Jiang, Jiang, & Zhao, 2012, p. 429).
Other methods employ using images, where the face has moved 180˚, allowing the
system to see the front and both sides of the face. One method involves analyzing video
and 3D information for accuracy (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).
Video sequences are more difficult to match compared to static images as they
often suffer from low quality, the presence of multiple faces, and background information
that hinders the process. However, the abundance of data in video sequences allows the
option of discarding less desirable images. Video sequences also offer the advantage of
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viewing the face from multiple angles, which can eliminate other accuracy detriments,
such as facial expressions and lighting.
3.4.3. 3D and Infrared
Most of the research on FR has been focused on 2D matching. However, as the
technology progresses increased attention will continue to focus on alternative matching
methods, such as, 3D information and infrared imagery. The 3D technique allows for the
recording of complex data, including the curvature of the face, jaw line, and cheek
profile. These techniques are also not easily confused by lighting and orientation
variances, compared to the 2D techniques. However, the complexity of the data causes a
significant increase in computing expenditures. Currently, 3D techniques employ the use
of lasers, structured light systems, stereo vision systems, and reverse rendering (Jafri &
Arabnia, 2009).
Infrared imaging offers yet another method for FR. Infrared techniques reveal
vein and tissue structures of the face, which are unique to each individual. Infrared
techniques are limited in use due to the high cost of thermal sensors, lack of data sets,
sensitivity to ambient temperature conditions, and the disruption glass causes when
collecting information (eyeglasses can occlude data) (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).
Nevertheless, infrared techniques allow for the collection of data in dark places, making
it a unique option for FR.
3.5. Facial Recognition Technology Uses
Current uses of FRT can be broadly categorized into three sections: government,
commercial, and private. These categories are often not distinct. For example, the
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government can contract with commercial vendors of FRT, and, in turn, the commercial
entities may use the data they gather for their own economic interests.
The original area of interest in the FRT was law enforcement. In September of
2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that its FR system was fully
operational. The system would allow law enforcement agencies, including probation and
parole officers, to cross-reference photos from criminal databases. It would also allow
continuous updates on reported criminal history for individuals in trust positions, such as
school teachers (Volz, 2014).
In March 2014, the city of Seattle voted to allow the police department to use
FRT to identify suspects caught on camera (Wagstaff, 2014). Police had reported they
were already doing the process manually, but that FRT would speed it up significantly.
The project was funded by a grant from the Department of Homeland Security. The
measure was originally opposed by the city council until certain provisions were added,
including allowing only trained officers to use the FR software, as well as limiting the use
of the software to still images and individuals suspected of criminal activity (Wagstaff,
2014).
Government uses tend to revolve around security and identity. Evgeny Morozov
(2012) described a situation in 2010 where Navy SEALs used FRT from satellite photos
to identify a suspected terrorist. The New York Times reported that the NSA is
collecting millions of photos that can be examined by FRT. This technology is also
deployed in airports to verify passports and heightened assurance of positive
identification on government IDs.
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It appears that some commercial entities may have an edge on the government in
terms of accuracy. Russell Brandom (2014) reported that Facebook’s DeepFace system
is better than the FBI’s new Next Generation Identification system boasting 97%
accuracy rate compared to the FBI’s 85% accuracy, respectively. The FBI’s FR database
has caused some controversy because the database will include biometric identification of
persons who are not suspected of criminal mischief (Electronic Privacy Information
Center, 2014).
A popular private sector use of FRT includes social networking sites, particularly
Facebook and Google+ which are leading developers of FRT. Facebook has spent
considerable time and effort developing its FRT with the latest announcement of their
DeepFace technology. The DeepFace technology is almost as accurate in identifying
faces as humans are (O’Toole, 2014), and is coupled with the largest photo library in the
world, thanks to Facebook users (Grandoni, 2014). Similar to Facebook’s tagging
feature, where Facebook asks if you would like to attach your friend’s names to pictures
on your profile, Google+ has a “Find My Face” feature that suggests names in photos.
Unlike Facebook, Google+ has users opt-in to use the controversial feature, providing
users with the opportunity to consent (Kincaid, 2011).
Payroll systems that employ FRT allow employers to eliminate possible employee
fraud on time cards. If an employee claims that they worked for eight and a half hours
and they should be paid for the time they put in, and liability on the employer’s behalf is
eliminated as well. This also prevents fellow co-workers from clocking in a late friend at
work, which can cost businesses thousands in lost revenue through decreased production
(Brackeen, 2014).
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Although commercial and government uses of FRT are still in their infancy,
experts perceive potential government uses for fraud prevention of social programs,
assistance in locating missing children, passport verification, and the prevention of
driver’s license duplication. Commercial applications range from social networking,
payroll systems, cruise ship photos, eye tracking, emotion research, facial response to
stimuli, image searches, and government sponsored vendor services.
3.6. Public Debate
The public debate surrounding FRT is one that continues to shift. Given the
technology’s history, especially that significant funding was provided by intelligence and
defense organizations, much of its earliest implementations were created for law
enforcement use (Ballantyne, Boyer, & Hines, 1996; McCullagh, 2001). Members of the
public, who seek police intervention to maintain law and order, grant such agencies a
certain amount of discretion in performing those roles, thus are unlikely to question the
need for this new surveillance technology (Gates, 2011). These views are supported by a
more communitarian view of privacy advocated by Amitai Etzioni (1999). Etzioni’s
views require individuals to relinquish some of their privacy in order to maintain public
safety and order. However, there are members of society who are more skeptical of the
role of police and question their need for such technologies. The Snowden revelations
have in part supported the latter’s argument. Daniel Solove (2011) argued that a false
dichotomy exists between privacy and security, and that both can be achieved properly
utilizing technology. For further discussion on contemporary views of privacy please see
section 4.2.
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Retail use is another instance where FRT has garnered much attention in the
public sphere. Advertisers and retailers are eager to use the technology to better serve
their customers, as they say, and quickly point them in the direction of products and
services they are likely to buy. Groups like Common Sense Media and Center for Digital
Democracy are concerned, though, about the technology being used to “steer” customers
to particular products/services or even discriminate based on race, gender, or age.
Providing disparate opportunities to customers via FRT is a legitimate concern.
Helen Nissenbaum (2009) argued for privacy in context. Privacy protections and
affordances should be based on the context in which they arise. There are some
indications that this may be the way that FRT is treated. For instance, people may enjoy
the convenience of FRT’s use at airports to speed lines, limit intrusive searches, and
increase security. These are likely seen as legitimate uses of the technology. FRT
systems located outside of children’s stores, bathrooms, or surreptitiously surveilling
people from mall kiosks are generally viewed as inappropriate uses of the technology at
the meetings. Furthermore, privacy is a fluid concept and a subjective value. Providing
individuals with a choice or the ability to consent to being subject to FRT is being
discussed as an appropriate way to deploy the technology. However, even with the
flexibility of choice and transparency, (two principles outlined in the CPBR) (Please see
p. 11 for full list of principles), there are participants who worry about “bad actors” who
would not consent to FRT in an effort to avoid detection and potentially aid in their
nefarious acts.
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CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For this project, the theoretical construct relied on the concepts of privacy,
communication technology regulation, and the multistakeholder collaborative process.
The academic community has not reached consensus on the theoretical or legal
conception of privacy as it has been interpreted as a legal concept in a variety of different
contexts. The framers of the U.S. constitution recognized the need for privacy as a
necessary condition for freedom. Although technological advances in communication
have played a substantial role in improving the public’s lives as well as the democratic
process, these advances have also enhanced the government’s and commercial
organizations’ ability to intrude on one’s privacy. Diverse theoretical and legal
interpretations of privacy focus on the dialectic between the right to privacy and the
enhanced technological power of surveillance. The theories of privacy presented here are
meant to serve as a “purposive sample” to cover the central arguments in the field of
privacy (Randolph, 2009, p.4).
Similarly, the presentation of theories on regulation and the multistakeholder
format is not meant to be exhaustive. The theories presented were selected based on their
importance to their respective fields, as well as their relevance to this research project.
Furthermore, the “regulation of technology” is not a phrase used often in the academic
literature, but, as will be shown, such a field exists nonetheless. Privacy is not a new
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concept, so it is important to track the way that scholarship and thinking on the subject
has evolved. Presented initially are some historical conceptions of privacy.
4.1. Historical Conceptions of Privacy
As early as the mid-19th century, John Stuart Mill conceived of privacy as a
necessary condition for freedom. For Mill (1988), “[I]n the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign” (p. 69). Mill believed actions that do not affect society
or other individuals should be permitted to the individual, based on his or her own liberty.
Mill also found “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (p. 68). Of course,
surveillance was already a problem in Mill’s time. In fact, surveillance was an issue
before Mill. During the early years of the U.S. postal system, letters would often be
delivered in bulk via ship, to a central location where they sat for extended periods of
time. To keep information private some individuals employed wax seals. In 1753
Benjamin Franklin, Postmaster General, required postal workers to swear an oath not to
open mail (Regan, 1995). In sum, two conceptions of privacy, the need for seclusion and
the need to keep information private, were recognized at this early time. The
categorization of physical privacy and information privacy are still used in scholarship
today.
In the late 19th century, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis were the first legal
scholars to argue about the right of privacy in the context of mass media and photo
cameras (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). For them, privacy was “the right to be let alone.”
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Warren and Brandeis penned The Right to Privacy in 1890, during a time when the
technologies of the day, cameras and the press, enabled others to encroach on one’s
privacy. The response occurred after Warren read a society page piece about the lavish
party he threw for his daughter after her wedding in the Boston Saturday Evening Gazette
(Rosen, 2000). Thus, decisive steps were made to broaden the notion of privacy by
considering the private agents abilities to conduct surveillance over private individuals; in
doing so, privacy was codified as a legal concept and constituted ‘intrusion of privacy’ as
a separate tort or private law.
In many ways, Warren and Brandeis created the foundation of FRT as a challenge
to privacy. They were concerned about cameras operated by private agents intruding on
others’ privacy, much like the capabilities of FRT. Now the NTIA meetings on FRT are
a continuation of the discussion started by Warren and Brandeis in the late 19th century.
Other scholars would continue to develop privacy as an academic concept.
Alan Westin (1968) maintained that the origins of privacy go well beyond the
19th century, back to man’s animal origins. Westin challenged Mill’s conception of
privacy as absolute, writing “[T]he individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since
participation in society is an equally powerful desire” (pg. 7). One must carefully
consider the balance between the individual’s right to privacy and the collective good.
Individuals have a vested interest to keep parts of their lives private, and, in many cases,
making certain beliefs, attitudes, or preferences known would be deemed offensive or
inappropriate. However, the collective good of society often compels individuals to
reveal personal information for the safety and benefit of the whole, as seen in the sex
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offender registry, vaccination compliance, and jury duty. The balance is not easy to
strike.
Government also has an impact on privacy norms (see section 4.3. for further
discussion on organizations’ need for privacy). For example, totalitarian governments
protect their own privacy and surveil their constituents closely. Conversely, democratic
forms of government are surveilled by groups and individuals while constituent privacy is
highly regarded. Indeed, high importance is placed on privacy as the voter casts his/her
ballot. The government requires some information from individuals and groups to
function effectively, but the balance depends on social norms and values. For Westin
(1968), most American claims to privacy stem from their fierce love of independence and
high value on individuality. Mill (1988) supported this notion in On Liberty.
For Westin (1968), privacy was not primarily viewed in terms of surveillance, but
he certainly was not unaware of surveillance practices. He described surveillance as
necessary for social control. He further wrote that surveillance was necessary to protect
society. However, surveillance can invade privacy with negative consequences. In fact,
just a few short years after Westin’s book Privacy and Freedom was published, Richard
Nixon resigned the presidency following the Watergate scandal. The Democratic
National Committee headquarters break-in ultimately started an investigation by
authorities. The authorities soon found that Nixon had placed wiretaps on the
Democratic offices in an attempt to gain insight into their political strategies (Mellinger,
2011).
FRT poses new challenges to privacy that previously did not exist. The
technology can be applied to images retroactively. Many individuals have had their
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pictures taken by newspapers, for yearbooks, and other events, the technology can
potentially identify individuals found in these dated images. Individuals post numerous
photos of themselves to social media where End User License Agreements (EULAs)
dictate what happens to user’s content and how long data can be retained. Individuals
may have their images captured without their knowledge and used for purposes to which
they did not consent. FRT has the potential to magnify the potential privacy harms faced
in each of these scenarios.
The French philosopher Michel Foucault provided one of the most insightful
notions on privacy and surveillance when he discussed Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon
(Foucault, 1995). The Panopticon is a prison design where one guard in a central tower
would have the ability to watch every single prisoner. At the same time, the prisoners
would not be able to see the guard to know if he was actually present or if present who he
was monitoring. Foucault (1995) stated, “Visibility is a trap” (p. 200). The individual is
seen but cannot observe who is watching him. Foucault stated that this makes the
individual “the object of information, never a subject in communication” (p. 200).
Furthermore, this asymmetric power imbalance is particularly effective in maintaining
social norms. When individuals cannot observe those who are observing them, they must
assume they are being watched and conduct themselves according to the norms. The
invisibility of the watcher gives him power, “This invisibility is a guarantee of order”
(Foucault 1995, p. 200). “Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power” (Foucault 1995, p.201). The principle difference, however, is that
citizens are not prisoners. Nevertheless, “[Jeremy] Bentham was surprised that panoptic
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institutions could be so light: there were no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy
locks” (Foucault 1995, p. 202). In many cases, the presence of cameras seems innocuous,
and may make people feel safe, such as in banks and schools. However, if these cameras
can all be accessed by the National Security Agency, and there are those who believe this
to be the case, the panoptic power would be unnerving. Government surveillance is but
one form of privacy invasion.
Private agents are a separate source of surveillance and a challenge to privacy.
When in public, there is normally no expectation to privacy; there is also no immediate
assumption that one’s image will be recorded either. FRT has the ability to turn the
assumption of relative anonymity around. As a result, citizens are beginning to take
action to protect their relative anonymity in public.17 Such behavior is an expression of
internally motivated resistance.
Foucault wrote that the Panopticon assures the functioning of power. Individuals
behave differently when they know they are being observed. In a world where cameras
are everywhere, one must ask how this will change individual behavior. It appears that
the number of cameras currently available and the limitations of FRT have already
changed how people act. Indeed, organizations like Justice Caps provide consumers with
hats that project infrared light to interfere with the camera and scuttle face recognizing
software (Chibba, 2014). Currently, the technology is somewhat limited for real time use
but future actions taken by individuals to protect their faces may be more drastic than
wearing ball caps.

17

Please see section 4.8 for further discussion on protecting relative anonymity from FRT.
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In summary, the surveillance power that FRT could impose may have material
effects on societal norms. Many aspects of privacy historically conceived are still
relevant to life in society today. Scholarship has continued to develop theories of
privacy, these are presented next.
4.2. Contemporary Conceptions of Privacy
Amitai Etzioni, former senior advisor to the Carter White House (1999), voiced a
communitarian notion of privacy. He noted, as did Daniel Solove (2011), that privacy
does not have to be traded for other values or interests. For Etzioni, privacy should be
balanced against the good of society. Etzioni stated that privacy interests should be
considered when there is a clear and documented threat to privacy, not just a hypothetical
fear. Many privacy advocates fear the government and its power of surveillance, but
Etzioni noted that privacy enhancing forms of technology, such as encrypted
communications, also allow criminals to operate with less fear of prying eyes. This
reasoning holds that the value placed on privacy in American society is inefficient for the
government and some businesses because it allows negative actions, including criminals
to operate, illegal immigrants to persist, and parents to not pay child support. One must
consider the costs and benefits privacy provides, and Etzioni contended that privacy must
not be placed on such a high pedestal; there must be compromise, especially in the
application of FRT.
FRT will have to be analyzed in such a light. At the NTIA meetings members are
concerned about the threats FRT poses to privacy. FRT poses significant challenges to
privacy. However, FRT also presents the possibility of providing more secure
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authentication methods. In the future, individuals will have to balance the potential costs
and benefits of the technology when attempting to regulate its usage.
Privacy has recently been balanced against national security in light of recent
terror attacks, beginning with the 9/11 attacks (terrorists flew planes into the World Trade
Center Towers killing thousands) and continuing with the Boston Marathon bombings
(2013) of more recent memory. The technology almost allowed the capture of Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev before the bombings took place; the technology was simply not advanced
enough at the time. Tsarnaev was spotted on several security cameras, but the images
were not of sufficient quality to allow the application of FRT.
Etzioni’s (1999) position on privacy is difficult for many who believe in
individualism. Communitarians worry about excessive individualism, a value that has
high regard in the U.S. However, Etzioni wrote his book before the NSA was tracking
citizens, before the IRS targeted specific individuals and groups, and well before the
government mandated national health coverage for all Americans all of which reveal
private and personal information to the government. Under the Affordable Care Act,
U.S. citizens are required to sign up for health coverage or be fined by the IRS. David
Lyon (1994) noted the power of the IRS writing, “In the USA the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) is the largest civilian collector of personal data” (p.91). Signing up for this
coverage includes divulging one’s name, location, income, and a host of other personal
information. Solove (2011) rejects an all or nothing privacy surveillance dichotomy and
a variety of actions, technologies, and policy changes support his view. In the process of
signing up for these services individuals must show some identification credential, such
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as a driver’s license or passport. Individuals are compelled to have their image captured
and utilized by the government and subsequently other private organizations.
Laurence Lessig (2006) challenged how people typically view their Fourth
Amendment rights in terms of privacy. Lessig wrote, “Technology enables perpetual and
cheap monitoring of behavior” (p. 200). Lessig specifically noted the privacy
implications of FRT, describing it as the least intrusive and fastest growing biometric
technology. Lessig is more concerned with the fact that on the Internet it is hard to know
what constitutes an overly burdensome search, as stated in the Fourth Amendment. It is
possible for one’s emails and computer to be viewed without one’s knowledge, which is
almost certainly a breach of privacy. However, is the search of one’s computer
burdensome if the individual is unaware the search occurred? Government institutions,
as well as private institutions, store personal data, which sometimes includes images.
Deciding whether or not a search is considered burdensome could have a profound
impact on FRT regulation.
For Helen Nissenbaum (2009) privacy should be interpreted in the context in
which it is examined. For example, if a person enters the hospital because of an ailment,
information may be collected about the patient including weight, blood pressure, preexisting conditions, and heart rate; information considered to be very personal. It may be
critical in this setting for the information to be collected, but in other circumstances
inappropriate or annoying in the case of higher insurance premiums. Nissenbaum argued
that privacy is not about restricting the flow of information but rather ensuring it flows
appropriately based on the context of the situation. Another point that Nissenbaum
makes is that there is information about individuals and information associated with
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individuals. It is entirely possible for incorrect conclusions to be reached about a person
based on information associated with his or her person. It does not take an elaborate
imagination to conclude that images of individuals could be associated with information
that may or may not be true about them.
If a right to privacy is a right to context appropriate flows [many forms of
notice are based on context], and not to secrecy or to control over
information about oneself, there is no paradox in caring deeply about
privacy and, at the same time, eagerly sharing information as long as the
sharing and withholding conform with the principled conditions prescribed
by governing contextual norms. (Nissenbaum 2009, p. 187)
It is unclear how these governing contextual norms are created or what happens when
there is unauthorized or malicious use of data. Unfortunately, there are no clear
precedents set for the unauthorized or malicious use of data, as well as no definite legal
recourse or policies outlining the considerations, legal or penal. For example, it is still
unclear if the NSA reading private citizen’s emails constitutes a search under the 4th
Amendment. These kinds of policy, legal, and penal considerations all provide context
which is central to Nissenbaum’s argument. Without these considerations, individuals
interested in protecting their privacy have a difficult time making informed decisions.
Nissenbaum’s argument for contextualizing privacy is predicated on individual
choice, which may not always be available. Not only can government institutions like the
IRS compel citizens to reveal information, private organizations can as well. Websites
like Google and Facebook are notorious for surveilling their users. Many individuals are
simply unaware their data are being used and some simply do not care. In situations like
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these the context matters very little because users do not have a choice in how their data
are used. Many websites end user license agreements (EULAs)18 are asymmetrical,
granting all the negotiating power to the organization. Despite the appealing notion of
appropriate flows of information, there are many instances in which the user has no
control over how his or her information is used. In such cases, it is left to the
organization’s self-regulatory policies, primarily the code of conduct, to contextualize the
provider/consumer relationship in the absence of government regulation or law.
Individuals are often presented with an all or nothing proposition and the costs of not
participating or utilizing a service are seen as higher than the private information they are
forced to reveal.
Daniel Solove (2011) reminded individuals that privacy is not just about keeping
information secret and that it is rarely an all or nothing decision. Solove examined the
argument many privacy advocates hear, “I have nothing to hide.” Privacy is not just
about keeping bad information secret. Surveillance and intrusion on privacy can have an
impact on free speech, free association, and other First Amendment protections that are a
cornerstone of American democracy. Furthermore, traditional refuges of protection, like
the Fourth Amendment, will not protect Google searches and personal information from
the government and corporations. Solove also argued that the aggregation of seemingly
innocent data in small amounts when compiled can create a detailed portrait of an
individual. This is the same concern Nissenbaum (2009) articulated when she
distinguished information collected about a person and information associated with a

18

Agreement entered into between the user and the software provider.

50

person. Multiple captured images of an individual could potentially reveal a great deal of
information.
Aggregating user data is easier thanks to the Assumption of Risk Doctrine, a legal
tort defense. It holds that when a person tells another person a secret they no longer have
an expectation that the secret will remain private (Solove, 2011). Pertaining to the
Internet, the doctrine does not protect the billing and shipping information provided to
businesses like Amazon under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, all the information
Amazon retains concerning past purchases and purchasing preferences is not protected
either. Images shared via Facebook could end up in the hands of a third party where the
expectation of privacy disappears as well.
Solove (2011) used the metaphor of an envelope to discuss Fourth Amendment
protections. The envelope is the material that is protected under the Fourth Amendment
from search and seizure. The information on the envelope is in plain view and therefore
there is no expectation to privacy, so it is not protected under the Fourth Amendment.
However, the information on the envelope is often just as valuable, as it says who the
letter is from and where they would like it to be delivered. On the Internet, the envelope
is the URL address. The problem is that the URL address, the address protocol for the
Internet, contains a lot of information that would otherwise be held in the content of the
envelope, e.g. http//www.google.com/what-is-the-formula-for-figuring-the-area-of-acircle? Using this innocuous example, it is not only easy to see who is sending the
message and where they are sending it, but what the content of the message is as well. In
this case Marshall McLuhan (1994) seemed to be absolutely correct that the medium is
the message (Lessig, 2006).
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Lessig (2006) and Solove (2011) alerted the reader to privacy threats on the
Internet in terms of the Fourth Amendment in their seminal works. Given the age of the
Amendment, it is clear it needs to be updated, or there needs to be a new interpretation of
it, to reflect current privacy problems. “Burdensome” searches are context dependent on
the Internet. “Reasonable expectations to privacy” also must be viewed in a different
light. If citizens are concerned about their privacy, and the NSA scandal suggests they
should be, constantly worrying about what one searches or says on the Internet has First
Amendment implications, a “chilling effect” or self-censorship similar to Foucault’s
panopticon effect. As Senator Samuel Ervin explained, “When people fear surveillance,
whether it exists or not, when they grow afraid to speak their minds and hearts freely to
their government or to anyone else, then we shall cease to be a free society” (as cited in
Neier, 1975, p. 12). From the above discussion, it becomes clear that in many instances,
American citizens may start considering privacy as a First Amendment issue.
Furthermore, Lessig and Solove appear to have been ahead of their time. Their
challenges to the Fourth Amendment, about what constitutes a burdensome search, have
been substantiated in a class action lawsuit, as stated in the introduction, filed by Senator
Rand Paul against the President, NSA, and FBI for collecting metadata about U.S.
citizens. A delayed ruling by Judge Richard Leon in the court case Klayman v. Obama,
ruled the collection of metadata likely unconstitutional. However, the ruling was delayed
so the government could file an appeal (Robertson, 2013). The outcome of Paul’s legal
action or the ruling in Klayman v. Obama could have profound implications on
surveillance and privacy depending on the wording of the decision.
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Privacy is a fundamental human right according to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Necessary and Proportionate, 2014). The declaration identifies principles
determining appropriate times for government to invade an individual’s privacy. Of
central concern are the concepts of legality, legitimate aim, necessity, adequacy,
proportionality, competent judicial authority, due process, user notification, transparency,
public oversight, integrity of communication systems, safeguards for international
cooperation, and safeguards against illegitimate access (Necessary and Proportionate,
2014).19 Legality is concerned with the legal authority that exists for a government entity
to invade one’s privacy and the legal restrictions regarding doing so. Legitimate aim
specifies that communications can only be surveilled by certain state actors to achieve a
legitimate aim. Necessity is the principle of gathering only the information that is
necessary for the government to build their case. Adequacy instructs state actors to use
an adequate surveillance level to achieve its goals. Proportionality is a check on fairness;
the government presumably possesses a far greater ability to invade citizens’ privacy than
citizens have on investigating the affairs of the government. Competent judicial
authority implies that impartial judicial authority must be obtained before surveilling
communications. Due process ensures a fair, impartial, and public hearing to the
individual on issues of any human right. User notification states that individuals should
be notified about the decision to surveil their communications with exceptions only in
exigent circumstances. Transparency is a concept that involves the government notifying
citizens about when they invade citizens privacy, the extent to which they do so, and the
tools they have available to them to do so. Public oversight ensures legitimacy and
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Please see Appendix A for a table detailing the principles further.
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transparency. Integrity of communications systems ensures that the state cannot compel
software or hardware providers to build in surveillance capacities in their products.
Safeguards for international cooperation suggest that in cases where state laws may
intersect with national laws, those with higher individual protections are used. Finally,
safeguards against illegitimate access suggest that the state legislates against illegal
public or private communication surveillance (Necessary and Proportionate, 2014).
Notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights considers privacy in terms of
interference which is the position further developed in this dissertation (see section 9.4.),
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference [emphasis added] with his [sic]
privacy…” (Hurley, 2015, p.72). These ideals are included in privacy considerations in
the international community.
4.3. Private Organizations’ Need for Privacy
Individuals are not the only party concerned when discussing privacy. Companies
must carefully guard proprietary information that they feel give them a competitive edge.
There are many examples of elaborate security measures enacted to keep company
recipes, like Coca Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), private. KFC famously kept
their fried chicken recipe in a lock box handcuffed to a security consultant as it was
moved to a newer more high-tech safe (Schreiner, 2009). This is related to companies
utilizing FRT, like Facebook. Facebook would not talk to National Public Radio about
its security measures, citing that, “social media companies rarely talk about their internal
systems” (Kaste, 2013). The paradox is that companies like Facebook go to great lengths
in order to capture their users’ personal information, but keep their own proprietary
information safeguarded. Fuchs (2011) stated “The use of targeted advertising and
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economic surveillance is legally guaranteed by Facebook’s privacy policy” (p. 149).
Browser cookies, information about pages visited on the Internet, are collected from users
by Facebook to sell to advertisers. Users have the ability to opt-out of the cookie
tracking feature, but only by viewing the lengthy privacy policy and clicking a link to a
separate webpage. A court case like Facebook Inc. v. Power Ventures Inc. illustrates the
lengths organizations will go to in order to protect their own information, Facebook sued
their third party advertiser for violating the company’s privacy policy. Companies
developing FRT carefully guard their proprietary systems. Certain FRT methods and
algorithms work better than others, thus companies developing FRT have a vested
interest in keeping these methods private. These various methods provide regulators with
additional challenges ensuring that all methods and uses of FRT are equally regulated.
James Coleman (1982) described the increasingly heavy influence that
corporations have when legal considerations are discussed. The law considers
corporations to be “natural persons,” the modern corporation, through limited liability, is
treated as an “individual.” Nonetheless, the individuals who run the corporations are
protected from being personally held responsible for the corporation’s liabilities.
Coleman described the rapid growth of corporations, as compared to natural persons, and
made the case that corporations have skewed the power wielded over natural persons in
their favor. For instance, individuals can sue Facebook over privacy violations, but
cannot hold Mark Zuckerberg personally responsible for them, nor damage him
financially for any violations. Given the valuation of fines the company pays, Facebook,
a company valued in the billions, is ostensibly paying a speeding ticket for its violations.
Most corporations have vast resources compared to the individual person. Indeed, most
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corporations are structured around CEO’s or executive boards, made up of natural
persons who are in charge of the corporation, who cannot be held liable for their actions
on behalf of the corporation. This skewing of power leads to what Coleman called, and
titled his book, The Asymmetric Society. Regulating companies in a meaningful way may
prove challenging as regulations are often predicated on legal definitions which are hazy,
at best, in the realm of privacy.
4.4. Legal Conceptions of Privacy
As it was already introduced, the first legal conception of the right to privacy was
provided by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890 for the Harvard Law Review
(Belmas and Overbeck, 2012). Through court decision in legal cases, two important
privacy concepts have emerged that most U.S. states recognize either by statute or
judicial decision. These concepts include that the media may publish newsworthy stories
on individuals without their blessing, but a person’s name or likeness may not be used for
commercial purposes, usually advertising without their express consent (Belmas &
Overbeck, 2012).
Most legal cases regarding invasion of privacy are tort actions or civil lawsuits.
Courts have identified four distinct privacy torts, including those concerning the
publication of embarrassing private facts, physical and technological intrusion, false
light, and commercialization (Terilli & Splichal, 2011). Genelle Belmas and Wayne
Overbeck (2012) noted that ten states have not recognized the “false light” tort of privacy
invasion.
There are several landmark court cases regarding privacy, but one of the most
foundational cases is Katz v. United States (1967). The ruling in this case considers a
56

“reasonable expectation to privacy” (Belmas & Overbeck, 2012). Some scholars have
found the ruling in Katz troubling as it is tautological; once a court rules there is an
expectation to privacy it is used regardless of whether it existed prior to the ruling
(Etzioni, 1999). Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) is credited with establishing a
constitutional right to privacy ruling that forbidding contraceptives violated marital
privacy. Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) ruled that contraception could be distributed to
unmarried couples, widening the scope of privacy. The ruling provided equal protection
to both married and unmarried couples and protected the privacy of unmarried couples.
Roe v. Wade (1973) granted women personal choice on abortion, an action previously
controlled by the state. The NAACP v. Alabama (1958) ruled that certain organizations
do not have to turn over their membership rolls to the state (Terilli & Splichal, 2011).
The court ruled in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, (1989) that public record information can be shielded from disclosure because it
exists in a computer database. There seems to be varied opinions on privacy that
continue to change based on the most recent rulings.
Despite many of these cases expanding the right to privacy the case that is most
central to FRT is Katz v. United States (1967). The Katz ruling states that one must have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in order for the actions to be considered private. A
reasonable expectation exists if a person actually expects privacy and if society as a
whole views that expectation as legitimate. In Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co.
(1997) the court held that it is implausible for an employee to expect privacy, while
toiling in a workplace’s open and undifferentiated work area (Hatcher, 2001).
Additionally, the court noted that employers have a right to efficiently operate their
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business. To facilitate this efficient operation employers have the right to monitor
occurrences that happen in plain view. The court also explained that since employers can
hire supervisors to monitor work, the business can also use unconcealed video cameras to
achieve the same purpose as long as they are not equipped with microphones (Hatcher,
2001). Similarly, in United States v. Vazquez (2011), the court ruled that women
videotaped entering an abortion clinic had no legitimate expectation to privacy as there
were persons consistently exercising their First Amendment rights on a regular basis, as
well as the tapings occurring in broad daylight in the open (Hatcher, 2001). Even more
controversial the C’Debaca v. Commonwealth (1999) case where a man’s conviction for
using a camera to film under a woman’s skirt was reversed, stating she had no
expectation of privacy while standing in public fairgrounds (Hatcher, 2001). Similarly in
Thompson v. Johnson Community College (1997), the court held that employees had a
legitimate expectation to privacy in individual locker areas but not in the surrounding
locker area. In short, the reasonable expectation to privacy is controversial and without
clear consensus (Hatcher, 2001).
In light of the Thompson ruling, FRT then has to reconcile with the plain view
principle. According to Mark Tunick (2009), the plain view principle is defined as
follows:
Plain view principle: (1) If information about ourselves (including the fact
that we are engaged in an activity or present in a certain location) is in
plain view or earshot of anyone engaged in legitimate means of
observation, we cannot reasonably expect privacy in that information;
(2)otherwise we can. (p. 599)
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This principle usually applies to police officers; they are allowed to seize contraband or
pertinent evidence that is found in plain sight during an investigation. The plain view
principle seems to clearly indicate that individual lives, despite any relative anonymity
they may currently enjoy, may be legally monitored in the future with the rise of Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV)20 and FRT. According to Maxine Frith (2004) the average
Briton is caught on camera an average of 300 times a day. It is true that Great Britain has
a more comprehensive CCTV system than the U.S. but there are an increasing number of
cameras in the U.S.
Early scholars of privacy were primarily concerned with invasion of personal
privacy by individuals. In addition to individuals intruding on personal privacy, now one
must be concerned with surveillance by both the government and corporations. In the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the erosion of privacy rights is now primarily
occurring in the name of security. Increased government surveillance is usually couched
in the need to keep citizens safe. Corporations also have a vested interest in surveilling
those who have been identified as shoplifters. Other intentions of corporate surveillance
include using the information to provide customers with more effective advertisements.
4.5. Information Privacy
There have been many ways that privacy has been conceived. One of the most
useful categorizations of privacy has been proffered by Smith, Dinev, & Xu. (2011),
making the distinction between informational and physical categorizations of privacy.

“Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a system where the circuit in which the video is transmitted is
closed and all the elements (camera, display monitors, recording devices) are directly connected. This is
unlike broadcast television where any receiver that is correctly tuned can pick up and display or store the
signal. Such specialized systems are not subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC)” (Brickhouse Security, 2015, par. 1)
20
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Historically, privacy was largely thought of in terms of the physical, “access to an
individual and/or the individual’s surroundings and private space” (Smith et al., 2011, p.
990). With the ever increasing amount of data being collected about individuals,
information privacy became a specific conception of privacy subsumed under the general
thought of privacy. Information privacy is concerned with information that can identify a
person, also known as personally identifiable information (PII).
Yet information privacy is much broader than information that directly identifies
someone. During the NTIA FRT meetings, Alessandro Acquisti, professor at Carnegie
Mellon University, showed his latest unpublished proof of concept experiment. During
the experiment he had students on campus to ask if they would like to have their picture
taken and fill out a three page privacy survey. Using the captured image, Acquisti was
able to use FRT to find the student’s Facebook profile, predict the first five numbers of
their social security number, and even find their Match.com dating profile, where
pseudonyms are typically used (Acquisti, 2014). Acquisti’s experiment utilizes face
information, which is tied to an identity that is unknown, and uses the face information to
identify the individual. Other information, such as spending habits, routines, places of
work, may also be combined to invade personal privacy and potentially result in a
positive identification.
With an increased importance placed on informational privacy, and the rise of ecommerce, privacy has also been conceptualized as a commodity. Zizi Papacharissi
(2010) contended that people tend to trade privacy for access to services such as online
social networks.
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Slowly, privacy defined as the right to be left alone attains the
characteristics of a luxury commodity, in that a) it becomes a good
inaccessible to most b) it is disproportionately costly to the average
individual’s ability to acquire and retain it, and c) it becomes associated
with social benefits inversely, in that the social cost of not forsaking parts
of one’s privacy in exchange for information good and services (e–mail
account free–of–charge, online social networking) places one at a social
disadvantage. (Papacharissi, 2010, par. 6)
From a business standpoint, consumers are constantly offered benefits, coupons, reward
cards, and discounts in exchange for personal information. There are also perceived
benefits to having more “friends” on social networks as users trade their information and
privacy to the networks.
Perhaps the most troubling conception of privacy, and one currently coming to
fruition, is a cognate based conception of privacy (Smith et al., 2011, p. 993). In a world
where privacy seems to be under constant attack, the mind may be considered the last
tomb for complete privacy; after all, credible telepathic individuals are hard to come by.
Facial expressions, whether knowingly displayed or not, can be captured by FRT and
reveal some likely thoughts. If the technology is applied to a video sequence, it can even
capture “micro-expressions” which deception experts are only able to spot with limited
accuracy in real time (Meyer, 2010). Infrared FRT can also measure the temperature of
one’s face, which may signal an increased level of interest or even deception. In fact,
high-definition thermal imaging is being developed to quickly and accurately identify
deception. One study showed deceptive individuals were correctly identified 75% of the
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time and those being truthful were correctly categorized 90% of the time (Pavlidis,
Eberhardt, & Levine, 2002). This technique was shown to be comparable to polygraph
tests, but do not require skilled operators and can be conducted with greater speed. While
current uses may primarily be concerned with deception, future uses may reveal other
aspects of human cognition.
A popular component of information privacy is privacy conceptualized as control
over one’s information. Control is a popular way of conceptualizing information privacy
because it allows privacy to be “operationalized”. For instance, regulators can create
rules for control such as who is authorized to review information, under what
circumstances they are allowed to review information and how sensitive data should be
protected. The Edward Snowden revelations have made clear that security agencies are
able to learn eclectic bits of information about individuals without their consent,
eliminating their ability to control the information. Data breaches at prominent retailers
like Target and Home Depot also illustrate why “control” is not a sufficient way to
conceptualize privacy.
Conversely, suppose an individual could have total control over his or her
information, there is still no guarantee of privacy. The government mandates that one
wear clothing while out in public, ensuring some physical privacy. However, there are
plenty of people on the Internet who choose to share operations of themselves, record and
display child birth, pose nude for art, or engage in pornography for money. Securing
control through established rules does not guarantee privacy (Allen, 1999, p. 867).
Despite data breaches and individuals who voluntarily relinquish their privacy,
the conceptualization of privacy as control still does not satisfy. Even when assuming
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individuals are privacy protective and adequate security to prevent data breaches exists,
there are a host of activities in which individuals are compelled to reveal private
information. A good example is the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA requires all
U.S. citizens to have health insurance, a noble goal. However, because of this individuals
are now mandated to reveal personal information in the form of medical history including
mental health issues, sexually transmitted diseases, and prior medical procedures or face
financial penalty. Beyond this, for an individual to qualify for federal subsidies, they
must reveal financial data just as they would when they pay taxes. The government has a
power to compel private information from the individual, as well as to compel the
individual to remain private by mandating clothes be worn in public, dictating what is
and is not private in search and seizures, and enacting non-disclosure agreements. The
ability to compel private information from an individual is sometimes necessitated for
public safety, but as Solove (2011) so eloquently explained that reason is used far too
often.
4.6. What Privacy Is Not
Privacy is often conflated with other terms such as anonymity, secrecy, and
confidentiality (Smith et al., 2011, p. 995). These terms are related to privacy in that they
often help us be “left alone.” While these terms are related to privacy they are distinct
from privacy.
Anonymity is often conflated with privacy but is a distinct idea. As Weicher
(2006) notes, “Anonymity allows the individual to have a voice without having a name”
(p.1). Smith et al. (2011) note, “Anonymity is the ability to conceal a person’s
identity…” (p. 996). Additionally, one can be completely anonymous or pseudonymous.
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Anonymity or pseudonymity exist when a person limits the ways that he or she can be
identified; this may help individuals exercise control over their privacy (Smith et al.,
2011, p. 996). Anonymity, according to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation standard,21 is a requirement to ensure privacy along with
pseudonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability (Yanes, 2014, p.1). Anonymity is
strictly concerned with a person’s identity; but the ability to control one’s identity is
necessary to control one’s privacy.
Secrecy is also confused with privacy at times. Secrecy involves concealing
information that is likely viewed negatively by the excluded audience (Smith et al., 2011,
p. 996). The revelation of secrets can cause a change in the interpretation of an identity
by others; secrecy affords opportunities to control how others view an individual.
“[P]rivacy, by contrast, protects behavior which is either morally neutral or valued by
society” (Smith et al., 2011, p. 996).
Finally, confidentiality is also mistakenly thought of as privacy, however, privacy
implies that the individual holds sole discretion on when to release personal information.
Confidentiality involves the release of private information, shared with a third party,
under controlled circumstances (Smith et al., 2011, p. 996). Therapists and insurance
providers often specify what the terms are for the release of confidential information, or
what was once private information, before being shared with a third party. Individuals
entrusting biometric and other sensitive data to third parties may want to check on the
security of data storage before releasing it. Data breaches wreck the controlled release of
information that confidentiality specifies. Security ensures that data is not manipulated
21

Common Criteria is an organization that certifies information technology products for security,
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness (Common Criteria, 2015).
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or that other parties can use an individual’s data for authentication purposes (Smith et al.,
2011, p. 996).
4.7. Discussion on Privacy
Privacy lacks a coherent and accepted definition and has been conceptualized in
many different ways, all with certain merits. Privacy suffers from numerous conceptions
because of the complex relationships between an individual and other entities as well as
varied ideological perspectives exacerbated by varied technologies and their ability to
monitor, record, and manipulate data. The established social and legal norms allow for a
variety of personal privacy preferences to be accommodated. Any discussion of privacy
is predicated on how it is initially conceived and valued. For these reasons, individuals
may want to think of privacy not as a subjective value with varying levels, or the
differences between physical or informational privacy but instead focus on interference.
No matter the conception of privacy, individuals, for the most part, know when they are
interfered with and are free to decide how they would like to handle the interference. By
thinking about interference, there exists a concept that allows for the varied conceptions
of privacy and the subjective reactions of individuals being interfered with.
Interference sounds similar to the legal concept of invasion of privacy. There are
certain parallels to the concepts. The basic difference is that invasion of privacy is a legal
tort. There are legal guidelines that define when an individual’s privacy has been
invaded. Depending on the individual, there are exceptions for public figures and
celebrities, and the nature of the interference because legal remedies can be pursued.
Interference, however, is a broader concept because a host of privacy annoyances occur
during daily life that are not illegal. Invasion of privacy only deals with illegal acts,
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while interference acknowledges a perceived threat to privacy and allows the law/people
to deal with it at the individual level. The concept again allows for subjective valuations,
or perceived threats to privacy.
Since there are varied conceptions of privacy and because privacy is dependent
upon the individual’s need or use of it, focusing on privacy in terms of interference can
unite the many conceptions of privacy and also allow for its subjective nature. If one
speaks of physical privacy, or the intrusion upon one’s person or private space such as a
bedroom, the individual is allowed to determine what level of interference they are
willing to tolerate.
If one conceives of privacy as a natural human right, interference still works as a
concept. If we concede that there are natural rights, those rights have to be defended and
fought for. Decisions that intrude upon an individual’s privacy, whether a natural right or
one outlined legally, are still subject to interference. Tribes of people without formal
laws may still have privacy expectations subject to interference. Similarly, in the U.S.
there are a number of troubling cases where the court found there was no “expectation of
privacy”, most notably including the taking of pictures in locker rooms, as in the case of
Thompson v. Johnson Community College.
When we view privacy as a commodity that can be exchanged for benefits,
interference is present as well. Online, users are subject to a variety of advertisements,
tracking cookies, and other forms of privacy intruding tools. Some users may be willing
to let the interference convince them that trading some privacy for a benefit is fine, while
others will view the interference as too intrusive and decline the offer or avoid online
commerce altogether. The same goes for brick and mortar retail stores. For example,
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Home Depot may solicit shoppers with a rewards card in exchange for a user’s private
information; some users will undoubtedly perceive the benefits of the rewards card as an
advantageous exchange. Privacy centric individuals may be so adverse to interference
that they only pay with cash, surrendering very little if any of their privacy. Both
individuals, those who value privacy and those who have less value for privacy, may be
caught on a security camera which will reveal any of a number of details about the
individuals.
No matter how we conceive privacy there will always be interference or unwanted
intrusions on our privacy. Thinking of interference allows all conceptions of privacy to
be discussed in terms of a common idea. Furthermore, privacy seen in terms of
interference allows for the subjective nature of privacy as well. All persons will be
subject to interference in regards to their privacy, but how they act after that interference
will vary.
4.8. Modes of Resistance to Facial Recognition Technology
An individual’s face is an inherently public part of one’s identity. Face is how we
recognize, remember, judge, and make a host of other evaluations about individuals. To
a certain extent, humans enjoy the recognition that their faces provide; it is how we are
immediately comfortable engaging with friends and family, how we remember business
associates, and how we recall individuals as helpful and friendly or harmful and rude.
Society also has the expectation that we will keep our faces public. After all, it would be
suspicious, unacceptable, and unlawful, to conduct one’s banking business while wearing
a ski mask. Since citizens have few options but to keep their face public, this section
describes a way citizens can protect their face or resist FRT.
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There are companies like Justicecaps.com that have conjured up interesting ways
for privacy centric individuals to protect their privacy. Their product is a baseball cap
with built-in infrared lights on the brim. Humans cannot see infrared light so most
individuals perceive the cap as a normal baseball hat. However, infrared light effectively
“blinds” cameras, distorting the individual’s face to the point of opaqueness to the
camera. One limitation to the product, however, is it only works at night (Charlie, 2014).
Currently facial hair, hats, and eye glasses can confuse the technology but these obstacles
appear to be surmountable as FRT continues to develop.
4.9. Communication Technology Regulation Studies
Communication technology regulation can be tracked all the way back to the
telegraph and we find attempts at regulation of communication technologies today,
specifically FRT. The first piece of legislation concerning the telegraph was passed in
1845, and it imposed a fine on those who might damage the telegraph poles and wires
along public roads (Nonnenmacher, 2001, p. 21). In a sense, this regulation had the
effect of promoting and protecting the growth of the new technology. As with most
technologies, there are several ways to implement regulation, in this case rival patents
were issued, most likely to protect the competitive advantages of rival companies.
As the telegraph continued to spread across the country, new legislation was
required by smaller companies. Smaller companies demanded that their messages be
transmitted in a “timely fashion” on larger company lines. This in turn revealed
information about the messages and senders so that disclosure protections were required
as well (Nonnenmacher, 2001, p. 22).
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The next major communication technological breakthrough was the telephone.
This was the first communication network that was designed to be accessed by the entire
population (John, 2008, p. 507). The two dominant providers of early telephone services
were Western Union (nationwide) and American Bell (regional). Western Union
remained mostly unregulated until the New Deal thanks to political lobbying and
consumer demands being substantially met, so there was minimal outcry from the public
concerning regulation (John, 2008, p. 509). Inventors still enjoyed patent protections for
their inventions making it harder for outsiders to enter the market. The patents
commanded large sums of money and could be sold. Local municipalities began
ownership of some telephone networks to prevent fraud and promote innovation.
While the U.S. was figuring out how best to regulate its own communication
industries, the international community gathered for a similar purpose. The International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) was created in 1934. The formation of the ITU led to
international regulation consistency, such as the International Frequency List for
broadcasting. A central consideration of the ITU was the large number of developing
countries involved. Developing countries outnumbered developed countries and started
to gain traction for assistance by the ITU with technical expertise and funding (Codding,
1994, p. 505). The ITU ensures that telecommunications around the world follow a
standardized format and have partnered with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
ensure compliance and fairness with laws and regulations. As the oldest international
organization, the ITU is an important historical and current regulator, one that has a
majority of developing countries as members. As technology progressed so did
regulation.
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The next major communication technology development was the radio. The radio
has a limited band of frequencies that can be used for transmission. As such this is a
scarce resource that could either enjoy private property rights or regulation by the
government. The following information comes from R.H. Coase’s (1959) The Federal
Communications Commission. In 1910, the Navy sent a letter to the Senate describing
the relative chaos of radio frequencies in the air. Despite bickering in the house and
senate licenses were issued by the Secretary of Commerce for radio use outlining certain
legal obligations such as wave length. Several other proposals included giving radio
authority to the Post Office and the Navy. By the early 1920’s broadcast stations began
to proliferate. After Secretary of Commerce Hoover refused to accept a license renewal
because it interfered with other stations, Intercity Radio Company filed suit. After more
suits were filed by various broadcasting companies, the Federal Radio Commission was
established and the ‘ether’ (of air) was deemed property of the people of the United
States. This required that offensive content could not be broadcast and that advertisers
must be announced by name. The commission, however, did not have the authority to
regulate government radio stations. In 1934 the commission’s powers were transferred to
the Federal Communications Commission which was also responsible for telegraph and
telephone businesses (Coase, 1959, p. 7).
A more contemporary example of communication technology regulation is the
Internet. The Internet Domain Name System (DNS) is governed by the International
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). There are other
communicative bodies, such as the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). These
international groups are representative of the connected world. Globalization among
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international bodies has forced national governments to regulate these matters. ICANN
does not “run” the Internet, but rather provides technical expertise (Fuller, 2001, par. 11).
While ICANN is not intended to run the Internet, it is “dedicated... to coordinate policy
through private-sector, bottom-up, consensus-based means” (Fuller, 2001, par. 12).
Bottom up regulation created through consensus is a stark departure from the old
top down legislative means previously employed by the government. This departure is
likely due to the global nature of communicative technologies, the complexity of the
technologies, and the rapid pace at which these technologies are innovated. Instead of
legislation, governments have been content to allow multistakeholder processes to
convene in certain circumstances, often where great technical expertise is needed.
Technologies, such as FRT, require such expertise and corporations involved in utilizing
the technology are often international in nature.
4.9.1. Theories of Regulation
Regulation is generally thought of in terms of restricting or preventing some
action. Regulation can also allow certain behaviors or action to begin but in a more
structured way. There are different views of regulation some more narrow and others
broader in context. Regulation can be seen as focused control or a set of specific
commands that must be obeyed. Regulation has also been viewed as state influence on
social or organizational behavior. Finally, regulation can be seen as any form of social or
economic influence (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 3).
The seminal question to ask regarding regulation is: “Is regulation needed?”
There may be a variety of situations in which regulation is needed or desired. One reason
to regulate may be lack of information available to the consumer. Situations arise when
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there is very little reward for providing consumers with information, and, Internet based
businesses are notorious for having hard to find, jargon filled, and non-negotiable privacy
policies and end user license agreements. In fact, unequal bargaining power is another
reason regulation may be needed (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 20).22
Another situation that may call for regulation is when services or opportunities to
individuals are offered without consistency. Perhaps the most famous regulatory example
to encourage fairness and consistency of opportunities would be Affirmative Action
policies. Concerns have arisen that FRT could be used in a manner called facial profiling
to offer certain opportunities to one race or gender in a discriminatory fashion.
Regulation need not always be viewed as hampering an activity, but permitting
activities as well. For example, the need for regulation can be seen as good for the public
in instances of security. FRT has been deployed at airports to enhance security and allow
for accurate identification, subsequently allowing passengers to more conveniently
navigate airport security. Regulation is often created because it is in the public’s best
interest.
Regulation occurs due to market failures, specifically concerning examples
previously mentioned. However, regulation can also fail and create odd externalities in
the market. Affirmative Action policies were created to enforce fair hiring practices for
minorities. Currently, there are some in the minority community who feel that the laws
hold back minorities, while others view them as a crutch that leads to stigmatization

22

FRT was famously deployed at the 2001 Super Bowl without notice to the fans in attendance
(McCullagh, 2001). Concerns have been expressed that deployment of FRT without notice or consent may
be problematic.
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(Navarette, 2014). Choosing when regulation is needed is a consideration that requires
careful evaluation.
As shown, regulation should be chosen when there are market failures, but
regulation can also have negative effects as well. Creating regulation that produces
maximum benefit and minimal problems is the optimal goal. Then again, what
constitutes “good” regulation? Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (2012) have created the
following five questions to determine if regulation is worthy of support. Is the action or
regime supported by legislative authority? Is there an appropriate scheme of
accountability? Are procedures fair, accessible, and open? Is the regulator acting with
sufficient expertise? Is the action or regime efficient? (p. 27). Regulation authorized by
the government is often seen as legitimate. However, regulation can be broadly worded
with a good deal of latitude in how the regulation is actually implemented. This results in
a need for an accountable group implementing the regulation. Regulation needs to treat
individuals fairly and allow for their participation. Expertise is often a central part of
creating regulation. Often technologies are complicated, and the various ways they
impact the market need to be considered. Finally, a lack of bureaucracy and red tape
leading to increased efficiency is desirable.
At this point regulatory regime needs to be defined as it is a central theme to this
dissertation. David Levi-Faur (2011) writes that regulatory regimes encompass the actors
making decisions as well as the norms and mechanisms used to make regulatory
decisions. Levi-Faur (2011) also notes “an increasingly popular concept in the study of
regulation and regulatory reform, which probably attests to the emergence and
consolidation of systemic rulemaking to govern different issues, arenas, and sectors” (p.
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20). Regulatory regimes are the norms and rules for making decisions as various
interests converge around a specific issue or group of issues.
How does regulation arise? There are many reasons and models for the
development of regulation, but one explanation most closely follows the MSH meetings
on FRT. The ‘Power of Ideas’ explanation closely resembles the MSH meeting format.
This explanation places primary importance on conversation and deliberation (Baldwin,
Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 49). “This ‘argumentative turn’ follows Habermas and points to
the importance of interpretative communities that are supposed to deliberate and come to
a shared understanding regarding the regulatory issues and processes” (Baldwin, et al.,
2012, p. 51). During conversations and deliberation knowledge is gained by the
participants and the learning that takes place is a tangible outcome of the process.
There are various strategies that regulators can pursue in order to ensure that the
regulation is enforced. Some strategies are punitive, incentive based, market based, or
pursued by other means. The enforcement of the voluntary code of conduct will be done
under the Section 5 authority of the FTC to enforce against unfair or deceptive practices.
This most closely resembles the command and control strategy where standards are
enforced by threat of criminal sanctions, something the FTC can pursue. Command and
Control strategies are seen as forceful by the public because they are backed by the power
of the state. This, in turn, provides additional confidence to the public that the regulation
will be enforced aggressively (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 107). Unfortunately, not all
members of the public will be able to agree that the regulation is in their best interest.
Additionally, “Command methods may also lack force when court sanctioning is weak
and the rules, as a result, fail to pose a credible deterrent” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 110).
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4.9.2. Soft Versus Hard Regulation
The result of the MSH process is a voluntary code of conduct that organizations can
agree to abide by and will be enforced by the FTC.

This code of conduct can be seen as

a form of ‘soft’ regulation. Keith Sisson and Paul Marginson (2001) noted that codes of
conduct can be viewed as soft regulation but there is little agreement on what defines soft
regulation or what ‘hard’ regulation is, for that matter. Sisson and Marginson (2001, p.
4) provide useful comparisons between soft and hard regulation. They note that soft
regulation is concerned with general principles where as hard regulation deals with
obligations. Additionally, soft regulation deals with obligations it tends to prescribe
limited provisions, whereas hard regulation sets standard provisions. Finally, soft
regulation may continue to be negotiated when hard regulation is seen as finished. As
stated previously, many of the companies involved with FRT are international in nature.
Soft regulation, because it is often less rigid than hard regulation, is seen by the
participants as a productive way to standardize the technology. Additionally, hard
regulation has a one size fits all nature that may not apply to the various uses of FRT,
such as validation, identification, and demographic uses.
4.9.3. Regulation of Technology
Technology and regulation are often represented as antithetical (Wiener, 2004).
Regulation can be seen as unnecessary bureaucratic requirements that slow the
development of technology and stifle innovation. In fact, this view is witnessed in the
multistakeholder meetings facilitated by the NTIA. The goal of the meetings is to
develop a voluntary code of conduct as a mode of self-regulation instead of allowing the
development of governmental regulation of FRT.
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A growing body of academic literature has been exploring the false dichotomy
that exists between technology and regulation. Jonathan Wiener (2004) explored
concepts of technology and regulation noting that technology symbolizes progress and
capitalism while regulation symbolizes bureaucracy and growth prohibition.
Nevertheless, the regulation of technology does not have to be seen as inhibiting
development or innovation. Some forms of regulation can actually promote the growth
and innovation of technology. For instance, it has been proposed, but not yet regulated,
that FRT be more effective at lower pixel rates thus increasing the accuracy of the
technology.
In attempting to explain what justifies the developing regulatory regimes for new
technologies some authors point to the fact that those technologies are so ubiquitous and
essential that using the technology becomes compulsory. Jennifer Chandler (2012) wrote
that competition between individuals and organizations drives the adoption and
enhancement of technology. These individuals or organizations become dependent on
the technology because the costs of discontinuation are too high. The multitude of users
establishes a need for a system of rules which prevents or punishes users through
negative social consequences, while also rewarding them which leads to positive social
benefits (Chandler, 2012). According to Jennifer Chandler (2007), courts also play a role
in regulating technology through the establishment of property rights or rights to
damages, which shape the regulatory landscape. Individuals, through tort claims, can
bring legal action against those who invade property rights. Technologies can be
impacted by the courts when they award damages in cases.
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Leo Marx (1994) found that technology is easier to view in a positive light
because the consequences of new technologies often escape us. Marx (1994) wrote of the
public pessimism surrounding technology only after disasters such as Chernobyl, the
Vietnam War, and various oil spills. Some individuals already hold this pessimistic
position on FRT because of its invasive nature. Balancing the concerns of those who are
pessimistic about FRT with those who are excited about its potential will be necessary to
ensure responsible regulation that allows for innovation while protecting citizens.
4.10. Discussion on the Application of Regulation Theories
Chandler (2012) discussed ubiquitous and obligatory technologies, and FRT has
the potential to become one. Online identity theft has become an issue of international
importance in the last decade, and FRT, as well as other biometric identifiers for
authentication, are offered as a possible way to slow the rate of, or prevent altogether,
identity theft. If this is the case, then future societies will depend on FRT to authenticate
bank transactions, rather than rely on simple pin numbers. Pin numbers will be seen as a
weak form of authentication and a dangerous way of performing critical transactions.
Consequently, how the enormous amount of FRT data is going to be gathered, stored, and
used, specifically by whom, becomes an issue of great social importance. The public
debate, as contained by the multistakeholder (MSH) meetings convened by the NTIA, is
directed toward developing the foundations of a regulatory regime for FRT, and this
debate will contribute to the case study for the current research.
As photos become stored for authentication and security purposes issues of
property rights are likely to arise. A recent example of these disputes is the so called
“Cute Convict.” According to Gabe Gutierrez and Scott Stump (2014), Megan Simmons,
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who was arrested for DUI, is suing InstantCheckmate.com over the public use of her mug
shot without her permission. The ruling will have legal implications over the use of
photos and may have implications for FRT over the scanning of public photos. For
instance, if the court agrees with Ms. Simmons, ruling that she has a property right to her
photo, then other organizations may have to change their practices as a result.
Conversely, they may rule that the photo was public and the company had a right to use
it, which could make other companies more aggressive in searching the Internet for
photos.
4.11. Multistakeholder Collaborative Process
Before presenting the multistakeholder format a brief history of organizational
studies is necessary to provide context to the process. One of the first writings on
organizational studies comes from Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations where he
described the division of labor (Hatch, 2006, p. 27). Following this work is Karl Marx
who wrote of labor and capital. Capital theorists began with theories of labor only later
to focus on management. For example, Ėmile Durkheim was concerned about the
specialization of labor while Max Weber focused on the origins of managerial authority
(Hatch, 2006, p. 30).
Scientific management was born from the work of Frederick Taylor. Taylor
studied the most efficient way to accomplish a task. Taylor’s scientific approach to labor
worked to achieve maximum profit for organizations (as cited in Hatch, 2006, p. 32).
Moving beyond such singular pursuits theorists started writing about systems theories
and challenging the single best way to organize labor. For example, in Total Quality
Management (TQM) the worker was seen as the person most knowledgeable on how to
78

improve an operation or an aspect of the operation. This singular input could have
positive material consequences for a business’s output, “Quality is not improved by afterthe-fact inspection but by control over the production process as it happens” (Sashkin,
1993, p. 11). Soon organizations and the tasks they are charged with were recognized for
their increasingly complex demands and organization. In turn, complex demands and the
interaction of multiple interested entities led to the rise and increased popularity of the
MSH format for solving such issues (Hintz & Milan, 2014).
The NTIA has been tasked with regulating a complex and nascent technology in
FRT. In many ways the MSH model is the practice of participatory democracy, “Their
power [practice of participatory democracy] derives from respect for their processes the
openness, the flexibility, and the ability for all voices that can credibly articulate their
positions to be heard and the quality of their outputs, which are intended to represent
broad stakeholder consensus” (Waz and Weizer 2012, p. 336). Similarly, David Held
(2006) described deliberative democracy as those who, “Champion…informed debate,
[and] the public use of reason” (Held, 2006, p. 232). The NTIA meetings have involved
informed debate and reasoning to pursue participant goals. Held (2006) continued,
The major contention of deliberative democrats is to bid farewell to any
notion of fixed preferences and to replace them with a learning process in
and through which people come to terms with the range of issues they
need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political
judgment. (p. 233)
The voluntary codes of conduct created at the NTIA are, in part, the result of a firm’s
general resistance to “excessive government laws and regulations,” (Kolk, Tulder, &
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Welters, 1999, p. 152). These voluntary codes are a “soft” form of regulation rather than
the top down command and control style regulation that could be enacted by Congress or
other governing bodies. Soft regulation has been employed to achieve a balance between
consumer protection and the need to innovate the technology.
The multistakeholder process is the format the White House (2012) has required
the NTIA meetings to follow. This format allows for non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), which possess a better understanding of the complex technology to meet and
garner greater legitimacy concerning the chosen policy (Antonova, 2011). Furthermore,
“[T]he open and inclusive stakeholder process leads to accumulation of intellectual
capital, development of relational infrastructure. ” (Antonova, 2011, p. 426). This also
leads to shared consciousness among stakeholders.
The MSH process is a collaborative one. Collaboration “is a process through
which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their
differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is
possible” (Gray, 1989, p. 5). The goal of collaborating is to gather stakeholders together
in order to gain a more complete and detailed understanding of the problem.
Stakeholders bring unique knowledge, experience, and views to the process which adds
to the formulation of the problem, as well as the solution.
When diverse stakeholders decide on the problem and how it is going to be
solved, there will most likely be conflict. Collaboration can help resolve conflict:
“Collaboration transforms adversarial interaction into a mutual search for information
and for solutions that allow all those participating to insure that their interests are
represented” (Gray, 1989, p. 7). Conflict does more than just ensure that stakeholders’
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interests are represented; in fact, conflict often leads to unforeseen opportunities:
“differences are often the source of immense creative potential. Learning to harness that
potential is what collaboration is all about” (Gray, 1989, p. 11). Oftentimes, parties are
only willing to collaborate if they can envision a positive outcome as the result. Remove
the possibility of a positive outcome and parties may decide to withdraw or to do their
best to disrupt the process.
Barbara Gray (1989), who is a prominent author on the theory of collaboration,
defined the criteria for problems that are best solved by collaboration:


The problems are ill defined, or there is disagreement about how they should
be defined.



Several stakeholders have a vested interest in the problems and are
interdependent.



These stakeholders are not necessarily identified a priori or organized in any
systematic way.



There may be a disparity of power and/or resources for dealing with the
problems among the stakeholders.



Stakeholders may have different levels of expertise and different access to
information about the problems.



The problems are often characterized by technical complexity and scientific
uncertainty.



Differing perspectives on the problems often lead to adversarial relationships
among the stakeholders.
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Incremental or unilateral efforts to deal with the problems typically produce
less than satisfactory solutions.



Existing processes for addressing the problems have proved insufficient and
may even exacerbate them (p. 10)

The problems identified on Gray’s list are consistent with the problems surrounding the
regulation of FRT. The technology is nascent, and there is often disagreement
concerning the technology’s capabilities and limitations. Also, many vendors,
technologists, academics, and advocates have a vested interest in the technology.
Gray (1989) noted that collaboration usually proceeds in three phases. The first
phase is “problem setting.” This phase is marked by identifying a common
understanding of the problem, a willingness to collaborate, identification of legitimate
stakeholders, the role of the convener, and identification of resources (Gray, 1989, p. 57).
The second phase is “direction setting.” In direction setting, rules for stakeholders are
set, an agenda is created, subgroups may be created, information is found, options are
explored, and an agreement is reached (Gray, 1989, p. 57). The third phase is
“implementation.” This phase is marked by dealing with constituencies, building
external support, and ensuring compliance of the agreement (Gray, 1989, p. 57). Each
phase faces specific challenges that have to be met and collaboration can increase the
success rate with which those challenges are met.
Collaboration is one of the central focuses of the MSH process, but how do
rulemaking standards measure up to other processes? Would the rules have higher
standards if they were developed under a different process? The stated outcome of the
NTIA for this process is to create voluntary codes of conduct (rules) for commercial uses
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of FRT. Fransen & Kolk (2007), suggested that the rules created at multi-stakeholder
processes are more demanding (rigorous and elaborate) than those drawn up by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and those of business associations (p.3). This
indicates that even though the codes of conduct, created by the NTIA, are voluntary, they
still have a good chance of setting high standards for consumer privacy.
Even though the expectations may be high, research also suggests cautious
optimism as voluntary codes are sometimes adopted by only a few organizations (Kolk,
et al., 1999, p.144). In fact, the last NTIA directed multi-stakeholder process, for mobile
app transparency (2012), resulted in very limited adoption. Complicating matters,
“Specificity and compliance mechanisms are seen as the crucial elements which
determine the likelihood of compliance” (Kolk, et al., 1999, p. 147). This suggests that if
codes are too strict or prescriptive in nature they may not be adopted by companies.
One must also be mindful of stakeholder motivations for creating a code of
conduct. Ostensibly, this process has the goal of protecting consumer privacy. Kolk et
al., (1999) noted that firms involved in the process may have ulterior motives, such as
influencing regulators or customers (p. 151). The content of the voluntary codes of
conduct determine whether companies will adopt them, how companies are regulated,
whether consumers believe they are legitimate, and the level of consumer privacy
protection they provide. Businesses typically try to avoid regulation; codes of conduct
may be created to prevent mandatory regulation (Kolk et al., 1999, p. 152). Codes that
are specific in nature allow them to be more easily measured. This clarity also
encourages compliance by businesses.
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4.11.1. Multistakeholder Processes and Shared Power
Bringing together diverse stakeholders who have a willingness to collaborate on
issues has many benefits as explained above. One should not assume that all
stakeholders possess the same amount of power to influence the process. Nigel Roome
and Frank Wijen (2006) contended “that influence is the equivalent of power, as power
that is not exercised is insignificant, and influence is a materialization of power” (p. 3).
Ian Mitroff (1983) described stakeholder properties, such as resources, special knowledge
or skills, relationships with other stakeholders, and the purpose or beliefs that the
stakeholder has, as impactful on the stakeholder’s power in the process (p. 36). With
regard to the MSH process on FRT, specialized knowledge and skill are critical factors
when considering stakeholder influence. As stated earlier, this technology is in its early
stages of development and its capabilities are still uncertain, making regulating the
technology challenging.
Each stakeholder exercises a certain amount of power in a limited capacity.
Given the nature of MSH processes, a consensus must eventually be reached or the
process will fall apart. For productive outcomes to be achieved stakeholders will have to
collaborate and negotiate until there is agreement. If stakeholders are unwilling to reach
consensus they may do their best to undermine the process, since they are still legitimate
stakeholders until they choose to no longer participate. Depending on the stakeholder
and their source(s) of power, not participating can impact the process in significant ways.
The MSH process is open, inviting diverse groups with diverse ideas that lead to
stimulating conversations; however, that can also make the process lengthy. The more a
stakeholder participates and speaks up during the process the more they can potentially
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impact it. Even though all stakeholders have been encouraged to participate by the
moderator, there are different forms of participation, including nonparticipation.
Nonparticipation may invite suspicion from other participants. Another way that
stakeholders exercise influence is by the “power of the pen.” Stakeholders have been
asked to join groups whose issues are most meaningful to them; they are then asked to
produce draft language about the issue to be discussed with the entire group of
stakeholders. Most of what is decided by the large group is dependent upon the smaller
group’s draft language.
4.11.2. MultiStakeholder Outcomes
Some outcomes of the MSH process, such as codes of conduct, are tangible and
easy to recognize. Other outcomes from the process are intangible and hard to estimate
and appreciate, including the knowledge acquired by stakeholders through the learning
process (Antonova, 2011). Tangible and intangible outcomes are important to both the
process and stakeholders as they move to other MSH meetings or revisit the original.
4.11.3. Learning
The learning that takes place at the forum is a facilitative part of the process and
also an outcome of the MSH process. The learning process is affected by several factors,
including “organizational antecedents, market positioning, technology, access to
stakeholder networks, sensitivity to multiple perspectives, and ability to facilitate inputs
from different internal and external stakeholders” (Roome & Wijen, 2006, p.6). The
material presented is most likely influenced by the views and beliefs held by the
stakeholder.
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James March (1991) described two forms of organizational learning: exploration
and exploitive. Exploration learning seeks to find new information which may include
experimentation. Exploration is also described as “double loop” (Roome & Wijen, 2006,
p. 7). Double loop learning “…provid[es] feedback and more effective decision making”
(Argyris, 1976, p. 363). Exploitive learning, on the other hand, seeks to take advantage
of known information and may include increasing efficiency or enhancing execution of
something (March, 1991, p. 71). Unlike exploration, exploitive learning is described as a
“single loop” or an action created as a result of a known theory (Argyris, 1976, p. 363).
Due to the emerging nature of FRT, most of the learning taking place at the forum
is exploration. The stakeholders are discovering ways to protect consumers while also
providing business entities the ability to continue innovating. This type of learning also
provides the flexibility that regulators need to balance consumer privacy with business
interests.
Learning occurs in three stages acquisition, sharing, and storage (Roome &
Wijen, 2006, p.8). In the explored FRT process, but especially at the beginning, various
technical experts were brought in so stakeholders could be exposed to different sources of
expertise and create shared meaning for later discussions. This acquisition was marked
by experts reporting on various experiments to demonstrate the technology’s capabilities,
accuracy, and uses.
Sharing information has been an ongoing process, and without a clear delineation
at the forum. Stakeholders share information to solve larger problems (Roome & Wijen,
2006, p.8). As the process continues, stakeholders have been counted on for their various
expertise; for example, lawyers have been drawn upon for legal advice, biometrics
86

experts have been consulted, and regulators have been brought in to discuss the scope of
the code of conduct. Information storage is used for shared meaning and later problem
solving; one form of information storage may include documents created based on
consensus.
As previously discussed not all information is shared. Corporations may want to
protect a competitive advantage and thus be reluctant to share information, or have new
uses of the technology that they do not want to discuss. Others may be reluctant to
discuss information as they feel it may be of advantage to them during the process.
The learning process is not limited to technical knowledge. Stakeholders may
learn new social skills, enabling them to participate more effectively at the MSH forum
(Turcotte & Pasquero, 2011, p. 457). Stakeholders learn where their views may be most
appreciated, as well as where their organization and others stand on an issue. This social
aspect of the learning process should not be discounted because it can enhance
cooperation and produce tangible outcomes and partnerships (Turcotte & Pasquero, 2011,
p. 457).
4.11.4. Consensus
According to Gray (1989) and Turcotte and Pasquero(2001) consensus is the
expected outcome of MSH processes. These processes are convened in order for
stakeholders to form consensus around specified issues in an effort to further or solve
issues. Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) note that consensus may be easier to achieve on
broad topics or umbrella issues. The details or specific mandates may be areas where
consensus is harder to achieve or stakeholders may be unclear on what is to be agreed
upon. Since MSH processes are generally convened to solve complex problems, goals
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may be quickly agreed upon, but how to achieve those goals may be more difficult to
agree upon. Even when appropriate solutions can be agreed upon, stakeholders may lack
the resources necessary to carry them out, thus consensus must be considered in a
multifaceted way. There are goals and then there are the means of achieving those goals
both of which need to reach consensus to be carried out. As stated previously, the
learning process may facilitate consensus on issues in multiple ways.
4.11.5. Capacity Building
Capacity building has been defined in terms of MSH processes as “the
accumulation of intellectual capital, skills, and competencies; development of a relational
infrastructure for the domain, as represented by stakeholder constituencies, collaborative
alliances/dynamic coalitions, and network communities; and emergence of a common
global consciousness” (Antonova, 2011, p. 436). These aspects of capacity building lead
to innovative solutions, also known as collaborative advantage (Antonova, 2011, p. 427).
4.12. Discussion on Multistakeholder Theories Application
Anticipated uses of MSH theories include strategic silence by stakeholders to
influence the process. For example, Facebook and Google have had representation in the
current MSH process but had not participated directly even after repeated requests to do
so. Facebook, however, did eventually contribute to the process. Why would two of the
most reputable companies in the space refuse to participate for so long? Will the
legitimacy of the code of conduct be enhanced or tarnished if they choose not to agree to
and abide by it?
It is expected that stakeholders will exhibit different amounts of power based on
their resources and relative distance to the physical meeting location. For example, there
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are three main ways to follow the MSH process on FRT: telephone, webcast, and
physical presence. Those who are physically present at the meetings wield the most
power as they are able to speak up at almost any time during the process. Stakeholders
who participate via telephone wait until the operator puts them into the question and
answer mode. Stakeholders who participate via the webcast may be able to e-mail, but
this was not revealed during the observed meetings. As the venue for the process has not
changed, those stakeholders residing in the Washington D.C. area have the inherent
advantage of easily attending the meetings, increasing their potential influence or power.
The learning process can have material outcomes on MSH processes. During this
process, competing ideas often led to different learning outcomes. Both privacy
advocates and industry technologists have been invited to make presentations illustrating
technology usage, necessary data, and technological capabilities. These presentations
have ultimately resulted in different conclusions. Who is to be believed about whether a
series of numbers can be reverse engineered into an image? What are the present
limitations of the technology? Answers to these questions are likely to have material
regulatory outcomes.
4.13. Summary
This project is informed by the social constructivist view that FRT can be
regulated in meaningful ways. The process is a rejection of the technological determinist
view that the technology will change the ways humans interact. The process and its
outcome clearly demonstrate that individuals not only control appropriate uses of the
technology, but also the meaningful limits on its usage.

89

Each of the three theoretical fields presented above are complex and multifaceted
on their own. These fields have converged in this project to improve understanding about
the developing regulatory regime for FRT and the privacy implications that result. The
MSH format has been employed to help develop “soft” regulation for FRT in the form of
a voluntary code of conduct.
Given the complexity of privacy views and the international nature of many of the
companies likely to be affected by this regulation, the MSH format plays an important
role in ensuring the presentation of diverse views and opinions. The nature of the
voluntary code ensures that the technology can continue to develop while providing
consumers with confidence that their privacy is being protected.
How privacy is constructed at the MSH meetings is likely to have material effects
on the regulation created. Privacy views present at the MSH meetings are anticipated to
include information, physical, cognitive, and privacy conceived of as a commodity.
Conceptions that have disproportionate representation through the process may have
enhanced regulatory safeguards. Conversely, conceptions of privacy not represented at
the process, or minimally represented, may lack meaningful regulatory protections. The
safeguards developed out of the MSH process represent the only meaningful limits
currently placed on the technology and its future utilization.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODS
This chapter provides insight into the philosophical paradigm employed
throughout this project. Explanations are provided as to why particular research methods
were chosen as well as their anticipated contributions to the project. All research
methods have shortcomings, and these will be discussed as well.
5.1. Philosophical Underpinnings
Much of this research subscribes to a social constructivist worldview applied to
technology. Following this paradigm is the notion that individuals ascribe meaning to
events and past experiences which impact their interactions (Creswell, 2009). Under this
paradigm meaning is created through discussion and interactions with others. This is
precisely what the multistakeholder process for facial recognition technology seeks to do;
it seeks to create shared meaning among the stakeholders to produce a voluntary code of
conduct for commercial uses of FRT. Much of this research focuses on the interaction
between government entities, individuals, companies, and industry representatives, to
build consensus on legitimate FRT uses.
Important to the social constructivist paradigm is history and culture. Many
Americans strongly identify with individualism and are skeptical of too much
government intervention in their lives. Multistakeholderism is a way to create governing
principles without the heavy hand of government, giving citizens a chance to directly
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express their concerns. Current events tend to shape human experiences, and the
developmental code of conduct is occurring in the context of a post-Snowden world
where Americans are more aware of privacy violations. As this is the reality, citizens
may be more sensitive to issues that FRT creates than they were previously. Continually
incorporating these varied perspectives is important in providing the most holistic
explanations possible for this dissertation.
The varied perspectives represented at the meetings may demand a social
constructivist paradigm. The complexity of views, participants, and positions cannot be
adequately covered by more limited paradigms. Technologists who develop, use, and
promote the technology have been responsible for educating participants on the
capabilities of FRT. However, some technologists who previously supported robust
growth of the technology have reconsidered and now advocate for more limited uses
(Opam, 2014). This is just one dynamic that could be covered between privacy
advocates, technologists, foreign government representatives, businesses, trade
associations, private citizens, and physically present participants versus phone or webcast
participants.
The complexity of the meetings is not just dictated by the participants and their
advocatory views, but also values and controversial scientific conclusions. Privacy lacks
a definition that can be agreed upon in the academic community, and amongst citizens in
general. Since privacy lacks a clear definition, it has been conceptualized in many
different ways. A participant’s conception of privacy and its subjective value makes the
issue very complex. Furthermore, these meetings are not only regulating the current uses
of FRT but also potential future uses. What the technology will be capable of in the
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future is uncertain, but can be determined through regulation. For instance, there is one
method of facial recognition called face “hallucination” where the technology takes
poorly pixilated images and begins to “guess” what the face looks like by comparing it to
millions of other known images. Whether or not this is a viable method of facial
recognition remains to be seen, but there are implications brought forth by this method
that may not be present in current methods. Social constructivism is best suited to
encapsulate the varied perspectives and participants as well as the highly complex nature
of the meetings and the interactions within.
In contrast, positivist approaches, derived from scientific and observable
knowledge, fail to grasp the complex issues that FRT raises. Essentialism, having certain
base qualities, may seem like an appropriate approach to the technology because it is
usually seen as being used for identification but there are multi-model methods of
conducting FR and the debates at the NTIA meetings are too complex. It is true that
stakeholders have ideas they would like to see incorporated or not incorporated into a
voluntary code of conduct, but the creation of the code evolves through negotiations and
stakeholders have to compromise their positions in order to broker a deal that companies
will actually agree to. Other philosophical paradigms also fail to adequately explain the
dissertation’s aims.
Rationalistic approaches are not useful to codes of conduct that regard privacy
because there is no academic consensus defining privacy. Furthermore, an individual’s
need for privacy is subjective. Even if consistent expectations of privacy existed, the
government may continue to invade individual’s privacy through taxes or privacy
mandates, such as requiring clothing in public.
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Technological determinism is a popular reductionist viewpoint that believes
technology is an independent force which has left society in its servitude (Alvarez, 1999,
p. 405). This project fundamentally refutes the idea of technological determinism. The
whole point of the MSH meetings on FRT is to directly impact technology by “allowing”
it to impact society in beneficial ways. If the premise of technological determinism is
taken seriously, then there is no need to attempt to regulate the technology. The social
constructivist view and the MSH meetings allow for normative values, such as privacy, to
be embedded in the deployed formats of FRT. As David Nye (2006) stated: “Rather than
assuming that technologies are deterministic, it appears more reasonable to assume that
cultural choices shape their uses” (p. 21).
How the challenges of FRT are framed during the MSH meetings will largely
determine the regulatory regime for the technology. For instance, stakeholders have been
informed that they are to focus on commercial uses of the technology and that
government uses are outside the scope of the group’s work. Given these limitations, the
group will only be able to regulate the technology in limited ways, further amplifying the
appropriateness of the social constructivist paradigm in this research project.
5.2. Research Design
The research design for this project is that of a case study. The FRT debate,
convened by the NTIA, constitutes an important case of developing a regulatory policy
regarding privacy and technology development. These MSH meetings are the first U.S.
attempt at regulating FRT. The case study design has been chosen specifically in relation
to these factors.
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Robert Yin (1984) defined a case study as a research approach that allows for
investigating “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used” (p. 23). He specified that the case study is the
most appropriate research design for studies, where “how” or “why” questions are the
primary concern of the researcher; he also suggested this format for studying current
phenomena on which the researcher has little or no control.
Similarly, Peter Swanborn (2010) described a case study as a research approach
that focuses on one or only a handful of events, but draws data from a variety of sources,
including documents and observation. Furthermore, Swanborn (2010) states that case
studies are appropriate for answering broad research questions by tracking how a process
develops. This research approach allows for comparisons to be made between the
positions of the various stakeholders. These comparisons will underscore outcomes from
NTIA meetings. For instance, heavy privacy protections may imply that NGOs, such as
the Center for Digital Democracy, had a strong influence in the meetings. Conversely, if
rapid innovation is favored, commercial organizations may have had a profound impact
on the debate. The case study design was chosen for this project as it helps answer
“why” questions, as defined by Yin (1984). The discourse analysis of meeting
transcripts, research interviews, and documents collected will help answer questions of
why particular provisions and considerations have been included in the code of conduct.
The case study design is not without its critics or controversy. One criticism
leveled against the design is that researchers may allow their views to influence the
findings and conclusions (Yin, 1984). Triangulation of multiple methods of data
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gathering, interviews with participants, participant observation, and meeting transcripts
are employed to try to alleviate this concern.
The case study design is suited to the project given the complexity of the MSH
meetings on FRT. As “a research endeavor, the case study contributes uniquely to our
knowledge of individual, organizational, social, and political phenomena” (Yin, 1989, p.
14). The NTIA MSH process on FRT is a politically directed and motivated process
mandated in President Obama’s CPBR. A wide variety of organizational interests are
represented and advocated for during the process which will likely affect individual
consumers. Given these diverse situations and the potential for profound social impact,
the case study is the most appropriate research design for this project.
This study proposes the use of three qualitative methods for data gathering: semistructured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis of meeting
transcripts. Triangulation, according to Donald Treadwell (2011), is the use of multiple
methods so that the researcher can have greater confidence in his or her findings.
Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt (2011) believed that the use of multiple methods,
with their own strengths and limitations, could provide cross validation of conclusions
and thus to help assess the overall validity of findings.
5.3. Stages of Research
5.3.1. Data Collection
The NTIA meetings started on February 6, 2014. The debates at the meetings
were recorded via Replay Video Capture 7 software and a Sony IC recorder, a digital
recording device, for redundancy. The software records the NTIA webcasts in .mpg
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format, which is accepted by the HyperRESEARCH platform, the data analysis software
platform.
5.3.2. Participant Observation
Participant observation is a method to collect data in settings where researchers
observe and/or take part in the activities of the study participants (DeWalt and DeWalt,
2011). Participant observation provides context for data, which supports the process of
identifying potential interviewees, formulating questions for the semi-structured
interviews, and detecting power structures in the MSH collaborative process. According
to DeWalt and DeWalt (2011), participant observation has several advantages, including
enhancing the quality of data obtained during fieldwork, helping to interpret said data,
and aiding in the formulation of new research questions based on the observations made
in the field.
This researcher traveled to Washington D.C. in order to observe the meeting that
occurred on June 24, 2014. This observation provided important context for how the
stakeholders actually experience the meetings. During this trip, the researcher learned a
significant amount about the venue and the meeting’s intricacies which could not be
experienced through the webcast alone. For example, many more individuals are in the
room than can be observed via the webcast. This has provided greater context and insight
for this research.
Meeting notifications are posted on the NTIA website as well as emailed out to
participants and viewers who signed up for the email list serve for the process. During
the meetings participants were observed in regards to their attendance and participation
during the meetings. When individuals participated in the meetings, their positions on
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specific issues were noted as well as their reasoning for having that position in contrast to
others discussed. After positions on a specific issue are offered and discussed,
observations were made as to how those positions were incorporated into the code of
conduct.
5.3.3. Semi-Structured Interviews
The participant observation and document analysis allowed for surveying the
stakeholders’ positions. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen
participants selected on the basis of their expertise, level of engagement with the debate,
and to be representative of the stakeholder groups. (See Appendix B for a list of
interviewees.) The goal of conducting the interviews was to explore particular
stakeholder positions on issues, encourage reflection on the process, and explore their
feelings about outcomes for the code of conduct.
This study employs semi-structured interviews to enhance exploration of the
public debate while allowing interviewees to share direct personal experiences and
reflections on the subjects discussed in the NTIA meetings. Fiona Fylan (2005)
described semi-structured interviews as those where the researcher has a number of topics
to cover, but the conversation is free to vary and may change substantially between
subjects. The semi-structured interview format is the best structure to achieve the
research aims and accommodate the varied view points and opinions of the interviewees.
A variety of issues and viewpoints are presented at the NTIA meetings thanks to
multistakeholder collaboration. The semi-structured nature of the research interview
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process allows the investigator to consistently address topics in the interview protocol,23
as well as collect information that informants feel is pertinent.
5.4. Data Analysis
The empirical data collected through the above methods have been subjected to
discourse analysis (DA). As a research method, DA has a complex history and has been
adopted by many different branches of social science without clear consensus on what
‘discourse’ actually means (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). However, Strauss and Feiz
(2014) described discourse as, “[T]he social and cognitive process of putting the world
into words, of transforming our perceptions, experiences, emotions, understandings, and
desires into a common medium for expression and communication, through language and
other semiotic resources” (p. 1). This definition encapsulates why the social
constructivist paradigm was chosen for this research project. According to social
construction epistemology, reality is discursively constructed and the examination of that
discourse has important effects on society (Creswell, 2009). Under this paradigm, the
conversations held at the NTIA meetings may have a profound effect on society
depending on the nature of the regulatory regime being developed for this technology.
Similarly, Starks and Trinidad (2007) noted that discourse analysis, “is concerned
with language-in-use; that is, how individuals accomplish personal, social, and political
projects through language” (p. 1374). For the present project, discourse analysis is
chosen as a research method to provide understanding for how participants attempt to
accomplish their particular goals while moving collaboratively towards the creation of a
code of conduct for FRT. This method of analysis has been paired with the data
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See Appendix G for the interview protocol.
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collection method of interviewing to enhance this understanding. DA is enhanced with a
variety of perspectives, “Within discourse analysis sampling different groups that
participate within a given discourse can illuminate the ways in which participants appeal
to external discourses and identify their influence on the discourse under study” (Starks
& Trinidad, 2007, p. 1375). Utilizing multiple research methods can enhance the
understandings of a singular method.
Fairclough (1995) noted that certain discourses are associated with particular
social institutions. The expectation for the explored case is that certain ideologies can be
identified with the particular stakeholders and social institution being represented. For
example, less regulation will be associated with business entities and enhanced privacy
protections will be associated with consumer advocacy groups. The discourse examined
concerning FRT at the NTIA meetings, the stakeholder groups participating, and the
transfer of knowledge provided an explanation on the crafting of the voluntary code of
conduct and its implications.
An important layer of discourse analysis is to distinguish discourse from actions
taken. Determining differences in the discourse between the MSH meetings and the
emerging code of conduct, aids in identifying stakeholder positions, “Nothing in
discourse is neutral. Each and every instance of discourse is imbued with some element
of stance; it is motivated by a perspective” (Strauss & Feiz, 2014, p. 3). Stance is
concerned with a speaker’s inherent attitudes, biases, and perspectives, which are
prevalent in all humans. These positions are in flux and are constantly being renegotiated (Strauss & Feiz, 2014, p. 4). Since the speaker’s stance is in a state of
constant negotiation, and those speakers, at times, represent larger institutions, it can be
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assumed that institutional positions are in a state of negotiation as well. In fact, the MSH
format ensures that positions are negotiated through interaction and their actions or
outcomes are negotiated by the stakeholders. This flux of speaker and institutional
stance, as well as the negotiating of actions or outcomes, reinforces the social
constructivist paradigm driving this project.
The expertise of stakeholders utilized in creating a voluntary code of conduct at
the NTIA meetings facilitates the creation of the regulatory regime of FRT. The
objective of this research project was to gain a clear understanding of group dynamics, to
identify privileged positions of authority and expertise, to recognize resistance strategies,
to create and transfer knowledge, and to realize the impact these factors had in the
creation of the voluntary code of conduct. Language was looked to in terms of action,
“[P]eople use their language to do things: to order and request, persuade and accuse.
This focus on language function is also one of the major components of discourse
analysis” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 32). This project is an analysis of how
stakeholders “do” things, create a code of conduct, with language.
Mediated discourse analysis (MDA) has largely been employed to discover
participant stances and the material impact on the creation of a code of conduct. MDA is
a more recent conception of DA that has been utilized in the academic community
(Jewitt, Kress, Ogborn, & Tsatsarelis, 2001; Johnston, 2004; Jones, 1999; Jones, 2007;
Kress & Leeuwen, 2001; Scollon & Scollon, 2004; Raudaskoski, 2010) to interpret a
wide range of social issues. This method is used to identify actions: “As a theoretical
position, it [MDA] focuses on linkages between discourse and action and how these play
out in complex social situations” (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012, p. 66). MDA
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focuses on “the outcomes of social interactive processes of production” (Scollon & de
Saint-Georges, 2012, p. 66). MDA attempts to understand social action by discovering
the intersection of three material entities 1) the historical body of social actors, 2) the
configuration and social structure of individuals present, and 3) the discourse carries out
social action (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012, p. 71). In other words, “[I]n democratic
public discourse positions are stated, positions are argued, positions are negotiated and
the actions which are taken and which become policy and practice are the outcome of this
dialectic” (Scollon, 2008, p. 162). The negotiation of positions and actions are of
primary importance to this project.
The dissertation utilized MDA to discover actions taken by the participants, what
their role in the process is, and why they are involved, and how discourse has shaped
those actions. Transcripts were created based on the debates at the NTIA meetings on
FRT and were subsequently coded for themes that help answer the formulated research
questions. Specific mention of individual participants in the dissertation were only
identified when their comments were made publicly. Stakeholders have been interviewed
for this project and to protect their anonymity, their views are simply attributed to the
larger stakeholder group they represent, NGOs, academics, government, and business.
MDA was not utilized to its full potential in this project. The research design and
methods chosen were selected predicated on the initial timeline set for the MSH
meetings, predicted to end around one year’s time. The timeline was altered due to
stakeholder concerns and scheduling logistics. As such, it was difficult to track the
changes to the code of conduct that resulted from the discourse of the group. A final
code of conduct has yet to be created and therefore it is problematic to pinpoint discourse
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that led to material language or changes in the code. Some changes were able to be
identified; however, this method fell short of expectations due to unforeseen
complications that arose with the timeline for the creation of a code of conduct.
Silences in public debates have been studied as a significant discursive strategy.
According to Huckin (2002), “[O]ften what is not said or written can be as important, if
not more so than what is” (p. 348). Huckin (2002) defined textual silence as “’[T]he
omission of some piece of information that is pertinent to the topic at hand’” (p. 348).
Textual silence can take on several forms, each with unique implications. Huckin (2002,
p. 348) described five types of textual silences. The first silence described is a speech act
silence. This silence is demarked by such force that the listener/reader is easily able to
interpret the meaning of the silence by pragmatic rules of language. Presuppositional
silences occur when the speaker does not state what is assumed to be common
knowledge. Individuals may employ discreet silences to avoid stating sensitive
information. Genre-based silence are dictated by conventions (obituaries usually omit
negative details about the deceased). Finally, and perhaps most troubling, are
manipulative silences, when pertinent information is deliberately concealed. Similar
discursive strategies were observed in the NTIA meetings. Technical presentations, for
example, contain some presuppositional silences, which is problematic for interested
laypersons. Manipulative silences were observed in the repeated calls for companies like
Facebook and Google to make presentations about their use of FRT. Examining these
silences produced important insight into the information omitted from the meetings and
the motivations for the omissions. Huckin (2002) wrote that context is the key
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component to identifying manipulative silences, otherwise all things unsaid would count
as textual silence (p. 353).
Discourse analysis was facilitated by the software HyperRESEARCH. The
software supports the case study design that was employed for this project
(Researchware, 2014). HyperRESEARCH is a software tool that aids in qualitative
research approaches by allowing the use of audio and video files for the coding of data.
Audio files were created by recording the proceedings of the meetings. The files were
then opened in HyperTRANSCRIBE where this researcher recorded manually the spoken
details of the meetings verbatim. After the meetings were transcribed this researcher
used HyperRESEARCH to create a code book24 of important aspects of the meetings, or
trends observed, and then applied these codes to the text created in HyperTRANSCRIBE.
HyperRESEARCH then organized all relevant sections of text according to how they
were coded facilitating the discourse analysis utilized for this research. Noticeably,
responses from participants were not attributed to individuals to protect their anonymity.
To enhance the quality of the applied discourse analysis the researcher attended
online webinars hosted by HyperRESEARCH. During the webinars, HyperRESEARCH
employees explained the various facets of the research platform. Examples of research
projects were presented along with explanations on how to code and identify important
trends. This additional support ensured that the codes and research conclusions were of
the highest quality.
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See Appendix H for a table of codes used.
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5.5. Research Questions
The methods chosen and discussed above are designed to help clearly answer the
research questions presented in this project. The first question this research addresses is
“How is the regulatory regime of FRT emerging in the U.S.?” Currently, the voluntary
code of conduct created by the MSH process are the most robust regulation to date, which
is why discourse analysis was selected to examine the arguments presented, the
participants who presented them, and the ultimate solutions proposed and passed to solve
those arguments. Discourse analysis lends itself to understanding the meanings behind
the arguments, as well as the solutions created.
The second research question is: “What are the roles of the various stakeholders
in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?” Semi-structured interviews, discourse
analysis, and participant observation were employed to answer this question. Semistructured interviews allowed the participants to define how they see their roles in the
process and describe in detail the ideas and solutions they are advocating for. To help
provide further insight to their answers, discourse analysis and participant observation
were employed. Discourse analysis analyzed stakeholders within the context of other
participants, as well as by the discourse created using the MSH process. Finally,
participant observation provided a unique “behind the scenes” perspective. Those who
call in to the meetings, or follow along with the webcast, miss the conversations that
occur during the breaks. They are also not privy to all the people in attendance. Being
present for the meetings provides a larger perspective in seeing the collegiality of the
group, and it helps identify which participants have better working relationships than
others.
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The final research question is “How does FRT challenge our current conceptions
of privacy?” Discussion of the various uses of the technology has revealed new
challenges to our current understandings of privacy. Analysis of the discourse at the
meetings as well as the varied privacy conceptions of the stakeholders has provided
insight as to how FRT challenges how privacy is understood.
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CHAPTER 6
EVOLUTION OF DATA PROTECTION REGULATION
Data protection has been an important topic of regulation between the U.S. and
the European Union (EU) since the differing views on how to regulate data protection
have created some tensions. The Edward Snowden revelations of the National Security
Agency spying on U.S. and EU citizens (collecting phone records and meta-data without
warrants) have even caused animosity between the entities. The EU is in many ways
leading the fight for the protection of citizen data and increased privacy protections for
citizens. Since many U.S. based companies involved in the facial recognition technology
space are international in nature it is important to understand the data protection
relationship between the U.S. and EU.
6.1. History and Development of Data Protection
Increased use of technology led to greater accumulation of user data. In light of
the increased amount of data collected, the first data protection law was enacted by the
German state of Hesse in 1970 (Cate, 1994, p. 431). The rise in the use of information
technology provided motivation for Germany to enact this state law nationally; it was the
first data protection law in the world (Wilhelm, 2015). In 1983, the Highest Court in
Germany declared a constitutional right to what was referred to as informational selfdetermination. This decision was in part, due to a population census and rising fear of
surveillance amongst German citizens (Hornung & Schnabel, 2009, p. 85). German
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citizens are acutely aware of the power of the census given their history prior and during
WWII. Informational self-determination was as a cornerstone of democratic exchange
because “The protection of personal data is essential for a free and self-determined
development of the individual. At the same time, the self-determined development of the
individual is a precondition for a free and democratic communication order” (Hornung &
Schnabel, 2009, p. 86). The Germans understood that information about the individual
needed to be under his/her control. Information regarding dissent not under control of the
individual, could have a chilling effect on free and open communication. Hornung and
Schnabel noted that:
If citizens cannot oversee and control which or even what kind of
information about them is openly accessible in their social environment,
and if they cannot even appraise the knowledge of possible
communication partners, they may be inhibited in making use of their
freedom. If citizens are unsure whether dissenting behaviour is noticed
and information is being permanently stored, used and passed on, they will
try to avoid dissenting behaviour so as not to attract attention. They may
even abstain from making use of their basic and human rights. In a
potentially all-knowing state, freedom of speech and freedom of choice
are virtually impossible. (p. 86)
Providing citizens with robust data protection strengthens open communication and uses
for political dissent, important components of healthy democracies. The right to
informational self-determination benefits the individual and the public in fostering open
communication.
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Before the formation of the EU in 1993, guidelines were issued to further advance
notions of data protection, “In 1980 the Committee of Ministers of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Rows of Personal Data (Guidelines)” (Cate, 1994, p. 431). The
guidelines had no real legal force and allowed for flexible implementation by individual
nations. Data protection had important implications for not only democracy, but also
commerce. In 1981, the OECD released a document titled “For the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,” a convention very
similar to the guidelines previously issued, but with a focus on protecting personal
privacy.
In 1990, the European Community Commission published a draft document that
would later become the EU Directive on Data Protection entitled, “Council Directive on
the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data” (Cate, 1994, p. 432). The directive was passed after
adding an amendment which eliminated the distinction between public and private sector
data. Treating public and private sector data as equal is a novel protection that puts
government on an equal footing with private entities, a provision not currently adopted in
the U.S., they share equal protections and require equal thresholds for examination. The
directive required countries to create laws governing the processing of personal data.
Processing personal data was broadly defined as, “any operation or set of operations
including but not limited to collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”
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of data (Cate, 1994, p. 433). Laws compliant with the directive provided an individual
with robust data protections including accurate information, legitimate use, consent of the
individual, the right to access data, and other protections25. The last point of the directive
is perhaps the most important for this MSH process under investigation in this
dissertation as it stipulated that each member state must: Establish laws prohibiting the
transfer of data to non-member states that fail to provide adequate data protection
(emphasis added).
This last point has become the center of tension between the U.S. and the EU.
The EU has asserted that the U.S. is doing an inadequate job of protecting its citizens’
data. The U.S. has no comparable data protection regime and is seen as “behind” the EU
on this front. Failure to offer adequate data protection could threaten commerce between
the U.S. and the EU, a relationship worth billions of dollars in trade.
6.2. Safe Harbor
The U.S. and the EU take different approaches to protecting citizens’ privacy. As
has been shown, the EU relies on comprehensive legislation with government bodies that
ensure the data protection laws are followed. The U.S. has a variety of approaches to
protecting citizens’ data, including “legislation, regulation, and self-regulation” (Export,
2013, par. 1). The U.S. and the EU worked together to create the Safe Harbor
Framework, which was formally adopted in July of 2000, so that the two entities could
share data and still be in compliance with the EU data directive (Wilhelm, 2015).
Participation in the Safe Harbor Framework is voluntary; entities that comply with Safe
Harbor must notify the U.S. Department of Commerce yearly that they are in compliance
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For a full list of provisions please refer to Appendix F.
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with the Framework (Export, 2013, par. 5). There are seven principles in the Framework
that must be complied with26.
The first principle that must be complied with is that of notice. Organizations
must notify individuals about the purposes for which they collect and use personal
information. They must provide information about how individuals can contact the
organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to which it
discloses the information and the choices and means the organization offers for limiting
its use and disclosure.
Notice is the precursor to the second principle which is choice. Organizations
must give individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out) whether their personal
information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose incompatible with the
purpose for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the
individual. For sensitive information, affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice must be given
if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than its
original purpose or the purpose authorized subsequently by the individual.
The third principle is transfer to third parties. To disclose information to a third
party, organizations must apply the notice and choice principles. If an organization
wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so only
if it makes sure that the third party subscribes to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles or is
subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding. As an alternative, the organization
can enter into a written agreement with such a third party requiring that the third party

26
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provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant
principles.
The fourth principle of the Framework is access. Individuals must have access to
personal information held about them by organizations and be able to correct, amend, or
delete that information where it is inaccurate; however, if the burden or expense of
providing access is disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy or where the
rights of persons other than the individual are violated then organizations are not required
to allow individuals access.
Security is another important principle of the framework. Organizations must take
reasonable precautions to protect personal information from loss, misuse and
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction. Recent government and
commercial data breaches have highlighted the importance of this principle in the eyes of
the public. In concert with security is data integrity. Personal information must be
relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization should take
reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete,
and current.
Finally, there is the Framework principle of enforcement. In order to ensure
compliance with the Safe Harbor principles, there must be (a) readily available and
affordable independent recourse mechanisms so that each individual's complaints and
disputes can be investigated and resolved and damages awarded where the applicable law
or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) must have procedures for verifying that the
commitments companies make to adhere to the Safe Harbor principles have been
implemented; finally, must instill (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of a
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failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure
compliance by the organization. Organizations that fail to provide annual selfcertification letters will no longer appear in the list of participants and Safe Harbor
benefits will no longer be assured.
Many of these same principles have been discussed in the development of a code
of conduct for FRT. Due to the international nature of many companies that use or want
to use FRT, compliance with Safe Harbor will be paramount in order to transfer data to
and from the EU. The U.S.’s fragmented approach to data protection has led to its use of
the private sector for most of the enforcement. If private entities fail to comply they can
be prosecuted under federal unfair or deceptive practice legislation, which is largely
accomplished through the FTC but, also through state legislation (Export, 2013).
Despite having both the U.S. and the EU operating under the Safe Harbor
Framework there were a series of events that left the EU wondering if they had
inadvertently created a data transfer loophole due to lower U.S. data protection standards
(Wilhelm, 2015). Shortly after the Edward Snowden leaks, which caused increased
concern in the EU about Safe Harbor principles being violated by the U.S., the EU
recognized that Safe Harbor needed to be updated. In March 2014, the EU strongly
recommended that the U.S. create new data transfer rules to protect EU citizens’ data; in
the same month, the EU Parliament also called for a suspension of Safe Harbor (Wilhelm,
2015). The main concern of the EU, regarded public authorities processing data.
Primarily, it wanted to ensure that exceptions for national security were limited to only
what was necessary for safety. In 2014, the Center for Digital Democracy filed
complaints against U.S. companies that had not complied with Safe Harbor. The FTC
113

then filed a complaint against the TRUSTe brand for failing to recertify companies for
Safe Harbor compliance. In light of these complaints the EU has considered suspending
Safe Harbor because of inadequate data protections, an act that would have serious
consequences for trade relations between the U.S. and the EU. Currently, as of March
2015, the European Court of Justice is hearing a case against the NSA that could have a
profound impact on the U.S. - EU Safe Harbor agreement (Wilhelm, 2015).

Figure 5. EU data protection timeline. Adapted from the Privacy Association (ErnstOliver, 2015).
6.3. U.S. Data Protection
Data protection regulation in the U.S. is a patchwork of state and federal
legislation enforced by multiple regulatory bodies. Financial firms follow standards set
in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act which promulgates rules for collection, use, and
disclosure of private information (Sotto & Simpson, 2014, p.191). Similarly, health care
providers are bound by the rules set forth in the Health Insurance Portability and
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Accountability Act (HIPAA). For non-regulated industries the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is the primary enforcement body. The FTC, under Section 5 of the
FTC Act, can enforce the unfair or deceptive acts or practices clause against businesses
that violate the section rules. State laws are generally enforced by state Attorney’s
General; otherwise, state laws allow for individuals to file suit against entities that have
broken the law. The following lists states other important laws that concern privacy and
data (Sotto & Simpson, 2014):
•

Electronic Communications Privacy Act: “[S]tatutory frame-work of privacy
protections and related standards for law enforcement access covering
electronic communications and remotely stored electronic records.
Significantly, the ECPA established the standards that currently control law
enforcement access to personal e-mail and electronic records, such as pictures
and date books, stored on remote servers” (Mulligan, 2003, p. 1557).

•

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Originally created in 1984 to criminalize
federal computer crimes, the act has been expanded five times and may now
cover all uses of computers in the U.S., with the potential to regulate abroad
(Kerr, 2009, p. 1561)

•

Fair Credit Reporting Act: Designed “to protect the privacy of consumer
report information and to guarantee that the information supplied by consumer
reporting agencies is as accurate as possible” (Stokes, 1999, p.1)

•

Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act: Designed to fight identity theft,
increase consumer access to credit, and improve accuracy of credit
information (Pu Holt, 2004, p.3).
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•

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act: This act severely limits the
collection of information about children under the age of thirteen without
parental consent. It also curtails the ability of children under the age of
thirteen to obtain an email account without parental consent as well (Belmas
& Overbeck, 2012).

One of the most important set of laws in the U.S. for privacy and data protection
is the Fair Information Practices (FIPS). The FIPS began as a report to the Department of
Health in the late 1970s, but now some of its principles have been discussed and
implemented internationally (Gellman, 2014, p.1). Provisions in addition to the FIPS,
have become common place in policy discussions and laws regarding privacy. The FIPS
have evolved over time. The Department of Homeland Security in 2008 issued their
version of the FIPS but updated and renamed it the Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPPS) (Gellman, 2014). The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) also embraces
the FIPPS. The CPBR FIPPS outline the following protections (Gellman, 2014, p. 16).
Individual Control, “Consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data
companies collect from them and how they use it.” Transparency, “Consumers have a
right to easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security
practices.” Respect for Context, “Consumers have a right to expect that companies will
collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in
which consumers provide the data.” Security, “Consumers have a right to secure and
responsible handling of personal data.” Access and Accuracy, “Consumers have a right
to access and correct personal data in usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to
the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse consequences to consumers if the data is
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inaccurate.” Focused Collection, “Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the
personal data that companies collect and retain.” Accountability, “Consumers have a
right to have personal data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to
assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” (Gellman, 2014, p. 16).
Despite the lofty protections that the FIPPS tries to achieve, it is inconsistent with
interpretations found in HIPAA and those put forth by the FTC (Gellman, 2014). Most
notable for this project is the inconsistency with the FTC, the enforcement agency for any
voluntary code of conduct created for FRT. It remains unclear how the FTC will deal
with inconsistencies found between the FIPPS, the FTC interpretation of the FIPPS, and
privacy protections created in the code of conduct for FRT.
The U.S. has weaker data protection laws than the EU because big businesses are
often able to lobby very effectively in Congress. Coleman (1982) made it clear that
businesses have grown increasingly influential and powerful in the U.S. However, the
EU has taken the opposite approach, granting consumers greater control over their data
and providing robust protection for them. As Simon Davies (2015) noted, “Silence from
the United States over collection of data from non-U.S. persons has fueled support for
strengthened legal protections over the collection and processing of data on EU citizens”
(p. 57). The EU may well suspend the Safe Harbor agreement if the U.S. does not take
action to provide better protection for consumer’s data and privacy.
The established U.S. and EU laws are reflected in the development of a code of
conduct for FRT. The code of conduct must comply with existing laws as the NTIA does
not have the authority to supersede existing laws. Since many of the corporations
involved in the creation and use of the code of conduct for FRT conduct business in both
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the U.S. and the EU, it is important to understand how both protect data. The U.S. and
EU will likely need a new privacy agreement, along with data protection rules and laws,
so that trade can continue and citizens’ rights and data be protected. Another important
right for U.S. citizens is the First Amendment, which applies to photography and is
important to the FRT debates.
6.4. Photography, the First Amendment, and Copyright
Since FRT is applied to photos, photo creation and photography are important
legal concepts to discuss. The United States Supreme Court (USSC) has yet to consider
the First Amendment rights of photographers, yet it is clear that they have a right to
expression and a property right interest in the work that they create, usually in the form of
copyright. Intellectual property law covers copyright, which exist to, “[P]rotect creative
works such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, music, film….” (Belmas & Overbeck,
2012, p. 237). Photographs constitute creative works and as such can be protected by
copyright, but there are limits as to what can be photographed publicly. Similarly, there
are limits on the protection that the First Amendment provides photographers.
6.4.1. Photography and the First Amendment
The USSC has yet to fully address the First Amendment rights of photographers;
however there are some court cases that do tangentially address the issue. The First
Amendment is not limited to strictly the spoken or written word, but also includes
communicative conduct (Kenworthy, 2012). In public, to be protected by the First
Amendment two criteria must be met for communicative conduct (photography). “To
achieve First Amendment protection, a plaintiff must show that he possessed: (1) a
message to be communicated; and (2) an audience to receive that message, regardless of
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the medium in which the message is to be expressed. (Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, & Bisexual Group, 1995)” (Kenworthy, 2012, par. 6). One court found a
limitation when a father taped his daughter’s choir performance, citing that there was no
“communicative or expressive purpose” and therefore was not protected by the First
Amendment (Kenworthy, 2012). With communicative and expressive purposes in mind
it is clear that most news gathering is covered under the First Amendment, but individual
citizens can also be afforded the same protection. In Lambert v. Polk County, an
individual citizen took a video tape in a public circle with the intent to sell any
newsworthy content. The individual happened to tape a fatal fight and the police
confiscated the tape. The plaintiff sued the police and the court found that the police had
violated his First Amendment right, noting that “It is not just news organizations… who
have First Amendment rights to make and display videotapes of events – all of us…. have
that right” (Kenworthy, 2012, par. 22).
6.4.2. Photography and Copyright
As stated previously, copyrights provide owners with a property interest. Images,
written works, and databases are but a few examples of media that can be protected by a
copyright. The 1976 Copyright Act also protects these works for a very lengthy amount
of time, 95 years (Belmas & Overbeck, 2012, p. 237). While the First Amendment
protects free speech and freedom of the press it is important to note that the news cannot
be copyrighted. One major individual copyright concern, with regard to FRT, is where
an individual’s image resides. In years past, photo albums were a popular place to store
photos, usually copyright free. Today, most or all of an individual’s photos reside online,
using Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and other popular social networking and interest
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forums. In many instances, when an individual agrees to the terms of use or the EULA
presented by the company, they grant the website service rights to use the images and an
individual’s likeness for commercial gain. Furthermore, the individual also grants third
parties that same right under the EULA. For example, a recent paragraph in Facebook’s
terms of service read,
1. For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos
and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the following permission,
subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to
use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP
License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have
not deleted it.
2. When you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to
emptying the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that
removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of
time (but will not be available to others) (Facebook, 2012, par. 4).
What is most concerning about online image storage and usage is not the “relatively”
short 95 year copyright protection that the government affords an individual, but the
ability for an image to survive and be used freely on the Internet for, hypothetically,
forever. Facebook’s terms specifically indicate that once content has been shared it will
not be deleted from another’s account even if the original individual deletes his or her
profile or profile content.
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Presently, there are countless numbers of images on the Internet. Individuals
currently post “selfies,” profile pictures, vines, and other such content featuring their
image without much thought to potential consequences. As FRT is employed more
frequently for secure access to property or privilege access the plethora of individual
photos may prove problematic for secure access. Individuals are likely to become
increasingly concerned about where their images reside and how they are being used
when the government and other businesses grant individuals access to their privileges
(government benefits) or property (bank accounts) through FRT. It remains unclear what
remedy, if any, an individual will have in controlling their image, unless it was taken in a
manner protected by the First Amendment or if the owner has protected the image with a
copyright.
A final thought concerning copyright and FRT revolves around the algorithms
and the data they produce. Suppose an image is copyrighted but FRT is still applied to
the image, keeping in mind multiple algorithms from different FRT vendors could be
applied to the image. Are the integers created by the algorithm protected under the
copyright? If the integers are protected under a separate copyright and the image can be
reverse engineered from the integers, who owns the resulting image and the underlying
data? These conflicts are bound to appear as courts deal with difficult questions.
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CHAPTER 7
HOW IS THE REGULATORY REGIME OF FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY EMERGING IN THE U.S.?
7.1. Stakeholders
A primary consideration of any multistakeholder process is the identification of
stakeholder groups, also referred to as stakeholders. Minue Hemmati (2002) defined
stakeholders as “[T]hose who have an interest in a particular decision, either as
individuals or representatives of a group. This includes people who influence a decision,
or can influence it, as well as those affected by it” (p. 2).

For the MSH process on facial

recognition technology four distinct stakeholder groups are represented. The groups were
determined by this researcher and citizen members of the public have yet to speak up and
identify themselves. The meetings include non-government organizations (NGOs),
academics, businesses (sometimes called industry or private sector and also includes
trade groups who represent several businesses), and government.
7.1.1. Non-Governmental Organizations
NGOs involved in the MSH process for FRT consist primarily of consumer
protection and privacy advocates. This stakeholder group consists of Consumer Action,
Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, American Civil
Liberties Union, Common Sense Media, Center for Democracy and Technology, Online
Trust Alliance, Technology Freedom, Secure Identity and Biometrics Association,
Computer Communications Industry Association, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
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This stakeholder group advocates for increased consumer protections, increased
protection of privacy, and increased transparency and choice offered by businesses.
NGO’s have been advocating for the responsible use and deployment of FRT, as well as
notification, transparency, and consumer choice, all of which will be explained in detail
later.
7.1.2. Academics
A number of academic presentations have been made to the group. Academic
presentations regard diverse issues, including the accuracy of FRT, how FRT works,
various uses of FRT, how FRT may be used to discriminate against vulnerable groups,
and how FRT can pose threats to privacy. Representatives of this stakeholder group
include UCLA, New York University Information Law Institute, Carnegie Mellon
University, and Rutgers. Academics have been invited by various stakeholder groups or
by the NTIA on behalf of a stakeholder group. Academics serve the group by filling in
gaps of knowledge that are not present by the stakeholders.
7.1.3. Businesses
Businesses have a vested interest in utilizing FRT. Facebook has the world’s
largest biometric database and its system works better than the FBI’s FR (Brandom,
2014). Business interests range from security, loss prevention, interactive advertising,
and a variety of authentication purposes. Members that have been identified in the
meetings include the Internet Association, International Biometrics and Identification
Association, Motorola, Interactive Advertising Bureau, NetChoice, IBG, Sotero Defense
Solutions, Business and Performance Research, Software Information Industry
Association, Application Developers Alliance, Computer Communications Industry
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Association, Direct Marketing Association, and Marketing Research Association. While
businesses have readily identified themselves as supportive of the process most have been
reluctant to discuss what they are doing or plan to do with the technology in the future.
As a general statement, business entities have advocated for minimal privacy protections,
wide latitude in deploying the technology, and minimal regulations to promote the
innovation of FRT.
7.1.4. Government
There have been two main government bodies represented at the NTIA MSH
meetings for FRT. The first is obviously the NTIA itself. The NTIA is housed in the
Department of Commerce and has been tasked with convening the MSH process for FRT.
The only notable foreign government represented has been the Information and Privacy
Commissioner’s office of Ontario Canada. Officials from this office have made
presentations at the meeting and have provided technical support for the duration of the
meetings. Other U.S. government agencies represented during the meetings have been
the Federal Trade Commission and the National Institute for Standards and Technology.
The FTC has made presentations about their enforcement authority as well as previously
identified best practices. NIST has provided technical expertise about the capabilities of
the technology.
7.2. Historical Results Impacting the Multistakeholder Process
for Facial Recognition Technology.
The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) directs the NTIA to convene MSH
processes regarding privacy issues. There was one previous MSH effort before the NTIA
convened meetings for FRT. During the Mobile Application Transparency Process
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(MATP) stakeholders met and ultimately created a code of conduct, yet stakeholders
encountered several sources of adversity that have impacted the FRT process. As
reported by the participants in the interviews conducted for this project, the adverse
sources included: perceived inefficiencies, issues of participation, differing expectations,
trust issues, and questionable motives regarding the outcome of the process. Historical
results and interaction of stakeholders are important to note for mediated discourse
analysis as they likely have an impact on the actions designated for the FRT code of
conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). Data that was recorded during the public
meetings for FRT will be reported with individuals’ names included; data recorded
during private interviews will be identified only by stakeholder groups to maintain the
confidentiality of the interviewees. Interviewee data is reported according to the
stakeholder group they represent, this does not imply that stakeholder groups are uniform
in their advocacy goals, interests, or knowledge base.
7.2.1. Inefficiencies
Inefficiencies in multistakeholder processes can transpire in a variety of forms.
Some sources of inefficiencies include participation (too much or too little), process
management , lack of information, decision making, and the inability to implement
results. As stated previously, the learning process is very important to multistakeholder
processes. Stakeholders need to know how companies use data and information in order
to understand what regulatory safeguards are needed.
Inefficiency 1: Participants and stakeholders may be reluctant to share information to
protect proprietary advantages or to avoid regulation. The MSH process can be slowed
or halted due to lack of information. According to Susan Grant (2014) of the Consumer
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Federation of America, “As you know I wasn't thrilled with the last process, but at least
we had active participants from the mobile app community.” Businesses were reluctant
to provide relevant information to the group in order to protect proprietary advantages
over other businesses that attended the meetings.
Inefficiency 2: Lack of participation by some stakeholders might best be categorized by
Huckin (2002) as discreet silences, or not revealing sensitive information. John Morris
(2014) of the NTIA stated:
My perception of how the last process played out is that a lot of
stakeholders kind of got more involved once the conversation moved to a
straw man or a set of principles or something….I think there's at least a
chance that if this group moves down a direction of actually talking about
principles, or a code, that there may be broader engagement.
This data shows the importance of active stakeholder involvement throughout the MSH
process. Stakeholders are cognizant of the importance of collaborating with all
participants to enhance their understanding of the problem’s challenges and solutions
(Gray, 1989, p.5). In the end, very few companies adopted the code; Intuit and Lookout
were among the few to adopt it (Tummarello, 2014). One possible reason for the limited
adoption of the code of conduct in the MATP was the delayed participation of
stakeholders until the code was being drafted. Businesses decided not to be actively
involved until the code of conduct was being drafted, presumably to protect competitive
advantages.
There were certainly inefficiencies early in the process. As it progressed,
and everyone was transitioning from the research and background into
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drafting a code, there were a lot of complaints that a few people in the
room ran away from, that and proposed language that others weren’t
happy with, but it was too late. The draft had been written and the
precedent had been set. (Business).
Lack of participation and information sharing by businesses in the beginning led to
creation of language in the code of conduct that, ultimately, very few were able to
implement.
Inefficiency 3: How decisions are made can have significant impacts on the efficiency of
MSH processes. During the MATP process, a drafting committee was formed to create
language for the code of conduct. There was a lack of transparency, or access to
information concerning the decisions being made, and stakeholders were left out of the
decision making process (Hemmati, 2002, p. 41). “So I don't think we are ready for a
drafting committee and I'm hoping we never get to a drafting committee as opposed to
some other way” (Business). This comment underscores previous comments made about
how “insular” the drafting group was. Creating a decision making process that was
inefficient was not a goal of the group. “Since I'm the one he's talking about I will say it
didn't happen on purpose that way. There were a lot of things that happened in the last
process and we were doing the best we could” (NGO). This comment suggests that
unfamiliarity with the MSH process in general may have contributed to the inefficiencies
experienced by stakeholders. Lack of familiarity with the MSH process was a theme
echoed by several interviewees. Borrowing from the literature, no “capacity building”
had transpired for the MATP (Antonova, 2011). Creating a complete code of conduct
and taking a vote on the final product led to animosity among stakeholders in the MATP.
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Ultimately, this decision making process increased tension among stakeholders, thus
voting on a final code of conduct with limited input from stakeholders led to a product
that few could adopt.
7.2.2. Participation
In MSH processes, who the stakeholders are and how they are able to participate
can have material consequences on results. Minu Hemmati (2002) defined participation
as “[T]hat all stakeholders have a voice in influencing decision-making. Participation is
the foundation of legitimacy in all democratic systems” (p. 41).

An NGO

representative noted, “What happens is big business gets behind these issues and put a lot
of money in their lobbyists and can over dominate discussion. That puts the advocates at
a disadvantage. So issues stall. That happened in do not track [Mobile Application
Transparency Process].” Money also makes attending the meetings easier as well, “The
other thing is also when you have these meetings they are all in D.C. and not all groups
are in D.C. who can afford to fly there all the time” (NGO). Mitroff (1983) noted that
resources impact the power stakeholders have to influence the process. No mention is
made of physical proximity to the MSH venue as a factor impacting stakeholder power.
Given the static nature of the venue, stakeholders with close proximity to the Washington
D.C. area have an advantage in terms of ease of attendance and cost savings in terms of
travel. This observation confirms that companies with greater financial resources can
have disparate effects on the process if they so choose (Mitroff, 1983).
Advocates have expressed frustration with what they feel is underrepresentation
compared to industry stakeholders. Underrepresentation appears to be mostly a financial
problem. Frustration has also been expressed in terms of limited financial resources in
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comparison to industry stakeholders, expressed in an interview that occurred July 23,
2014:
There are highly paid lobbyists or tech companies and they can spend all
day talking about the word "if" because that's what they are paid to do.
And you have the public interest community who numbers maybe five
advocates who care a lot about it but don't have the personnel to do
that…there's an imbalance there. Certain industry participants have
disproportionate financial means to influence the proceedings if they so
choose (NGO).
One individual felt that the MSH format favored industry participants, he stated in
an interview on October 13, 2014 “…[T]he structure would be unfair to non-profit
groups, consumer groups, because industry would be able to dominate those proceedings
in numbers [and] in terms of resources etcetera. So I've been critical” (NGO). Advocacy
stakeholders have expressed concern about representation from a purely numerical
standpoint. Industry stakeholders have countered these concerns by noting that only one
person can speak up at a time. In an interview occurring September 5, 2014 one business
representative expressed:
You can be company X and bring 20 people to the meeting, having 20
people there provides you no particular advantage other than it might look
good for people back at your company. If you’re a law firm having lots of
people there is good for your billable hours. I don't see that having any
impact on the process. [It matters little] if you represent yourself or a
gigantic company, the process tends to be quite a leveler (Business).
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While equitable numbers of stakeholder groups may provide individuals comfort,
meaningful participation adds value to the discussion (Mitroff, 1983). If stakeholders
cannot meaningfully contribute to the discussions at the forum, they are unlikely to be
influential in the process.
7.2.3. Business Resistance
The goal of the MSH process for MATP and FRT has been to create voluntary
codes of conduct. The academic literature notes that businesses are generally adverse to
regulation and therefore have reasons to resist the creation of new regulation (Kolk,
Tulder, & Welters, 1999, p. 152). This view is substantiated by one business participant
in this process in an interview occurring June 24, 2014:
I still think industry self-regulation is probably the best approach because
we also know the most about what we do. But there are benefits to this
process. If this discourages some consumer advocates from now
petitioning for these hard hammer laws then I think that's a real benefit
for everyone [emphasis added] (Business).
Stakeholders are mindful of the fact that refusing to negotiate on positions can have
adverse effects, “[I]t does force you to make a decision or balances that you probably
wouldn't have struck on your own. If you’re not open to doing that, this process is
quickly going to degenerate” (NGO). Business resistance is a legitimate concern of the
MSH process, one that was seriously discussed in the FRT process.
Two dominant positions have emerged from the MATP that are also present in the
FRT process. NGO’s have, mostly, advocated for legislation that provide “teeth” to the
principles that they are creating in the code of conduct. Many NGOs have expressed
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concerns that because the code of conduct is voluntary if the group enacts serious privacy
protecting principles companies will not agree to its implementation. Conversely, if the
group creates standards that are easy to implement and of poor quality many businesses
may sign on to the code out of convenience and to give consumers the pretense of real
privacy protection. Businesses also feel that they are in the best position to regulate the
technology and their own business practices because of their expertise in utilizing the
technology. Both stakeholder groups have legitimate positions. These positions have
been relatively stable throughout the current MSH process for FRT and both stakeholder
groups are cognizant of the other’s desires and their likely actions towards a code of
conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). The voluntary nature of the code of
conduct remains a point of contention for both groups. NGOs worry that businesses will
not sign on because of privacy protections, while businesses often worry about spending
time and resources on a code of conduct that ultimately no one will adopt.
7.2.4. Trust
Presumably, participants in the MSH process are there to develop codes of
conduct. Determining the motivations of participants is part of developing trust in other
stakeholders and the process in general. Stakeholder motivations for the FRT process
will be discussed in detail later. Some participants may not be interested in collaboration
“[A] source of adversity includes sometimes you have groups that are unwilling to budge
or want to use the NTIA process as more of a stage rather than a meeting room. That's
where you are going to see some challenges” (Business). Stakeholders have misgivings
about participants who are at the forum to grandstand rather than work towards the
development of a code, and are particularly cognizant of how fragile the MSH format can
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be. “The fact is, if you are not buying into the MSH process, you can end up sacrificing
[time and resources], essentially you can turn the whole thing into a farce very quickly”
(NGO). Due to the fragility of the process stakeholders have to trust that all participants
are interested in brokering a fair deal. Unwillingness to collaborate is detrimental to the
MSH process, and can determine its success or failure (Gray, 1989, p. 59). The concern
about the process failing is if some stakeholders feel they are better served by preventing
an agreement (Gray, 1989, p. 63).
With stakeholders obstructing the process trust is vital within the content of the
document. During the MATP there was concern that language proposed by participants
did not end up in the completed document, “Of course the concern is having gone
through this process once before, we sometimes know that brackets have a tendency to
just disappear and underlying text remains” (Business). Returning to issues where
immediate consensus could not be reached apparently resulted in the exclusion of
language that was important to certain participants.
Stakeholders have concerns about trust beyond the other participants in the room
and the document created. The convener of the meetings, the NTIA under the
Department of Commerce, has been a source of mistrust for some stakeholders, “Right
away I knew this was not a good way to develop privacy policies” (NGO). One
individual noted that the NTIA is housed in the Department of Commerce. The
participant felt that the NTIA was incapable of brokering a fair deal when the agency is
housed in a department whose main directive is to promote American business and has
not historically been involved in privacy protection, “It's corrupt in a sense that really the
loyalties of the Commerce Department are industry” (NGO). These comments make
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clear that certain stakeholders lack trust in the Department of Commerce, a question
substantiated by looking at the mission statement of the Department of Commerce, where
there is not a single mention of the word privacy. (See Appendix D for mission
statement).
7.2.5. Expectations
The codes of conduct created outline acceptable uses of the technology and are
prescriptive about aspects of the technology including data protection. The expectation
for a code of conduct is to be actionable so that companies can adopt it, “I would like to
see something that companies would actually sign onto and agree to follow and see where
we go with that” (NGO). Companies must adhere to responsible practices that can be
adopted and are actionable or consumers may choose other services. “And the question
is what can we actually get industry to agree to adhere to that will make consumers better
off. And frankly, the only thing that matters is whether they will come to the table and
sign on” (NGO). The ability to broker a fair deal is an important prerequisite to
collaboration (Gray, 1989, p. 62). Provisions in the code of conduct can determine
whether companies will sign onto the code of conduct or not. Code provisions must be
actionable so they can be implemented, but they must also protect consumers or
consumers may choose alternative services or products. Businesses may be reluctant to
agree to all consumer protecting provisions, in the meeting on December 15, 2014 Carl
Szabo of NetChoice stated:
I'm talking about the potential benefit to getting people to sign onto the
code. I'm going to look at Bill as the resident attorney at the big law firm
advising clients. But if you had a client asking you, “Hey should I expose
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myself to greater data breach liability?” you are probably going to say no
(Business).
Expectations from stakeholders are not to simply create a code of conduct, but create one
that can be adopted by companies to provide consumers with privacy protection.
7.2.6. Moderator
Moderators are responsible for facilitating MSH meetings, and they can have a
profound impact on the results of MSH processes. According to most interviewees, the
initial moderator for the MATP had a negative impact on the proceedings. One
interviewee summed the position up best in an interview occurring September 5, 2014.
We had a facilitator who was anything but. He was a condescending
jackass and tried to treat a room of hundreds of people as if they were
elementary school children. Which in one respect, if you knew a lot of
these people, you could understand why he might approach them that way,
cranky, childish (Business).
The relationship between the moderator and stakeholders can have an important impact
on the proceedings. The NTIA initially brought in an outside moderator, probably to
avoid being seen as biased, however the moderator lacked a significant stake in the
process. “What the mistake is, is they brought in a 3rd party facilitator and they [NTIA]
raised their hands as to giving it some direction” (NGO). The NTIA, in its effort to avoid
biased behavior, disengaged too much from the process, leading to conflict and a
deterioration of the process. One participant described the moderator’s effect on the
process as, “This wasn't going to work, it was going to fail. Part of it was the facilitator
was bad” (NGO). These views express the importance stakeholders place in the
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moderator for having satisfactory outcomes. Moderators can be productive facilitators
leading to productive outcomes, or can obstruct the process as was seen in MATP.
Academic literature also notes the importance of moderators on the process:
“Nevertheless, competent moderators who facilitate, push, and maintain the process were
seen as indispensable (Schwilch, et al., 2012, p. 56).
7.3. Previous Processes Regarding Facial Recognition Technology
The founding document that sought to regulate FRT was the Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights. The CPBR designated the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration to convene multistakeholder processes on a variety of privacy related
issues. After conducting a MSH process on mobile application transparency the NTIA
convened its second process on FRT. The NTIA multistakeholder process was also
predated by an FTC workshop on commercial uses of FRT, held in December of 2011.
The FTC invited “Researchers, industry representatives, consumer advocates, and privacy
professionals” (Federal Trade Commission, 2011). The workshop observed commercial
uses of FRT. For a month following workshop completion, public comments were
allowed concerning the content. The FTC received 80 public comments from a variety of
stakeholders. In October of 2012, the FTC issued a staff report entitled “Facing Facts:
Best Practices for Common Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies.” The report did
not cover every single use of FRT, but focused on commercial uses of the technology.
Stakeholders are often mindful, and in some cases involved, with previous processes and
those experiences inform their positions and thought processes for the current MSH
process on FRT. Understanding this history is important when tracking the creation of
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the current code of conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). The scope of the
current MSH process on FRT is discussed later in this chapter.
The FTC recommendations from the workshop were based on a March 2012 FTC
privacy report Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change and consisted of
privacy by design, simplified consumer choice, and increased transparency. “Privacy by
design” refers to the recommendation that companies should incorporate privacy
protections into each stage of the development of a product. “Simplified consumer
choice” specifies that companies be consistent with the context of a business relationship
or transaction, or provide consumers with an alternative option at an appropriate time.
Finally, “increased transparency” directed companies to make data collection and use
practices visible to consumers.
It is expected by this researcher that the regulation of FRT will emerge via the
MSH process. Diverse stakeholders have been invited to offer opinions and information
towards developing a voluntary code of conduct. According to Patrick Erwin (2011),
codes of conduct “are designed to explicitly detail an organization’s commitment to CSR
(corporate social responsibility) and outline expected conduct from the organization’s
employees” (p. 535).
7.4. The Current Multistakeholder Process on Facial Recognition Technology
The MSH process on FRT has not occurred in a vacuum. Stakeholders who are
interested in participating have preconceived notions about multistakeholderism. Some
of these notions may be informed by the previous MATP or experiences they have had in
the past with other processes. Gaining insight into what stakeholders perceive as the
benefits and deficits of the MSH process may affect how they approach the current
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process for FRT. Opinions differ, but they can be grouped into two broad categories;
those who perceive benefits from the process and those who have frustrations with the
process.
7.4.1. Perceived Benefits From the Multistakeholder Process
Multistakeholderism encourages collaboration and cooperation between diverse
interests. Often the process results in positive outcomes for most or all parties.
Stakeholders have noted the diverse interests represented in the MSH format and view
this diversity as a positive development. One interviewee expressed praise for the MSH
process stating in an interview on October 15, 2014:
I think one of the benefits to the MSH process is its casting a wider net.
It's inviting consumer and privacy advocates, academics, in addition to my
attendance there's been representatives from the Canadian government and
so it seems to be putting together a wider group of stakeholders (NGO).
The diversity of stakeholders has had a positive impact helping some understand the
technology better. One interviewee supported the academic literature on stakeholder
learning stating in an interview on June 23, 2014:
Well some of the benefits, clearly you are getting a much more expansive
view of the technology, you’re getting it from multiple perspectives, not
just the perspective of individual company products or an industry
association that wants to promote the technology itself without really
sensitivity, necessarily, to what other people might not be as enamored to
the technology, you get more breadth of opinion (NGO).
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Bringing together diverse parties not only aids in understanding the technology but also
in the outcome of the process, “[T]here's a benefit to having both parties at the table so
there's buy-in on both sides” (Business). When parties meet to discuss issues they
disagree on, they can come to solutions that both are willing to accept. This sentiment
was echoed by another stakeholder, “[I]t's a longer process but the benefit is you get a lot
more buy-in” (Business). There are business benefits identified with the MSH process as
well.
One of the motivators for stakeholder participation can be to avoid legislation by
Congress (Kolk, Tulder, & Welters, 1999, p. 152). Stakeholders have recognized that
participating in the MSH process on FRT may lead to better business outcomes. The
following analogy, provided by an interviewee on June 23, 2014, provides insight into
this line of thought:
[C]ongress has said, make the water cleaner. Now you can do that just by
fiat, the EPA can say here's how you are going to make the water cleaner.
Alternatively the EPA can get a bunch of people in the room and say "how
do we make the water cleaner in a way that has the least impact on your
business, has additional environmental benefits that we don't know about"
There can be a lot of value in that. In other words, you want to do as little
damage as possible and that's one of the things MSH is very good for.
(NGO).
Business participants recognize the potential to collaborate with other stakeholders and
achieve goals in ways that can enhance their business or at least limit any damaging
effects to their business interests. Stakeholders are also cognizant that legislation can
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often be a “one size fits all” approach to nuanced problems. One interviewee on June 24,
2014 phrased it as follows:
Sometimes legislation has a tendency to go down with more of a hammer,
than with a "let's identify the problem we are trying to address" which is
discrimination. Let's say you can't use FR for purposes of discrimination.
But it's much harder to get those very narrow tailored laws through. But
that type of nuance is something we can achieve through the course of
these MSH meetings (Business).
These comments echo the literature in that codes of conduct can create elaborate rules to
resolve problems (Erwin, 2011). Both business and privacy advocates realize that
Congress may not protect their interests as well as the MSH process; therefore, the threat
of legislation has been a source of industry motivation to participate in this process.
7.4.2. Criticism of the Multistakeholder Process
Just as there are perceived advantages to the MSH format, stakeholders also have
expressed several reservations about the format. Perhaps the most widely cited complaint
about the MSH format is the length of time it can take. One business participant stated:
“It's longer, it's a lot longer” (Business). An NGO participant confirmed the previous
observation stating: “What you sacrifice of course is speed” (NGO). Stakeholders are
frustrated with the amount of time and resources that the process demands. Participants
also recognize that quality products take time to develop and they do not want to rush
through the process either, “Yeah, we are trying to create something that lasts and Rome
wasn't built in a day, for lack of a better phrase, and of course that didn't last, maybe not
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the best analogy. But you get the point” (Business). In short, what is sacrificed in speed
may be gained in creating a quality outcome.
Another frustration with the MSH process on FRT for some stakeholder groups is
that its outcome is a voluntary code of conduct. The NTIA cannot compel individuals or
groups to participate. “So we did one already on mobile app transparency. It exposed
some value but also the difficulty in doing MSH absent underlying legislation. You
really do need a stick to get people to cooperate” (NGO). It is difficult to achieve
stakeholder cooperation for multiple reasons. Stakeholders may be reluctant to
participate in order to protect competitive advantages, discreet silences (Huckin, 2002).
One interviewee (September 17, 2014) was cognizant of the silence but was
understanding of their rationale:
That'd be great to get more information on their (business) process but I
recognize why a company doesn't want to tell us what they are doing or
planning or researching. I don't know what they would gain on the
corporate side (NGO).
Observers who do not participate in the process have caused some stakeholders
consternation. It is important to hear from business entities that are implementing the
technology or that have plans to. Knowing what businesses plan to do with the
technology can help enact privacy protections for those uses. Without this input, the
efficacy of the code of conduct may suffer.
7.4.3. Convener
The role and power of the convener have been broadly discussed in the literature
on MSH processes (Hemmati, 2002; Schwilch et al., 2012). In the current FRT case, two
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views have been expressed in relation to the NTIA, where the convener has faced
criticism refuting its stance as an impartial broker who facilitates the MSH process on
FRT. The NTIA is housed under the Department of Commerce. One stakeholder noted,
“[The Department of] Commerce has never historically been supportive of protecting
consumer privacy. Department of commerce is an agency that protects the interests of
American business” (NGO). After examining the Department of Commerce’s mission
statement, there is not a single mention of privacy included in the document (see
Appendix D for mission statement). On the other hand, the code of conduct created will
be enforced by the FTC under its Section 5 authority against unfair or deceptive
practices. Certain NGOs have suggested that the FTC would be a more appropriate
convener given its previous experience with the technology, as well as being the entity
that will enforce the code of conduct. “We recommended it to the White House to shift it
[MSH on FRT] to the FTC. The FTC recognizes that the Obama plan is basically a joke”
(NGO). This individual felt that, for political reasons, the FTC was not eager to convene
the MSH process on FRT; a MSH process for FRT convened by the FTC would likely be
seen as redundant given their previous efforts.
Other participants, though, felt that the FTC, as an enforcement agency, may not
be the most appropriate convener. One interviewee expressed his rationale in an
interview occurring September 25, 2014 as follows:
[T]he fact that they are an enforcement agency, they come at this with a
certain perspective; I think you can argue that NTIA may be a better
broker in this type of discussion. I think when you look at the agency or
the administration's influence on the process, I think you would see a
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heavier hand in some sort of FTC process. I think NTIA has really made
the best of, what is a difficult process [MSH processes generally, not FRT
specifically] (Business).
In fact, FTC representatives have echoed their support for the NTIA as convener. An
interview was conducted with an FTC representative occurring October 15, 2014 where
she expressed the following:
My thoughts to that are, we are observing this process and participating at
the meetings but really our role would come into play when we would
enforce the code or enforce against companies that said they would
comply with the code and then did not. Whereas [the] NTIA is working as
a convener of this process. So I think there are different roles
(Government).
Despite differing opinions on which agency is the most appropriate convener for
this process, stakeholders were also asked if they felt the NTIA had a particular influence
on the process. Several stakeholders acknowledged the difficulty of the process and felt
the NTIA has been a fair broker. One interviewee expressed the following (September
15, 2014):
I think from my perspective the Department of Commerce, the NTIA has
done a good job of bringing together… have done a good job of acting as
a convener of the meetings and organizing and helping to move the
discussion along amongst stakeholders. I feel like it's been a discussion
amongst the stakeholders at the meetings (NGO).
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It is important that stakeholders and the public feel that the NTIA, as convener, is a fair
broker in this process otherwise the legitimacy of the outcomes will be questioned. Other
stakeholders felt the NTIA did have a particular influence on the process. One
interviewee expressed the importance of the role of the NTIA in an interview occurring
June 23, 2014:
We wouldn't be here if they hadn't convened a process. That's important.
If somebody doesn't get the table and the room and get people talking and
give it a cover of officialness it won't happen. [However] the NTIA
doesn't have any power. They can't threaten to shut the process down and
just go with the civil society stakeholder proposal unless industry brings
something forward. So what they’re essentially doing is trying to convene
a group of people and cajole people. But… it's a tough task (NGO).
Stakeholders who felt the NTIA influenced the process indicated that the agency has
added legitimacy to the process. Even though stakeholders reported influence by the
convener, they felt said influence added legitimacy to the process which will hopefully
translate into broad agreement and adoption about the negotiated code provisions, “we
are here, giving you the venue, the time, we help convene, but we will not be an active
creator of standards, that makes it a little bit slower. They have their reasons for doing it
that way” (NGO.)
It is important that the NTIA is not seen as a creator of standards for the code of conduct.
If the NTIA was accused of creating standards, they may be accused of negotiated
rulemaking, which involves the creation of an advisory committee by an agency, the
NTIA in this case, for the purpose of creating rules (Coglianese, 1997, p. 1256). Creation
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of such a committee would undermine the structure and potential benefits of the MSH
format.
7.4.4. Scope
The FRT meetings began in February 2014, only several months after the June
2013 Snowden leaks concerning the National Security Agency (NSA) spying on the
American public. Through a series of revelations, highly publicized news reporting, and
an eventual Ted Talk (March, 2014), the American public became increasingly aware of
privacy issues and digital technologies. These revelations prompted some participation at
the FRT meetings to address what they perceived as a legitimate privacy concern
government use of FRT. However, the process was enacted to address commercial uses
of FRT, and not government uses. “I just think that the NTIA has a certain jurisdiction
and law enforcement is not within that jurisdiction it doesn't mean the process is invalid
just that it's not as broad as people would like” (NGO).
The frustration surrounding the inability to address governmental uses of FRT
have been an ongoing issue during the meetings. Business representatives in an effort to
avoid regulation want the process to be constrained so that they can continue to work
with government entities as a client. One interviewee noted the NTIA’s role in
constraining the scope of the process in an interview transpiring on September 5, 2014:
They have done a reasonably good job keeping it contained. One of the
flashpoints that keep coming up is Government access to FR data and
government use of FR data, which is completely outside the scope; and
different activists both left and right tried to take it in that direction and its

144

combination of most other people in the room as well as folks at NTIA
saying that’s not our purview at all. (Business).
At first glance there seems to be a very clear delineation between government and
commercial uses of FRT. However, the commercial sector often drives technology
innovation, and the government frequently contacts commercial entities as a customer for
the use of certain technologies. “Exactly, they [NTIA] don't want to go there and it's
another example of how constrained or restrained the process is” (NGO). Other
participants felt that government use could be in the scope of the process in the meeting
occurring February 6, 2014:
[W]e can talk about the role of commercial data collection in relation to
subsequent uses by the government, and it would fit the structures of the
purpose of the work. It doesn't run afoul of that, and I think it would make
the discussion a little bit more kind of refined… it just strikes me as the
right way to address the issue without restricting what the government
does (Unknown).
Some stakeholders feel that government use of FRT may not be out of the scope of the
process so long as the government comes to a commercial provider as a consumer.
However, enforcement of a code of conduct when the government is the customer
remains less clear. This has been a point of contention amongst stakeholders and the
convener since the first meeting (February 6, 2014):
The intent of this process is to implement the Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights and to draft a code of conduct that applies those top level principles
to commercial facial recognition technology. When companies adopt that
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code and move forward, the FTC has the authority to make sure they keep
their promises. The FTC does not have authority over government
entities. (Verdi).
Some privacy advocates feel that limiting the scope of the code of conduct to strictly
commercial use undermines the legitimacy of the code. Participants countered in the next
meeting (February 25, 2014) that government use was needed so they could determine
the overall protection level of the code. Chris Calabrese from the ACLU said,
I understand that this group cannot regulate what the Department of
Justice does or the Department of Homeland Security, that's self-evident.
However, it's equally evident, at least to me, that what the department of
Justice or state and local police choose to do with the technology impacts
the privacy of everyone it impacts whether I want to be in a biometric
system, whether I can give meaningful consent or not. So without
understanding those things I don't see how I can tell anyone yes this is a
privacy protective code or it isn't.
However, since the FTC does not have enforcement authority over other government
entities, it remains unclear how the code of conduct would apply to the government when
they act as a consumer of FRT.
Beyond contending with the U.S. government, and issues with the government as
a commercial customer, many of the companies involved in FR are global. Entities such
as Google and Facebook must comply with not only U.S. law but international law, as
well as the laws of the countries in which they operate. For the first time, during the
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December 15, 2014 meeting, a representative from Facebook articulated this
multinational view stating:
I think when we are looking at a lot of companies like Facebook, Google,
and others that are multinational. We have obligations in other
jurisdictions and by saying a U.S. based standard, even if it does evolve it
could prove problematic if there might be different standards. I'm trying
to be open-minded and look more towards the global view and hoping the
code be interoperable with other requirements in other jurisdictions
(Business).
The code of conduct is clearly limited to U.S. jurisdiction because of the FTC’s
enforcement capacity. Stakeholders must contend with the international nature of some
companies while also ensuring they comply with U.S. standards. It should be noted that
Facebook’s initial participation at the meetings was to try and avoid U.S. regulation.
The NTIA is charged with convening and moderating the MSH process on FRT,
but has also been influential in limiting the scope of what the group, and ultimately the
code, will address. One interviewee (June 24, 2014) described their role in limiting the
scope of the process as:
They also helped to keep it tailored. One of the things that John Morris
[Associate Administrator and Director of Internet Policy, John Verdi’s
boss] was lambasted about was the removal of government from this
[MSH process]. But it was important to remove that at the outset because
as much as we may want to limit government access… [An] industry code
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of conduct cannot regulate the federal government. That takes an act of
Congress or that takes an act of the executive branch itself. (Business).
The NTIA finds itself in a precarious position around the regulation of FRT with limited
ability to regulate government use, particularly after the Snowden revelations heightening
public awareness about government intrusions on individual privacy. In the public’s eye,
failure to adequately address the concerns of the stakeholders and the public could
jeopardize the legitimacy of the voluntary code of conduct.
7.4.5. Moderator
Several stakeholders expressed disappointment in the third party facilitator
initially brought in by the NTIA. Others expressed increased satisfaction after the
facilitator was replaced by John Verdi, the NTIA’s director of privacy initiatives since
2012. As one participant put it, “He [Verdi] is night and day from the professional
facilitator that we had for the first few meetings [of the MATP, April 2012]. It's pretty
amazing. John hadn't done anything like it before but he is a natural facilitator”
(Business). Broad stakeholder acceptance of the moderator is an important aspect of
facilitating MSH processes (Hemmati, 2002, p. 222). Verdi (2014) explained his role in
an interview as strictly a facilitator, he noted:
I'm a facilitator. That's it. [T]here are different models; I'm not an active
chair. There are some organizations that have an active chair that rules up
or down on issues. I don't do that. I don't hold the pen on drafts. I
facilitate discussion. I try to identify areas where conversation is going to
be constructive. I try to help folks identify and refine areas of agreement
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and sort of work towards consensus on areas of disagreement. But it's
facilitation pure and simple (John Verdi, 2014, used with permission).
Being a facilitator in this way limits the opportunities for stakeholders and observers to
claim that the moderator is influencing the process. Verdi has been explicit about his role
with stakeholders which is another important aspect of facilitating MSH processes. Verdi
also has a background in computer programming, privacy advocacy, and is a lawyer, so
he is “representative of the various stakeholder groups” and has valuable knowledge that
contributes in identifying issues and promoting consensus (Hemmati, 2002, p. 222).
Contrarily, an approach that is too involved also caused problems with the previous
process on mobile apps. Verdi may be aware of his role in facilitating the process due to
his previous experience as a privacy advocate.
John Verdi remains the moderator for the MSH process on FRT. It is important to
note that Verdi could be seen by some stakeholders as inherently biased. Formerly, John
Verdi was senior counsel at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). EPIC is an
important non-profit organization that advocates for privacy self-described as, “EPIC is
an independent non-profit research center in Washington, DC. EPIC works to protect
privacy, freedom of expression, democratic values, and to promote the Public Voice in
decisions concerning the future of the Internet” (Electronic Privacy Information Center,
2015b). Despite being a former privacy advocate, stakeholders seem receptive to Verdi
moderating the meetings. During the current process, stakeholders have expressed
positive sentiments about John, stating. “I respect John; he has done a really good job in
a difficult position in terms of having to corral a lot of people with different viewpoints
and can be hostile” (NGO). Having broad stakeholder support for the moderator is
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certainly a positive aspect of this process, especially considering that the animosity
towards the previous facilitator had a negative impact on the MATP. Stakeholders kept
the moderator who was productive at facilitating the process, an action drawn from
historic results (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).
Beyond having a personal affinity for Verdi, stakeholders attribute positive
facilitation of the meetings to his moderation style. His facilitation of the meetings has
been described in the following terms: “I feel like John Verdi and the NTIA have been
very good at trying to speak with everyone and get everyone involved and make sure
people are heard and run the meetings so they are efficient” (NGO). The previous
observation was confirmed by another participant who stated, “I think John Verdi has
done a really good job of trying to make it much more inclusive” (Business).
Stakeholders seem to not only appreciate Verdi, but the NTIA’s job of inviting
stakeholders and making their contributions heard and valued. “I applaud John Verdi for
being able to facilitate such a diverse group” (Business). Verdi seems to have garnered
the respect of many participants involved in the process
7.4.6. Participation
As with the MATP, issues of participation again cropped up in the FRT process.
There are other groups that some feel have been left out. “There's no minorities, there's
no academics. The NTIA has been just terrible. The NTIA is a creature of the industry
ultimately and the NTIA has no courage, no interest” (NGO). These comments are
directed at the NTIA because they are housed within the Department of Commerce,
which is mandated to support American business. No minority advocacy groups have
been explicit about their participation in this process; the groups closest to representing
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minorities would be the ACLU and Common Sense Media. As to the statement that there
are no academics, this is patently false, but there are individuals who would like more
presentations from academics to be made in order to increase stakeholder-knowledge on
the issues and technology. Susan Grant of Consumer Federation of American explained
to the group in the meeting occurring April 29, 2014 that companies who operate/employ
FRT are missing from this process:
As you know I wasn't thrilled with the last process, but at least we had
active participants from the mobile app community. We don't have the
active participants that we need in this [process]. We've got the vendors,
but I think very little of this has to do with the vendors actually and more
of it has to do with the users of facial recognition and we don't have them
actively participating (NGO).
Google was noticeably absent for the entirety of the process, Facebook has been mostly
absent, and both have been a source of concern for some stakeholders. There are two
ways of addressing the silence that Google and Facebook have exhibited. These
businesses would describe themselves as employing discreet silences in not wanting to
reveal sensitive business practices (Huckin, 2002). Conversely, these companies can also
be viewed as employing manipulative silences to deliberately conceal current or future
business practices that they wish not to fall under the code of conduct (Huckin, 2002).
“[W]ill the NTIA ask that Google and Facebook present for the next session” (NGO).
This question was immediately followed up in the next meeting on March 25, 2014 by
Jeff Chester from the Center for Digital Democracy:
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I have a question John. At the last meeting I, and I think we were
seconded by several others, asked that Google and Facebook come to this
meeting to talk about what they do in terms of commercial recognition
given the fact [that] they are market leaders, to explain what they do and
what they plan to do. When we talked yesterday you told me that you did
request that they speak and that they declined (NGO).
Despite the NTIA making the requests, the MSH process is voluntary, thus facilitators
cannot compel groups to come forward and share information. As previously discussed,
businesses have legitimate reasons to keep proprietary information private to protect their
competitive advantage in the marketplace.
There have also been issues of false or incomplete representation among
stakeholders.27 There has only been one instance, so far, of a stakeholder misleading
participants as to the totality of the constituents they represent, a manipulative silence
(Huckin, 2002). While this was a brief point of contention, it was most likely known by
all stakeholders involved in the MATP that Mr. Sperapani represented the Application
Developers Alliance, which “[I]s a non-profit global membership organization that
supports developers as creators, innovators, and entrepreneurs. We promote the continued
growth of the industry and advocate on behalf of our members on public policy and
industry issues” (Application Developers Alliance, 2015). Misrepresentation could cause
confusion or lead to animosity amongst participants as was seen in the MATP.

“Chris Calabrese- I'll ask a moderately pointed question. You introduced yourself as Tim Sperapani
concerned citizen, are you representing app developers who want to adopt a code as part of this process.”
Tim Sperapani- “Yes and they do want to adopt a code”
27
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7.4.7. Expectations
During the meetings, the moderator has repeatedly stated that the goal of the
CPBR and the NTIA is a voluntary code of conduct for FRT to protect consumer privacy.
This goal has been questioned by Chester and by the convener at the March 25, 2014
meeting.
This is a stakeholder driven process. What we just heard [is] that the
NTIA goal, the administration’s goal, is to develop a code of conduct.
But… if the stakeholders decide that it's too premature… to develop a
code, then won't in fact [the] NTIA and the administration simply accept
the will of the stakeholders?
This was the first occurrence of a participant questioning the stated outcome of the
process. NGO participants have expressed a strong desire to provide consumers with
robust privacy and data protections, if that cannot be achieved they are unwilling to
endure the process for a result that will question their legitimacy and abilities in the eyes
of their constituents. The fact that the process could end without achieving the stated
outcome after only three meetings caught the moderator off guard. Verdi countered, “It's
a stakeholder driven process… with the goal of developing a code of conduct. Is your
goal to develop a code of conduct or to not develop a code of conduct?” Jeff Chester
(Center for Digital Democracy) responded in kind stating:
My goal is to protect privacy. But I'm certainly not willing… I could not
be railroaded to do it because that would not be dealing with the public
interest that I hold in my job. So it's a stakeholder driven process with
conditions and that's quite interesting.
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At this point the ACLU decided to support the notion that acceptable privacy protections
must be achieved by this process or the NGO participants could not participate further.
Calabrese stated:
I think Jeff's got a point. Fairly stated, the end goal is to advance privacy
through a code of conduct. However, if the stakeholders can't do that then
we won't have a code of conduct. You know, I think that goes without
saying doesn't it?
The exchange clarified that everyone had the same expectations; to create a code of
conduct. The discussion also highlighted the power stakeholders have to ensure a strong
code of conduct is created, particularly one that protects consumer privacy. Expectations
were again questioned as issues of representation cropped up later in the same meeting.
Rather than scrap the process if a code of conduct could not be created Susan Grant
proposed an alternative way forward.
I'd like to make a constructive suggestion picking…if we shouldn't be
thinking more in the way of principles and less in the way of a code of
conduct, that we have no indication that the real players here are going to
help fashion and adopt anyway.
Grant was unsure that the current expectations for the group could be met and tried to
further privacy protection via less formalized principles, similar to the best practices
issued previously by the FTC.
7.5. New Strategies Adopted to Encourage Stated Outcome Success
As stated in the MDA discourse, historic positions and actions can affect the
actions presently taken by individuals, thus understanding how the historic results affect
154

future action is important for the present study (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). The
current MSH process on FRT has had the benefit of learning from the experiences of the
previous effort on the MATP. Some stakeholders have been involved in both of the
processes. One of the frustrations with the last process was the limited adoption of the
created code of conduct. Participants voiced varied opinions about the final code of
conduct and its adoption. Some participants were convinced it the process was wasted,
“It wasn't adopted at all” (Business). Others felt there was limited adoption, “I think
there were only two or three companies that signed on” (NGO). The most positive
comment regarding the previous code of conduct was this, “So we came up with
something and that was fairly successful” (NGO). Current stakeholders are cognizant of
the limited adoption of the previous code of conduct and have been mindful of trying to
improve the adoption rate. “I'm also coming from it from the angle of I don't want to see
it end up where the last approach did where basically only one company signed on,
because the document was that unworkable” (Business). These comments suggest that
stakeholders are aware of the results of the previous process and are willing to pursue
strategies that will encourage wider adoption of the code of conduct for FRT.
7.5.1. Personal Communication Strategies
Since the comments from interviewees and individuals during the meetings
suggest that many stakeholders had a negative experience during the first process,
stakeholders skeptically entered the second process. One potentially positive outcome
from the first process is that the stakeholders learned what processes help develop a code
of conduct and which do not. Learning about the process was as important as learning
about fellow stakeholders.
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Learning about other participants is also important. The NTIA also learned the
importance of having a moderator who can manage the process in an effective manner.
Stakeholders involved in both processes have been mindful of the importance of
respectful communication, as well as learning about the organizations and their goals.
These previous experiences align with certain aspects of capacity building discussed in
the literature. With these experiences in mind, stakeholders took steps to ensure that they
had a more positive experience with the second process. “I think everyone’s been very
respectful” (NGO). “It’s gone a lot better than the last one so far” (Business).
Stakeholders appear to have adopted new modes of conduct and interaction with one
another to create a more positive and productive atmosphere. “I don't think people are
being willfully problematic this time around and I appreciate that” (NGO). Stakeholders
have strategized ways to compromise and are respectful of diverse views. While mostly
negative feelings about the MATP persist, stakeholders appear to have put that
experience largely behind them and are creating an atmosphere of “good faith.”
Stakeholders have changed their approach to the MSH process in several ways.
From the comments listed previously in the MATP, it is evident that there was animosity
in the room; one stakeholder went as far as to call other participants “pretentious.”
However, the FRT process has resulted in a different group dynamic as reported by in
one interview occurring August 6, 2014.
At the last process I think some people’s reputations hampered their
ability to make their points. There were a few people on the mobile app
that were obstructive, or oppositional, or to prevent any compromise from
happening. Those people were not seen favorably by the group (NGO).
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Participants seem conscious of the fact that to achieve a positive outcome they need to
engage respectfully with one another.
7.5.2. Decision Making Strategies
Aside from participants being respectful of one another, stakeholders changed the
way that they make decisions throughout the process. For instance, they found during the
first process that voting on a finalized code of conduct at the end created arguments and
limited adoption. However, they changed the format for the process on FRT as noted by
Carl Szabo of NetChoice at the November, 6 2014 meeting:
One of the nice things I think we have done this time around, and the
lessons learned, is we have avoided putting the cart before the horse like I
think we did last time. Last time, a couple people quickly ran to the pen
and started writing a code of conduct and then we started talking about the
big issues and that's where things broke down. That's why I think you
have seen so little adoption as we have from last time.
Stakeholders learned that this decision making approach hampered the creation of an
effective code of conduct that could be widely adopted by companies. This comment
also acknowledges the learning that has occurred amongst the stakeholders. The
importance of learning in MSH processes cannot be overstated as “MSPs will only
[emphasis added] work if all participants are willing to learn from each other. (Hemmati,
2002, p. 53). Having an insular group drafting language was not effective, thus “Going
forward in this process we are trying to completely avoid that” (Business).
Stakeholders have learned from their past mistakes, thus have changed the way that they
make decisions in the MSH process for FRT.
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By avoiding insular drafting groups, stakeholders hope the adoption of a new
decision making process will achieve wider acceptance of a code of conduct. One
interviewee described the new decision making process on September 5, 2014:
[T]he benefit of going through that mess [MATP] was learning what
works, how to work together to find common ground, how to work
towards that common ground between parties that tend to not cooperate on
anything. It was a very long painful dry run to work out a lot of the things
that don't work. The key thing that was dropped…was the idea of having
a small group of people who were designated as the drafting team
(Business).
Stakeholders have adopted a more piecemeal fashion of making decisions on multiple
smaller issues rather than one comprehensive code. The new decision making process
has evolved in stages. The first stage identifies an issue the group thinks they can come
to an “easy” or relatively easy consensus on. This is a best practice cited in the literature:
“It was recommended that MSPs should always tackle the easiest objectives and common
ground first in order to build trust and pull out some real initial achievements; then it can
start to face the more contentious areas” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 116). Then individuals draft
code language on that issue, where individuals volunteer based on interest or specialized
knowledge. The draft code language is then brought back to the group to decide if
consensus can be reached. Assuming consensus is reached, the language is “frozen” and
stakeholder groups can take it back to their constituents for comments and suggestions.
This point was explained in an interview occurring September 5, 2014 as:
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There have been sort of small groups of people that have gotten together
to hash out lists, they don't make decisions but they make lists. What are
the things we need to worry about on topic X. So you have a group of
people working on definitions and coming up with common definitions
that the group can look over and work on. Eventually perhaps agree on
(Business).
The definitions list is included in Appendix C for illustrative purposes. This approach
has been supported by a number of stakeholders. Bill Baker of Motorola supported the
notion at the April 29, 2014 meeting stating:
What I might prefer we have, is a point of where we have little drafting
committees taking on pieces of it instead of one drafting committee taking
on the whole thing which I didn't think was a particularly good way of
getting it done last time.
Stakeholders have decided to have multiple working groups for issues. Participants hope
that having multiple small groups working on issues will achieve broad consensus not
experienced at the MATP and produce better outcomes. Evidence suggests that certain
stakeholders are happier with this approach: “It's gone a lot better than the last one so far”
(Business).
Stakeholders are not the only groups who have supported a change in the decision
making approach. An interview respondent explained it as follows (September 25,
2014):
This time around I think NTIA has been careful not to have groups come
to the table too early with a complete code which then becomes the base
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draft. Instead trying to piece that together as more section by section and
more based on where the group can find consensus. I think to their credit
they are trying to be a little more, I don't know inclusive in the drafting
process (Business).
Stakeholders would soon learn, however, that the new approach was not without its own
set of problems.
Some stakeholders expressed frustration with the smaller groups. “One of the
problems with this process is that there's no executive committee or a designated group of
people to actually draft something” (NGO). Despite not having a designated drafting
committee, other participants felt that drafts would still get done, “My experience last
time is the way this tends to work is you find a couple of people on the same page as you
and you look for some buy in. That may not work on a piece by piece basis” (NGO). A
fragmented approach lacks a complete document to work with and has resulted in new
frustrations such as increased length of the process. Walter Hamilton, of the IBIA, at the
December 15, 2014 meeting noted:
I might also say that… I have no real issue with most of the language that
is there, but it's me speaking for myself. We have not had… [an]
opportunity to go back and fully vet this language, or the code in general
since this is a piecemeal approach, with our members and down through
our members to their customers where there could be legitimate concerns
expressed about various aspects of this. That's where we are today.
Without a complete document it is difficult for stakeholders to take anything substantive
back to their constituents. Since some stakeholders represent several companies
160

soliciting all of their opinions and meaningful comments is very important. “This
demonstrates the need for participants to work closely with their constituencies,
particularly in MSPs which aim at agreements and implementation” (Hemmati, 2002, p.
117). A third decision making process was suggested to avoid previous problems and
any current complications that may arise from the new fragmented approach.
To avoid the problems of the MATP as well as the complications arising from the
disjointed format adopted in the FRT process, it was suggested that the NTIA hold the
pen as an independent unbiased body. Yet, there are limits to what the NTIA feels
comfortable contributing in this process. The NTIA has defined their role in the process
and self-imposed not drafting language for the group. Verdi in the November 6, 2014
meeting stated:
I actually don't have authority to say NTIA can pick up the pen on
something like this. To be honest, it makes me a little nervous to have
NTIA do much more than we have which is group issues, figure out
related stuff, mechanical fair broker type process. That is something I'm
comfortable doing because I think it helps the group move forward and
I'm using stakeholder language. In terms of NTIA picking up the pen and
creating language, my suspicion is that will cause angina. I don't know
that’s the role that we are best situated to play in the process but I am
happy to take it back.
This suggestion received resistance from other stakeholders, particularly Szabo of
NetChoice stating:
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I was going to second your comments just from the optics of it. The optics
of the government, it might be misconstrued as the government is creating
a privacy policy, can we really trust them after all the issues that they have
had recently.
The suggestion for the NTIA holding the pen on a complete code of conduct was not
adopted. In fact, the opposite has tended to be the case; rather, the NTIA has been
instrumental in getting stakeholders to hold the pen on various issues. “But who wants to
take the pen on this?” “Others who want the pen?” The NTIA has been vocally hesitant
to even appear to hold the pen on any issue. Verdi offered an alternative option stating:
A third way to do this is I can comb through I, John Verdi, can comb
through the documents submitted by stakeholders and other principal
documents submitted…and put together a combined document which
won't look like a rational code and isn't me holding the pen because I will
just copy and paste.
This supports the position of the NTIA as strictly a process facilitator. The NTIA has the
difficult job of moving the process forward while traversing diverse views and a
complicated past with the MATP. It makes sense some participants would want the
NTIA to hold the pen to avoid the drafting problems experienced in the MATP.
However, if they do create the draft language, it would no longer be a stakeholder driven
process and would detract from the legitimacy of the MSH format. The NTIA has been
mindful of both of these views and has struck a middle ground between them by
compiling comments received from stakeholders; in doing so, they help to facilitate and
move the group forward, while maintaining transparency and adjusting any language
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submitted in view of the whole group. In fact, Verdi has the webcast cameramen show
before and after screen shots of code language so that viewers at home can see what has
been changed. Providing this level of transparency and facilitation is a good compromise
between holding the pen and maintaining the legitimacy and benefits of the MSH format.
7.6. Complications With the Multistakeholder Process on
Facial Recognition Technology
7.6.1. Disparate Opportunities to Participate in the Decision Making Process
Despite adopting new strategies for making decisions, not all stakeholders have
had equal influence on the process. The meetings can be “attended” in one of three ways:
physically, via telephone, or via webcast streaming. These three methods are employed
to facilitate convenient access to the meetings. An unintended consequence of these
modes of access is stratification of participation, and thus influence.
Ease of attendance and financial travel savings are not the only advantages for
stakeholders who can physically attend the meetings. “Unfortunately, when you are on
the phone you have about one tenth the ability to interact and such” (NGO). An
interviewee provided further insight (October 15, 2014):
I think you are limited by calling in mainly because it's hard to break into
a conversation that’s going on among a bunch of people in a room if
you’re on the phone. I also think you are a little more limited because it's
hard to maintain focus for four hours if you’re on the phone (NGO).
Through meeting observation, participants are able to monitor the process and contribute
over the phone, but in limited ways. Attendees in the room can speak into the
microphones located at their seats at almost any time they desire, though there is usually
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an order designated by the moderator. For phone participants, the moderator designates
to the operator when to enter “Q and A” mode where phone participants can be heard by
the rest of the group. Callers are muted by the operator when not in “Q and A” mode.
Additionally, stakeholders who monitor the meetings via the streamed webcast have no
opportunity for interaction with the proceedings, as there is no way for webcast viewers
to communicate with the group. Therefore, stakeholders who are able to physically
attend the meetings have a distinct advantage if trying to influence the process.
The NTIA has done a good job of being inclusive and inviting diverse
stakeholders according to participants. Various communication channels, represented in
the NTIA meetings, all have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Electronic
communication has the benefit of “neutralizing differences in status and personality as
related to gender, age and ethnicity” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 87). Electronic communication
also focuses attention on the content of the communication rather than the subject.
However, electronic communication also promotes heterogeneity in the group and may
be ideal for gathering diversity of opinion on a given matter (Hemmati, 2002, p. 87).
Since the NTIA will convene another MSH process on drones, they should consider
adding an interactive component to the webcast so that online participants can more
effectively engage with the process.
7.6.2. Perceived Representation Issues
The NGO representatives in the FRT meetings have voiced concerns to this researcher
that they lack the resources of industry members (August 6, 2014).
There are two advocates in the room, not everyone can be at every
meeting. There probably isn't more than ten of us. [There are usually 40164

50 participants in the room at any given meeting] I think we are
outnumbered by other interests. We don't have the capacity to monitor on
the advocacy side. Everyone who goes has to be strategic about what they
are doing (NGO).
NGOs continued to discuss their limited resources stating, “In addition there are about
five or six advocates and the rest more or less are from industry. Of course the
advocates, not only do we have small organizations but we are dealing with multiple
issues” (NGO). As the literature has shown, privacy is a complicated issue that is of
primary concern in many venues, thus advocates must choose strategically where to
deploy their resources. However, other stakeholders, representing business interests, do
not view numbers or resources as an issue. These stakeholders contend that bringing
value to the discussion is the most important aspect of a stakeholder’s participation, a
position supported in the academic literature (Mitroff, 1983). If a stakeholder can
contribute to the discussions meaningfully then they will be heard, regardless of who they
represent or what their resources are. An interviewee expanded on this view stating
(September 5, 2014):
There is a guy, an elderly man who is a consultant, he is extremely cranky
but he has been an interesting addition to the mix. He doesn't represent
anyone other than himself but he speaks up and he has sometimes very
useful things to add to the process and therefore he is influential. It
doesn't matter; do you bring anything of value? Do you bring value when
you speak and participate? That's the most important thing (Business).
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There are differing opinions present about representation in terms of numbers and
representation, in terms of value added to the discussion. Stakeholders are generally
referred to in the literature in terms of unique knowledge, experiences, or resources, not
in terms of their numbers (Gray, 1989; Mitroff, 1983). Participants can add value to the
discussion in a variety of ways, including expertise, practical solutions to implementation
problems, and clarification of diverse views, all of which can help facilitate consensus.
One participant’s contribution in the meetings is to clarify complicated views that appear
to be oppositional. However, he is usually able to strike a compromise. Hearing from
groups that would actually adopt the code of conduct is an important part of the process
as well.
Those who are to adopt the code of conduct need to be represented and have their
input heard. This view was expanded upon in the first meeting (February 6, 2014).
I mean my recollection of the previous one [process]… a lot of people that
weren't involved in it. And I think it would be a really good idea to make
sure that everyone that might be impacted by this, [code] because even
though it's not a regulation the people that might be encouraged to adopt
it, ought to all try to be in the room…(Unknown).
In the MATP, the late participation of groups who were to adopt the code of conduct
produced a multitude of problems in adoption of the code; stakeholders for the FRT
process remember these issues and have tried to incorporate stakeholders who would
adopt the code from the beginning of this process. Despite their efforts, there is a
continuation of this trend as many potential adopters have yet to provide meaningful
input into the process, at least initially.
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7.7. Towards Creating a Code of Conduct
As a result of the efforts to increase respectful dialogue between stakeholders and
adopt a more effective decision making process, stakeholders are more satisfied with this
process than the MATP. Respectful communication has led to stakeholder collaboration
on draft code language, as well as offline meetings to discuss differing views in an effort
to reach a compromise on issues.
Part of the benefit of a negative initial start is learning which processes are most
effective at creating a code of conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). The last
process involved a group of people drafting code language and then conducting a group
vote at the end. This process was not productive in creating a code of conduct. Marking
the differences between the two processes highlights effective strategies for future use.
The FRT process has differed from the mobile app process in that the group has
decided to tackle issues in a piecemeal fashion, whereas the last process had a small
group bring back a complete code to the group. The moderator has suggested and
directed the group toward issues that appear to lend themselves to easier consensus, so
called “low hanging fruit.” Parties who are interested in a specific topic or topics have
the ability to form a small group to develop draft language; afterwards, the entire group
can add comments or suggestions and vote on whether it is acceptable. While this way of
creating a code of conduct may be easier to reach consensus on, there have been some
concerns about where to include certain items in the code. Stakeholders are concerned
that as items are tabled for inclusion into other sections of the code of conduct, they may
be forgotten.
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Once sections of the code come back from the drafting group, they are presented
to the group. If the group approves the language initially, it is “frozen” so that
stakeholders can take the language back to their members and receive comments from
their constituents before the language is finalized for the code of conduct.
7.8. Conclusion
The regulatory regime of FRT is emerging via the MSH format. Stakeholders
have experienced a variety of challenges, creating a voluntary code of conduct that
includes representation issues, disparate opportunities to influence the meetings, limited
regulatory scope, and differing views of expected outcomes. The process has succeeded
in bringing together diverse groups to holistically represent the technology and its
capabilities. Stakeholders have worked to adopt productive strategies for creating
regulation, including respectful discourse, completing small sections of code that can be
agreed on instead of decision making from a completed code perspective, and early
interaction with representative stakeholders. Although the process is far from completed,
stakeholders have expressed positive sentiments about the FRT process and its expected
outcome.
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CHAPTER 8
REGULATION OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
In this chapter, I will discuss the development of regulations for facial recognition
technology. This development has been influenced by the knowledge obtained from
experts, as well as discussing the various modalities of FRT and the privacy implications
that are attached to each use. Extensive discussion of these privacy implications are
covered in chapter nine. Stakeholders continue to grapple with issues related to
providing appropriate consumer privacy protections.
As discussed earlier, stakeholder learning is a continuous part of the
multistakeholder process and an intangible outcome of the proceedings (Argyris, 1976;
Held, 2006; Gray, 1989; March, 1991; Roome & Wijen, 2006). The first part of the
MSH process on FRT, between February and April 2014, was dedicated mostly to
exploration learning or seeking new information on the technology (March, 1991). Not
all stakeholders entered the process with the same amount of knowledge regarding FRT.
In the first few meetings, stakeholders spent a majority of their time listening to technical
experts reporting on the capabilities of the technology and had the opportunity to ask
questions. In an effort to learn more about the technology, stakeholders wanted to know
where the technology was deployed, how it was being used, what the anticipated future
uses were, along with other relevant contextual information.
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8.1. Deployment of Facial Recognition Technology
At the first meeting, February 6, 2014, Microsoft presented to the group about
their use of FRT, which they utilize in their Xbox gaming platforms. Specifically the
game system works in conjunction with Xbox Kinect.28 Kinect tracks the game player’s
body movements and has the on screen character mimics the users; for example, if the
user jumps so does the onscreen character. Microsoft built a user notice into the system
that alerts the user to the use of FRT, which operates via a colored light on the gaming
system. Microsoft also allows the games to be played without the use of FRT, so users
can turn it on and off as they see fit. However, Kinect also includes an audio detection
component that is always on, “In fact, the new camera and microphone system is so
sensitive to your presence, that Microsoft says the new Kinect can even read your
heartbeat while you're exercising, and recognize and process audio that's personalized to
specific individuals” (Sottek, 2013). Notice and choice, as well as the ability to turn FRT
on and off, are important concepts that merit their own discussions and will be addressed
later in this chapter.
At the second meeting, February 25, 2014, Marc Vaillant from Animetrics
informed stakeholders of the accuracy of the technology currently deployed as well as the
factors that affect the accuracy of FRT. Vaillant discussed technical aspects of FRT
including lighting, pose, false positives, false negatives, and other confounding variables
to accuracy discussed previously in chapter two. Depending on the application, there are
reasons to have higher and lower accuracy rates.

28

Xbox Kinect is an add on product to the Xbox gaming system and works by utilizing a camera to track
body movement, gestures, and even voice commands.
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Noticeably absent from the meetings were two of the largest companies deploying
FRT: Google and Facebook. Facebook finally contributed to the meetings on December
12, 2014. Their unwillingness to present has been a source of frustration for some
stakeholders. Nonetheless, several other companies presented information to the group
about the usage of FRT and its best practices.
At the third multistakeholder meeting, March 25, 2014, Alessandro Acquisti from
Carnegie Mellon University presented a proof of concept study. In this study Acquisti
determined a student’s identity while they filled out a three page privacy survey. His
experiment proceeded in several stages:
So the first experiment, online to online, the idea is we use data from
social networks, where people use their names to identify profiles on
dating sites where people do use their photos because [if there are] no
photos, no date. But they don't use their names because there is still a
certain social stigma associated with using online sites for that (Aquisti,
2014).
Our identities are negotiated in the physical world but also online. Acquisti notes the
importance of selective anonymity online. Consumers reveal a great deal of information
about themselves via social networking sites and yet value a certain amount of anonymity
in certain online interactions, in this case online dating. The experiment tested whether
an individual could reveal personal information and still remain anonymous:
Now clearly our goal was not to expose these users. Rather, it was to see
whether it is even possible to remain anonymous online if you are using
your face. And, therefore, if you make yourself trackable across different
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sites. [In] this approach we identified one out of ten dating site members
(Acquisti, 2014).
As this experiment shows, an individual’s face has the ability to link known profiles with
anonymous profiles online. Currently, the technology is limited in its ability to make
these linkages, but as the accuracy of the technology continues to improve, and as
consumers continue to upload dozens of images of themselves online, we can expect
anonymity, and privacy by extension, to erode. However, this technology is not limited
to just exposing anonymity online:
Now the second study was offline to online. The same idea only now the
anonymous photo was taken from offline specifically from students
walking in a campus building. The subjects were asked to sit in front of a
desk and we took three shots of them using a cheap webcam. Using this
approach we identified one in three subjects in the second experiment
(Acquisti, 2014).
As the second experiment demonstrates, FRT possesses the ability to take anonymous
individuals in the physical world and identify them via content they have posted online.
Before FRT, individuals involved in unpopular speech or found in compromising
situations could expect to remain anonymous; however, now with cloud computing and a
camera phone these individuals can be identified.
Losing anonymity, and by extension privacy, is a compelling enough reason to be
concerned about the accuracy and increased utilization of FRT but the technology can
also reveal additional sensitive data. In a previous proof of concept study Acquisti and
colleagues demonstrated an ability to predict social security numbers from profile
172

information found on social networking sites. In his follow up study Acquisti was able to
derive a social security number from an individual’s image.
In other words, can we predict a social security number from a face?
And the answer is yes. It’s difficult of course, the accuracy as you can see
keeps degrading. Its proof of…. a broader phenomenon that I call data
accretion. The term is beautiful term that is not due to me and due to Paul
Hall a scholar at the University of Boulder Colorado. It’s like money an
investment accrues over time, data, personal data, accrues across databases
(Acquisti, 2014).
Often we feel the information that is collected about us is innocuous. Since the
information is viewed as benign we reveal this information for our personal benefit a
perfect example of, privacy as commodity. Acquisti’s experiment showed that data
accretion, when properly analyzed, can reveal sensitive information, such as sexual
orientation, political affiliation, credit score, and other sensitive details about an
individual. More concerning still is the reality that this can currently be done using
technology available to the public:
[T]his iPhone app uses the iPhone camera to take a shot of the person in
front of you and then it does what the experiment did but does it in real
time. So [it] takes a shot, uploads it to the cloud, the cloud the server
based part of the app tries to find a match between faces from social media
and the shot coming from the iPhone. And then if it finds a shot now with
the presumptive name, with the presumptive name…tries to find
demographic data…tries to predict the SSN and then it sends this
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information back to the phone all relying on the face of the person. This is
what I'm referring to as augmented reality (Acquisti, 2014).
This example highlights some of the capabilities of FRT. Both of the studies referenced
above can now be reviewed in detail,29 but at the time of the presentation the latest
experiment was unpublished.30 Researchers can track people across the Internet,
destroying virtually any sense of user anonymity. Anonymity, which is highly valued on
online dating sites, is being eroded with the use of FRT and readily available technology.
While FRT may have some obstacles to overcome to be viable in real time, the
technology is developing rapidly. According to Acquisti (2014), “The federal program
which tries to standardize the performance of facial recognition in about 14 years
improved by almost 3 orders of magnitude.” If this trend continues, FRT may be viable
in real time in the near future.
Acquisti’s experiment is impressive but is not how the technology is regularly
used today. FRT is commonly used for 1) face detection 2) authentication and 3)
identification. One of the most popular uses of FRT is authenticating identification
credentials. Russell King from Picasso, a company involved in authenticating
identifications, also presented at the March 25, 2014 meeting. King said, “Picasso
provides solutions for both identity management and identity assurance.”
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Acquisti, A., & Gross, R. (2009). Predicting Social Security numbers from public data. Proceedings of
the National academy of sciences, 106(27), 10975-10980.
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Acquisti, A., Gross, R., & Stutzman, F. (2014). Face Recognition and Privacy in the Age of Augmented
Reality. Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality, 6(2), 1.

174

Picasso is headquartered in London, but also has offices in the U.S. (King, 2014). Unlike
the one to many matching scenario presented by Acquisti, Picasso does one to one
matching for authentication purposes as King explained:
We take a government issued ID…We actually extract data from the ID
and we then compare the photo on the ID with a live individual looking at
the camera. That provides a level of confidence to our clients that they in
fact have the individual they are purporting to be. Performing the one to
one match is not all that useful if the identification document is forged.
Picasso also looks at various features on the identification credential to
ensure it has not been tampered with.
Most modern passports contain a chip that contains the individual’s face and personal
information (King, 2014). Picasso has the ability to read the chip. The chip also has
information from the issuing authority that can verify that the chip belongs to the
appropriate document (King, 2014). One of the main uses of the Picasso platform is for
airport security, but they are expanding into other areas.
So the purpose of our products is to simplify the onboarding experience of
a consumer, as well as elevating the level of assurance to our client that
the customer is who they say they are. Within a healthcare capacity, it's
patient assurance, which is a clear patient safety issue. Unfortunately, we
have a tendency of having multiple patient records. The ability of
biometrics to reduce the exposure to that sort of issue is quite a useful and
powerful proposition (King, 2014).
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FRT has the ability to help reduce fraud, increase security with increased authentication
confidence, and prevent gambling addicts from entering gaming facilities if gambler so
chooses. Picasso is only one company in the FRT space, but many other companies are
employing FRT for different uses.
During the next meeting, April 29, 2014, Brian Brackeen CEO of Kairos,
presented on how his company uses FRT.
We focus only on facial recognition in the commercial space, so very
germane to these discussions. We do it for a number of types of
customers. Facial recognition via a time clock product…we capture the
image with the person kind of saying take the button, up to the cloud, back
down, we've identified you and then you’re checked in. That data then
goes into the company's payroll system (Brackeen, 2014).
Payroll is only one finance area in which Kairos is involved. Worldwide, credit card
fraud is a yearly hundred billion dollar problem. Kairos has introduced a product they
call Kairos Trust to help combat credit card fraud by utilizing FRT; this product is
expected to be introduced soon. Despite the firm’s development just two years ago,
Kairos has already had an interest in their products from over 320 companies (Brackeen,
2014). The products that these companies are potentially interested in vary greatly.
During the meetings, Brackeen discussed the utilization of FRT by a cruise ship to help
organize photos taken during vacations. However, the same technology can also be
utilized to provide physical safety to customers and not just for mere convenience.
Another example… is a hospital, a private hospital, it's a children’s
hospital actually. What they do currently is, when you go to check in,
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when you walk in any one of the doors, you give them your ID, they take a
picture, the picture kind of gets printed onto your badge and that's
generally how they know that people aren't on like a Meagan's Law list or
things of that nature. There are also other certain doors, like ER and some
other kind of back doors where there aren't guards present because they
are either not used very often or because in an ER situation you don't want
to stop people coming in. So there's a concern that there could potentially
be predators sort of intentionally going into these like soft openings and
soft doors. (Brackeen, 2014).
Age is a factor that determines whether FRT will be used or not. In the cruise ship
example, FRT is only used on passengers who are the age of majority, 18 in most
jurisdictions. In fact, Kairos does not accept clients who would use FRT on minors.
These three presentations constituted the bulk of the commercial uses of FRT
presented to the group. Stakeholders identified numerous concerns about the possible
uses of FRT; these will be discussed in detail later. Age was identified as an important
concern to the NGO stakeholder group. NGOs asked for further presentations on the
intersection of age and FRT.
Adriana Galvan, from UCLA, presented information on the brain maturation of
adolescents at the July 24, 2014 meeting. Her presentation included information on
adolescents, now to include college aged individuals, particularly concerning their
decision making process and their perception of rewards and consequences.
It's meaningful because a more excitable reward system means that people
in this age group are more responsive to incentives. In other words they
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will work towards receiving incentives than other age groups with less
consideration of consequences associated with those behaviors. They are
more susceptible to social rewards and this includes faces (Galvin, 2014).
Common Sense Media was an NGO partly responsible for Galvin’s presentation. In a
consumer context adolescents present a troubling case because they are not of the age of
majority yet they typically have access to money making them valuable consumers to
commercial entities. Other research referenced in the presentation showed that
adolescents’ brains were more excited when presented with faces than children or adults
and this made them susceptible to wanting social rewards more. Galvin continued
noting:
So all of these factors have implications for policy and thinking of ways
adolescents should be considered a special developmental periods when
making choices or regulations for adolescents. The development of an
adolescent appropriate policy is critical… adolescents benefit from
explicit examples of consequences. Abstract concepts are still challenging
for them to appreciate. Adolescents need time to think before they act.
They need to be given the tools to allow them to consider consequences to
think about how their reward and behavior may influence later outcomes.
It's important we provide the scaffolding they need (Galvin, 2014).
Fairly stated, Galvin’s research underscores the goals of Common Sense Media, to
provide special protections for children and adolescents in the code of conduct. A one
size fits all code would simply fail to address the special treatment that developing minds
need for robust consumer protection.
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Since adolescents have limited ability to recognize long-term rewards and consequences,
the deployment of FRT around minors may need special consideration (Galvin, 2014). It
is easy to imagine that advertisers may want to take advantage of the youth market by
combining peer pressure for products, showing individuals that their friends are wearing
or using certain products. The previous research shows that minors are more excitable
when they see images of people they know, including friends wearing or using various
products, combined with their limited ability to grasp long-term rewards or consequences
and it may be quite easy to persuade minors to purchase products or services.
While it is relatively easy to imagine advertisers or businesses targeting minors
for their products, it is harder to imagine a code that can appropriately address these
concerns. The previous research shows that the adolescent brain is not fully developed
till age 25 or 27, yet adolescents become legal adults at age 18 in most jurisdictions. The
issue of adequately protecting adolescents becomes more difficult when factoring in
intelligence and emotional maturity differences present at each age. Presumably, a code
of conduct for FRT can only cover “adolescents” until age 18 when they legally become
adults, yet this leaves many vulnerable years for young adults with regard to FRT.
Perhaps the stakeholders will address the gap when they discuss adequate notice and
transparency that must be given to consumers by companies using FRT.
Age is not the only sensitive demographic characteristic which FRT is able to
detect. Some NGO stakeholders worry about what was initially called facial profiling.
The term facial profiling drew immediate criticism from some business participants, as
profiling is a term with a negative connotation. Business did not want to associate their
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products with a negatively charged term so they decided on determining demographic
characteristics.
Jerome Williams from Rutgers University also presented information on FRT and
marketing/advertising uses at the July 24, 2014 meeting. Williams expressed concern
about FRT being used to advertise products:
We are at a point in marketing today where we take a million messages
and customize them for our purposes, narrowcasting. Think about all the
photos available we have elevated the level of sophistication and can tailor
each message to an individual. Sometimes we refer to that as
segmentation (Williams, 2014).
Williams’ comments echo Brackeen’s, in that, there is a real interest from the business
and advertising communities to incorporate FRT into their practices. Faces, due to their
unique ability to link data, may now represent the best opportunities for marketers to
personalize their messages to consumers; after all, the face can tell relative age, race,
interest in product, and even health.
The next slide is about face marketing; when you have the ability to
capture all kinds of faces, whether its information or other it allows you to
very easily target at a very sophisticated level…others that you want to
use. We are at the point where you walk down the street and pass a retail
store or window and the ad appears based specifically on you, your age,
race, gender, ethnicity, all other kinds of socio demographic variables
have been captured (Williams, 2014).
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The technology has the potential to aid advertisers in crafting targeted messages to
individuals. While this is a real advantage for advertisers, and potentially benefits
consumers with messages relevant to their wants, this technology also presents new
opportunities to discriminate against and marginalize individuals.
Retailers are deploying FRT to identify customers as a retention
technique. On the surface you might say that's a good thing detecting
which individuals are more engaged in shopping and the store can help
with loss prevention. In some of my work…we find some instances where
one racial group only represents 5% of the customers in the store but 95%
of the shoppers stopped for shoplifting. That suggests the technology and
cameras are focusing on one group (Williams, 2014).
Racial profiling has been a part of society for quite some time, it appears that cameras
aided with FRT have the ability to exacerbate this problem. This problem has gained the
attention of the news media as well as commercial entities.
The media has gotten some of this…the cases that talk about “shopping
while black” or consumer racial profiling, people refer to it as shop and
frisk. Essentially you identify people and you pay more attention to them
in the store and also when they leave the store and using FRT to zero in on
only certain groups and perpetuate this behavior. My concern is that if
FRT is not looked at in terms of the harm it can cause, there could be
perpetuation of [this] (Williams, 2014).
It became clear to the group that FRT could be a powerful marketing tool, but that it
could also lead to disparate opportunities presented to individuals based on age, gender,
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race, and ethnicity. Therefore, the group became even more aware of the importance of
where FRT was deployed.
These presentations represent most of what the group has seen concerning the
potential for discrimination utilizing FRT. This also constitutes the majority of the
presentations made from invited guests. After these presentations, which ended at the
July, 24, 2014 meeting, the group felt satisfied with their level of understanding and
moved into more policy heavy issues, as well as the creation of a code of conduct.
These presentations illustrate some key findings found in by the group. The first
theme found amongst the presentations is the ease with which FR is conducted. As
Acquisti (2014) made clear, “if an economist can do FR then anyone can.” Brackeen
(2014) has over 320 companies viewing his company’s website looking to utilize FRT for
business solutions. King (2014) noted the ubiquity with which the technology is being
deployed for security and international use. FRT is easier to implement, and is improving
rapidly in terms of speed and accuracy. As Acquisti (2014) alluded to, increases in
computing power and various FR applications will increase surveillance, making privacy
harder to protect.
Currently, accuracy remains an issue with the FRT and accuracy rates decrease as
the population size increases. While low accuracy rates sound like good news for those
wishing to protect their privacy this may not be the case with data accretion. The
Associated Press (2013) reported that Facebook alone has over one billion active monthly
users. The ubiquity of social networking sites, the pictures contained on them, and the
associated data stored with these profiles presents uncountable opportunities to apply and
use FRT. Low accuracy rates could lead to increased use of FRT in order to find
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individuals or information about them, and increased use could reveal important
information about an individual’s social group; this is particularly concerning for minors
whose profiles can provide information about their friends and families and potentially
lead to geographical tracking. Regardless, using FRT on minors is a contentious issue for
stakeholders and technology providers, all of whom understand the increased concerns,
some even refuse to provide FRT to individuals wishing to apply it to minors.
Data accretion and linkage is a major concern for minors not only from social
networking but also from school obligations. Students are required to attend school and
much state funding for schools is the result of student attendance rates (Kravets, 2013).
Schools are increasingly turning to student IDs to prevent unauthorized access to students
and to track their whereabouts. Students have even been suspended for refusing to wear
ID’s that contain Radio Frequency Identification chips (RFID). RFID equipped student
IDs contribute to data accretion because they contain a student’s photo, monitor his or her
location and movement, and could contain other sensitive information, such as a
healthcare contacts, healthcare information, and financial services used for school
lunches or activities. These developments confirm Chandler’s (2012) observation about
the obligatory technologies necessary to participate in society.
Developments such as these highlight the concerns that Acquisti informed the
group about such as offline to online linkages and online to offline linkages. While
student IDs increase school security and protect students, they are also creating unwanted
linkages between a student’s real life and their online profiles and activities, causing
additional safety concerns of their own. Student IDs are just one example; college
students and many employees are required to wear similar ID badges which create similar
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privacy concerns. With data accretion one must ask whether student IDs and similar
photo based credentials are creating safer spaces or additional opportunities to exploit
security and privacy as well as track individuals.
Student safety and secure schools are often reasons used to justify student IDs
with similar reasons used to justify various forms of identification for employees and
American citizens. However, another issue, and an underlying theme from the meetings
and presentations, concerns the profiling of individuals. Much of the interest in and
funding for FRT has been for security purposes, but these security interests can lead to
the profiling and discrimination of individuals. A problem inherent with many security
systems and cameras is that they are run by individuals who have their own biases. It is
possible that racially biased individuals would choose to follow certain individuals
around locations or apply the technology in differential ways to discriminate against
others. FRT has the ability to amplify an operator’s biases by providing additional
information about an individual they otherwise would not have, such as credit score,
political affiliation, sexual orientation, and other sensitive details.
The continued and varied uses of IDs for students, workers, and citizens should
give us pause when we think about the likely increased use of FRT. These credentials are
often required, meaning users have less control over their identities and privacy than they
may have originally thought. The application of FRT to these credentials provides
individuals with a feeling of safety and security but there is also the paradox of increased
surveillance and invasion of privacy that comes as a direct tradeoff.
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8.2. Stages of Facial Recognition
There are other facets of the technology that complicate the regulation of FRT
beyond simply where it is deployed and the variety of individuals that can interact with it.
This section contains technical aspects of the technology that have been extensively
discussed by the stakeholders. The technical definitions presented throughout this section
can be found in Appendix C. Appendix C is a consensus document of definitions agreed
upon by the stakeholder groups; there are also different modalities of FR discussed, but
please refer to chapter two for detailed discussion on their differences and capabilities.
The first task that any FR system must complete is called facial detection. Facial
detection was defined by the definitions group as, “A task where the Facial Recognition
System distinguishes the presence of a human face and/or facial characteristics without
necessarily creating or deriving a Facial Template.” Face detection is seen as mostly
innocuous by the group. During this process no identifying data is stored or associated
with a face, and demographic characteristics are not monitored or used. Face detection is
mostly used for counting purposes. For example, retailers may use this modality to
monitor foot traffic into their establishments. Retailers may be interested in monitoring
traffic at their stores or monitoring numbers in facilities to ensure they are not violating
capacity restrictions. The technology is capable of counting humans and providing
simple and innocuous information to customers wishing to deploy FR systems for facial
detection purposes. However, FRT is capable of much more than simple facial detection.
Another capacity of the technology is age estimation. Patrick Grother of NIST
presented to the group at the November 6, 2014 meeting on the age estimation
capabilities of FRT. Like humans, the technology is imperfect in this area, “What you
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get there's a data point and it says that 67% of estimates are within 5 years of correct”
(Grother, 2014). This is to be expected as “Some people look genuinely young for their
age” (Grother, 2014). The technology becomes less accurate when trying to estimate
older individuals as Grother explained:
Somebody can be in the 80's and you don't know if they are in their 90's or
70's. This distribution gets wider naturally but never the less the numbers
are what they are. Age estimation accuracy gets less as we get older.
While imperfect, age estimations by FRT can be expected to improve as the
technology evolves. Age estimation by FRT may be used in the future to allow or
prohibit individuals from entering a bar or other locations that are age restricted. Age
estimation was seen as a mostly noncontroversial issue by the group unless its
deployment was used to discriminate against an individual based on their age.
Another use of face detection may be identifying products the individual is
interested in at a retail store. Face detection may be coupled with eye tracking
technology to identify how long a person has looked at a product while also attempting to
determine the emotions on the face as they engage with the product. Marketers are
interested in these capabilities of FRT so that they can more effectively advertise
products to consumers. This effective and targeted advertising strategy is developed by
intruding on the mind’s thought process. I refer to this intrusion as interference with
cognitive privacy, or the privacy we take for granted when we choose to conceal or reveal
our thoughts to others. This form of FRT is in its infancy but poses a significant threat to
one of our most trusted conceptions of privacy cognitive privacy or privacy of the mind.
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Another popular use of FRT is facial authentication. Facial authentication was
defined by the group as:
A task where the Facial Recognition System attempts to confirm an
individual’s claimed identity by comparing the template generated from a
submitted face image with a specific known template generated from a
previously enrolled face image. This process is also called one-to-one
verification.
Facial authentication is a mostly unobjectionable use of FRT because an individual has
normally enrolled their image in a database so it can be authenticated. Facial
authentication is commonly used for security purposes and gaining access to privileges,
like access to a database or an area of a building. Facial authentication has been
deployed in Canadian casinos to prevent gambling addicts from betting. One interviewee
explained how the technology was being deployed in detail (July 29, 2014).
All the gambling in Ontario are state owned [casinos] but people of course
lose money and it creates social problems. This corporation tried to
promote responsible gaming. So they created a self-exclusion program.
So some gamblers that feel they need help ask Ontario Lottery and
Gaming Corp to put them on the self-exclusionary list. So OLG would
take their photograph and name and basically said they wouldn't let them
enter the facility (Government).
Previously, casinos had their security guards memorize photos of individuals that had
self-selected to be excluded from the casino. As expected, the guards had difficulty
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remembering all the individuals on the list and some gamblers who relapsed into
addiction sued the casinos for allowing them into the facility.
So OLG decided to use FR. So the photographs of the self-excluded
people were used to generate templates and create watch list. Anyone
who enters the facility his or her facial image is taken and run against the
database. If there is a match this person will be approached by security
guards and they check their ID and if it’s an excluded person they will be
escorted out (Government).
Facial authentication can be used for prosocial purposes and is frequently used for
security purposes. For these reasons, and because an individual has generally
volunteered their image, facial authentication uses of FRT faced few objections from the
group.
FRT used to identify an individual faced increased scrutiny from the group.
Facial identification was defined by the group as “Searching a database for a reference
matching a submitted Facial Template and returning a corresponding identity.” Facial
identification is controversial to the group because it can provide individuals with
information that they would not otherwise have. As will be discussed in detail later, an
individual’s facial template can be linked with a wide variety of sensitive data including
credit scores, criminal records, and sexual orientation. Consider, for example, walking
into a dealership to purchase a vehicle and the dealership has deployed FRT. The
dealership may be able to identify an individual based on their face, a feat they could not
perform previously, and determine that the individual has a poor credit score. Now,
instead of the promotional financing rate that they would have previously offered, the
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dealership has a finance offer with a higher interest rate. Such instances could occur with
facial identification.
The group has also discussed a hybrid version of facial identification which is
face recognition without identification. Recognition could include an individual’s image
being captured on a security camera at a store and their template is stored; when they
return to the store, the FR system recognizes that the individual has been in the store
before but does not have additional information about the individual. Steve DelBianco of
NetChoice at the May 20, 2014 meeting expanded on this point.
You mentioned two levels of definition, one called detection, that's a face,
and then recognition. Recognition doesn't necessarily associate that with
a name [emphasis added]. Recognition could be that face has been in my
store before. Without ever associating with a name it just says I've seen
that face before. That's one form of recognition that doesn’t associate with
identification at all.
Recognition uses of FRT raise concerns about surveilling and monitoring an individual’s
habits or routine. This form of recognition is not the one initially thought of by most
individuals and is probably being addressed so that there are two separate provisions in
the code of conduct, one most likely providing less protection than the other, a business
goal. Recognizing that an individual has been at a certain location could be viewed as
useful or even as an acceptable form of surveillance. DelBianco continued the example
with a useful application of the technology.
So I walk into the apartment building in Manhattan. The instant the
camera sees my face it does a quick detection to see where my face is with
189

this guy at the door. And then it makes a template. In truth it compares
the template with the known templates on the residents of the building and
if there's a positive match to the threshold define the door will probably
buzz and they will let them in. If it doesn't the door won't buzz. There's
no requirement or expectation that that template will be enrolled or
retained or shared in anyway.
In this example presented to the group, facial recognition enables convenient access to
the apartment building by tenants. The use of this technology also increases the security
of the building by preventing non-residents from gaining access to the building.
8.3. Facial Recognition Technology Data
Through the use of FRT, biometric data are captured. Biometric data are unique
biological characteristics that are particular to each individual, in this case the face; other
examples include fingerprints, the iris, and DNA (Biometrics Institute, 2015). For further
discussion on biometric data please refer to chapter two. One of the initial arguments of
the group concerns whether or not a face template, the information created from the face
through FRT, constitutes personally identifiable information (PII). According to the
National Institute for Security and Technology (NIST)31,
PII is ―any information about an individual maintained by an agency,
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place
31

NIST is one of the nation's oldest physical science laboratories. Congress established the agency to
remove a major handicap to U.S. industrial competitiveness at the time—a second-rate measurement
infrastructure that lagged behind the capabilities of the United Kingdom, Germany, and other economic
rivals. Today, NIST measurements support the smallest of technologies—nanoscale devices so tiny that
tens of thousands can fit on the end of a single human hair—to the largest and most complex of humanmade creations, from earthquake-resistant skyscrapers to wide-body jetliners to global communication
networks (National Institute for Standards and Technology, 2015).
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of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other
information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical,
educational, financial, and employment information (McCallister, Grance,
& Scarfone, 2010, p. ES-1).
Despite biometric records being included in the definition of PII, according to
NIST, there have been disagreements about whether data derived from FRT should be
considered PII for the purposes of a code of conduct. From the outset of the first meeting
(February 6, 2014), FRT data being treated as PII has been discussed:
…when we map the data that's used by face recognition systems into a
framework of PII, then we are bringing in the type of protections we are
elevating… in a way that a high resolution doctored photograph that’s
frontal is as dangerous being kept online as your social security being
publicly published online…in the next 5 to 10 years that image is going to
be harvested [collected from the Internet] (Unknown Academic).
Certain participants are concerned about facial photographs being collected from
the Internet and used for purposes other than their original intention. The sensitivity of
the data collected is undisputed amongst the stakeholders, and industry advocates
understand the liabilities they carry when storing sensitive information. The issue is
whether an individual’s face, an inherently public personal feature and one we are not
normally allowed to hide, should be considered PII. The other complicating factor with
the code is that companies must still comply with state, federal, and occasionally
international law. Therefore, stakeholders must be careful to not write provisions that
contradict those laws as Alvaro Bedoya pointed out (December 15, 2014).
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[I]f the state law covers it; it covers it, and if it doesn't you have to take
certain action following breach and treat it as PII. I think here the guiding
principle should be not looking at what the states have done but looking at
what companies do. On biometrics…Apple, Samsung, Facebook, and
Google protect the heck out of this data. They certainly treat it as PII and
as a result…I would say it should be treated as PII for purposes of breach.
If you have a face template that's been developed using 25, 50, or 100s of
photos, you can use that template quickly to figure out who that is using
publicly available information. So I think we need to protect it as PII
without any connection to name or anything else. It inherently connects to
other things. So we need to have some kind of breach standard. I think
anything less is totally unacceptable.
Previous presentations by FRT providers helped stakeholders recognize several strong
protections in industry self-regulation. Following, but also mandating, some industry
best practices have been helpful to move certain issues forward.
Stakeholders have also been mindful of government precedents that have been set
with regard to PII. Walter Hamilton of the IBIA explained to the group on June 3, 2014:
When a [any] federal agency creates a system of records, they have to
perform a privacy impact assessment on that system of records, identify
any PII that's collected and come up with a policy and a set of rules by
which that data is collected and retained and ultimately disposed of32.

32

The E-Government Act of 2002, Section 208, establishes the requirement for agencies to conduct
privacy impact assessments (PIAs) for electronic information systems and collections (U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2007, p.2).
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That does not apply to commercial entities. What it does is to show that
what is PII, and by the way, I think a photograph is PII, a photograph is
not a biometric. A derived template from a photograph or fingerprint is a
biometric and meets the definition of that term.
In 2010 the Internet Policy Task force, an entity under the Department of Commerce,
endorsed the use of Privacy Impact Assessments (Wolf, 2015, p. 211). A plethora of
governmental agencies support the consideration of biometric data to be included as PII
as Bedoya explained at the June 24, 2014 meeting.
The government has repeatedly recognized it as PII. The NIST and
Commerce among others, Department of State, Homeland Security, OMB
[Office of Management and Budget], all categorically recognize
biometrics as PII. Also, I had that the companies handling the data, and
certainly in Senator Franken’s33 view, have afforded it the highest
protection possible and have gone out of their way to protect that data. I
would argue even more so than they protect things like address [and] date
of birth.
While consumers have a reasonable expectation of strong data security, there are
important First Amendment implications in the balance. Photography is a First
Amendment right that could pose a challenge to those who may want to use FRT. One
participant was quick to note the copyright protections afforded to photos: “From a
copyright perspective it's clear. I snapped a picture of you, it’s my picture. I own the
copyright, done. [Its] settled law, absent some contractual agreement, you have no say

33

Sitting Senator for Minnesota.
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over the matter” (Government). The complications between the First Amendment and
copyright law are discussed further in chapter five. As Szabo pointed out in the June 24,
2014 meeting photography also has positive uses:
So the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] for example, encourages
public photography but they are trying to strike a balance between public
photography versus what happens to those photos once you start using
them. You hear a lot of horror stories about this being used to identify
people at a marijuana rally. But then you can flip it around and say well
there's a strike going on and there are some guys going down there to
crack skulls, will the ACLU use FR to identify those people and for whom
they work. You can make a more transparent notice of companies doing
bad things.
This example illustrates the threats and protections that FR can provide to First
Amendment protected activities including political support and opposition.
Since FRT can be used retroactively on photos there is a legitimate question about
the scope of a code of conduct. One participant observed, “If we're talking about a jpeg34
might later be used and put in a database, then we are writing a code for all photography,
aren't we?” (Business). The code of conduct cannot limit one’s First Amendment rights,
and there is a clear distinction between photography and biometric data in that a
photograph is not biometric data.
While a photograph is not considered biometric data, stakeholders began to
wonder if the integers (whole numbers including 0) created as a result of applying FRT to
34

A computer file format for the compression and storage of usually high-quality photographic digital
images (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2015).
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a photo should be considered PII. Predictably the business community resisted the
integers being classified as PII as DelBianco stated in the February 25, 2014 meeting.
The number that Mark generates from his algorithm is absolutely not PII.
It’s a vector of integers that his algorithm generated for that photo… Mr.
Atick said that unless you have it married with meta-data,…or married
with data that identifies a person, it is in and of itself not PII.
Stakeholders continue to struggle with which data inputs and outputs of FRT constitute
PII.
As the previously mentioned big data report suggested, citizens and stakeholders
should concern themselves with the use of data and not the collection of data. This
conclusion is naïve in an age of NSA and IRS scandal. Citizens should be concerned
about the collection of data because conclusions are reached from the processing of data
and data cannot be processed unless it is collected. Consumers should be mindful about
the content they post online, especially their image. As discussed previously it remains
unclear if the integers created from an image being processed by FRT can be protected by
copyright. Furthermore, the EULAs of Facebook and other prominent social networking
platforms make clear that images and content posted by consumers can and will be
utilized by these companies for their own monetary gain. Chandler (2007) noted the
importance of courts assigning property rights in regulating technologies. Images or face
templates created via application of FRT, if assigned property rights to the individual,
could have important regulatory consequences for FRT providers.
Two primary views are represented in this discussion of PII and the integers
created as a result of FRT. Business has a vested interest in keeping the status quo to
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continue profiting from their consumer’s content. Therefore, they are advocating for
photos, and the integers created from photos via FRT, to not be protected under PII.
NGOs, on the other hand, are advocating for the opposite: consumers should have
property rights over their images and the integers, thus should be protected as PII. Under
the business paradigm, it remains unclear what property rights consumers will have over
their images and the potential to access property and privileges based on their image.
However, following the NGO paradigm could potentially limit photography rights as
currently conceived under the First Amendment. Also under the NGO paradigm, current
business practices would have to be restructured as consumers would have a property
right over their images and integers; it remains unclear how social networks and other
businesses could monetize user content. The decisions made here could set important
legal precedent for establishing a consumer’s property right over their image, and, by
extension, their identity. Although laws exist to protect an individual’s name and
likeness, this precedent would extend to commercial uses; in time, private use may also
have equally important ramifications.
8.3.1. Reverse Engineering Data
Most companies using FRT have their own or have licensed a specific algorithm
to conduct FR. Each algorithm processes the facial vectors differently, focusing on
unique parts of the face that will allow the most accurate identification. Algorithms that
are highly accurate create a competitive advantage for a company. Most algorithms are
unique, unless a vendor has licensed their algorithm to multiple companies. The question
the group maintained was: what could be done with the integers created. Could another
company recreate the original photograph used by the FR software? This topic was one
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of contention for the group. Some stakeholders felt that the image could absolutely not
be reverse engineered. Marc Vaillant explained this difficulty at the February 25, 2014
meeting.
What we do is extract from the image discriminating information and so it
takes the image down to about 200 to 1000 numbers…and so that's a
tremendous compression, you can think about the 6+ megapixel picture
that it came from and now we are talking about 200-1000 numbers. And
the other important point about this is that it is opaque. In other words,
you can't go in the other direction, you can imagine because of this
tremendous compression. Also, it’s unknown how the data was generated.
That’s sort of the secret sauce of the algorithm and so it’s only known to
the algorithm…our biometric template is not the same biometric template
that is used by Cognitec or NEC or NL1.
According to this view, the data cannot be reverse engineered into the original photo or
be utilized by a separate company’s algorithm. Other stakeholders maintained that the
data could be reverse engineered. The implications of the argument involve data
brokers35 selling the created information and placing individuals back into the original
photograph which can contain more potentially sensitive information. Vaillant went on
to explain:

“[Data brokers] are collecting, analyzing and packaging some of our most sensitive personal information
and selling it as a commodity...to each other, to advertisers, even the government, often without our direct
knowledge. ….[Compared to government snooping] a much greater and more immediate threat to your
privacy is coming from thousands of companies [data brokers] you've probably never heard of, in the name
of commerce” (Kroft, 2014, par. 1).
35
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[E]ven if you are not given information about the algorithm that generated
the biometric template, you could work very hard to reverse engineer, the
biometric template and… depending on how the biometric template was
generated, and it’s certainly not the case for all biometric templates, and it
depends on what the vendor did to generate that biometric template, you
could infer information from that biometric template.
Despite some technical limitations that may currently be present, small concessions were
made by the business community at the February 25, 2014 meeting that found reverse
engineering the data was possible, although admittedly very difficult. However, some
stakeholders took a strong position about the ability for the data to be reverse engineered.
In an interview occurring July 29, 2014 it was explained that:
Secondly, that the image cannot be reconstructed from the template,
especially the template algorithm that is proprietary, that is also not true
and we showed that. Finally, there was a claim that two templates created
from the same person by different algorithms cannot be linked together, in
fact they can be linked together. So we tried to address and debunk that
mess and published a note and it's published on the NTIA website36.
Stakeholders felt that the best course of action was to proceed as if the data could
be reconstructed as technological advances would likely make this process more accurate
and easy to accomplish. Some stakeholders dissented from this position, as explained in
a September 5, 2014 interview:

36

The paper can be found here:
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uniqueness_of_faceena_recognition_templates__ipc_march-2014.pdf (Chibba & Stoianov, 2014).
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That's the Ontario Privacy commissioner and she is way off base. I think
they are taking an absolutist approach that everything can be re-identified
and that's an ideological view rather than something that's borne out by the
evidence, including a researcher from Ottawa in a day long debate on deidentification in D.C. a couple of years ago. We couldn’t do that.
Proceeding as if the data could not be reverse engineered would have potential resale
benefits for industry advocates, while the opposite approach benefits privacy advocates.
In the end, it was conceded that the data could be reverse engineered. Since stakeholders
agreed that the data could be reverse engineered, the code will likely be worded with this
agreement in mind. Proceeding as if the data could not be reverse engineered would
create a privacy blind spot where images could be reconstructed, companies would be
further incentivized to sell data, and consumers would be given the false impression that
their data was safe. Contrarily, proceeding as if the data can be reconstructed to an image
acknowledges the technological advances that are likely to occur, provides consumers
with a realistic set of expectations about how their data can be used, and acknowledges
the plethora of other potentially sensitive details that can be included in an image. The
stakeholders’ consensus on reverse engineered facial data provides consumers with an
enhanced level of privacy protection.
8.3.2. Data Security
Stakeholders were charged with assigning strong protection to the data given the
sensitivity of biometric data and the fact that it can be reverse engineered. Two primary
areas of concern for stakeholders included when the data was in transit and when it was at
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rest or in storage. It was determined that encryption would act as the primary protection
for biometric data.
Stakeholders formed strong consensus on the need for robust security protections
for FRT data. Encryption was determined to be an important component of the security
regime. Stakeholders, however, were unable to initially agree as to what constituted
encryption. Some stakeholders felt that the creation of a template constituted encryption
because of the uniqueness of the algorithm used and the data it generated. This assertion
was contested at the meetings “What is the intended significance or take away from
declaring or asserting that FR scans are a form of encryption?” (Government). If the face
template created was to be considered encryption it would eliminate a major technical
requirement for companies that wanted to sign onto a voluntary code of conduct. Not all
stakeholders were receptive to that idea, nor did they think the creation of a face template
constituted encryption. “A faceprint is not an encryption of an image. It isn't. It's an
abstraction of an image. Can you take the abstraction that is [a] faceprint and get back to
the original image? No. But it's not an encryption” (Business). Stakeholders were also
cognizant that, though a unique template did not constitute encryption, there was some
utility to storing templates without identifying data as Walter Hamilton of the IBIA
explained in the June 3, 2014 meeting.
I do support the notion that a biometric algorithm that generates a template
is not encryption. That to say, it would be encryption would be security
by obscurity and I don't think that's valid. While it's less than useable in
most forms if you don't know who the vendor was and their proprietary
algorithm, you would have to have some knowledge about that. It is not in
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the form of a secret key as is defined generally from the term data
encryption.
Facial templates do not constitute encryption in and of themselves. However, omitted
information about the algorithm used on a template, makes it difficult to interpret the
data, which is security by obscurity. Eventually, the definitions drafting committee did
some research and prepared a draft of what they considered encryption. The group
defined encryption as “The protection of data using reasonable means that have been
generally accepted by experts in the field of information security, which renders such
data unintelligible or unreadable.” Stated another way:
Encryption is a method of converting an original message of regular text
into encoded text. The text is encrypted by means of an algorithm (type of
formula). If information is encrypted, there would be a low probability
that anyone other than the receiving party who has the key to the code or
access to another confidential process would be able to decrypt (translate)
the text and convert it into plain, comprehensible text (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Service, 2015).
After stakeholders agreed that the creation of a face template did not constitute
encryption, they still had to decipher what standard of encryption would be appropriate.
A common format for encryption is 128 bit encryption. A bit is an integer of either “1”
or “0.” Depending upon the encryption method there may be one key to unlock the series
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of integers or multiple keys to encode and decode the information.37 As the bits of
encryption increase, so does the security of the information.
Despite the desire of the group to strongly protect the data, there was
disagreement about how to best address the standard of encryption required.
Stakeholders are aware of the developing nature of FRT and encryption. The problem
the group needed to address was how to define 1) an appropriate level of data security via
encryption and 2) how that standard would last given the evolution of technology. Two
separate proposals were offered in regard to the evolution of encryption standards. Some
stakeholders, notably Carl Szabo, preferred vague language to allow flexibility for the
standard in the future:
We looked at the security procedure for banking which should [by] all
accounts have the highest degree of security. Basically we say: Parties to
this code should use commercially reasonable measures to secure facial
template information. Once again, the commercially reasonable, allows
flexibility for evolution yet it requires businesses and parties to the code to
maintain a certain degree of protection.
This view puts the code of conduct more in line with industry self-regulation for
“commercially reasonable” security practices. Businesses certainly have an interest in
maintaining the security of their information, otherwise consumers may choose their
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If the key is 128 bits long, attempting to crack the code without the key would be 4.7 sextillion
(4,700,000,000,000,000,000,000) times more difficult than cracking a 56-bit key (which itself has 72
quadrillion possible combinations)! Given the current power of computers, experts consider that a 56-bit
key could be cracked by using the brute-force method in 10 million hours of computer time (14,000
computers used around the clock for 4 months)” (Kang, 2000).
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competitors. However, given the recent security breaches at Target, Home Depot, and
Apple, one must question the efficacy of the commercially reasonable standard.
The second proposal for the evolving nature of data protection in the code was
tied to a governmental standard, “What I detail is FIPPS validated cryptographic method
that has been confirmed as a base security and cryptographic measure by NIST” (NGO).
This alternative proposal was justified on the following grounds by Michelle De Mooy
from Consumer Action at the December 15, 2014 meeting:
I think it’s perfectly reasonable to expect a decent NIST approved level of
security for such sensitive information as FR. I think the other just sort of
legal aspect of this language is it puts it basically into FTC jurisdiction.
They have sort of exercised that recently with Wyndham and LabMD38.
But the important point is that it would be in their jurisdiction but it is not
prescribed by them. It’s taken to a more generally accepted level by NIST
and that's important, because we don't want it to be something that can be
invalidated by a court, we want it to stand the test of time (NGO).
It is important to note that the second method did not try to be overly prescriptive but did
want to tie it to a specific standard. NGOs felt the code language needed the standard for
rigor, “So where we are coming from with option B is not a prescriptive, though it may
seem detailed, that's not the same thing as being prescriptive” (NGO). That standard was
clarified to the group by the moderator, Verdi, who stated:

Companies that have challenged the FTC’s rulings against them for suffering data breaches (Privacy
Association, 2013).
38
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To give a little background without speaking for NIST, FIPS 140-239 that
standard is not a standard that is baked and set in concrete. That's
something that has been around for a decade or better and gets updated
and visited periodically.
The debate continued during the December 15, 2014 meeting and is best summarized in
the following exchange between stakeholders. The business community would prefer the
Uniform Commercial Code because it allows for the greatest flexibility while the NGO
community would like to see the security standard tied to something concrete that
provides strict assurance of protection. Both groups want something that can evolve over
time so as to not have to renegotiate periodically. Szabo advocated for the Uniform
Commercial Code stating:
At the end of the last meeting we had this exact discussion and that's why I
went with commercially reasonable. For example, the NIST standard says
a minimum of 120 bits of security. Well if suddenly tomorrow
commercially reasonable jumps to 256 that would actually engender a
more strict and higher degree of security than the one we are attempting to
prescribe here. So the UCC [Uniform Commercial Code] is not something
that should be dismissed off hand.
Szabo goes on to note that the UCC is used by the banking industry which has strict data
security protocols because of the sensitive information they handle and store. He further
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FIPS 140-2 was created after FIPS 140-1 entered a five year review period with a three month request for
comments period. The standard was finalized in December of 2000. FIPS 140-2 dictates security
standards in each of four security levels it outlines, allows for flexibility in choosing security features,
ensures cryptographic modules contain proper security features, and assures that modules are in compliance
with cryptography requirements (Snouffer, Lee, & Oldehoeft, 2001, p. 2).
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notes that this standard has evolved over a period of over fifteen years, so it is reasonable
to expect that it could continue to evolve. However, the NGO community still felt that
specific assurances were necessary for robust consumer protection. De Mooy of
Consumer Action countered:
That is in fact totally erroneous. I'm going to look at something that NIST
says. 120 bits affords a wide latitude for companies to choose between a
whole bunch of cryptographic protections and methods. It's not a hugely
high standard in terms of it being difficult in terms of companies finding a
way to do that. The other thing, the security strength according to NIST is
to last up [until] 2030 or 2031 according to NIST.
The De Mooy, backed by most of the NGO participants, tried to provide businesses the
flexibility they need while also holding them accountable to tangible standard. This point
was further argued against by the business community. Szabo argued:
So the point I was making was that commercially reasonable is not
dependent on some national board determining what is or is not
commercially reasonable. It's whatever it basically becomes. [This seems
to evolve according to the needs of business with little oversight] While
NIST may have 128 bits today but the commercially reasonable standard
may be something else much higher potentially. [But not guaranteed].
The point of contention between the two proposals was finding a method of data
protection that was flexible enough for a variety of different businesses to implement and
explicit enough to ensure that companies were protecting FR data in a responsible
manner. As noted previously, the variety of companies that might sign onto the code of
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conduct proved problematic. As can be seen in the following exchange occurring during
the same meeting Emily from Facebook said:
I just want to comment in favor of option A [Commercially reasonable
standard]. I think when we are looking at a lot of companies like
Facebook, Google, and others that are multinational. We have obligations
in other jurisdictions and by saying a U.S. based standard, even if it does
evolve, it could prove problematic if there might be different standards.
[The UCC is also a U.S. standard].
Having flexibility in implementing appropriate data security was an important issue for
many stakeholders. To allow for the international nature of some companies, the
following proposal was put forward by Hamilton of the IBIA to secure FR data:
Following up to Emily’s [Facebook] comment. There is an international
equivalent to FIPS 140-2. Which I believe is ISOIEC-19790. It defines
security levels for cryptographic modules. Its lowest level to the highest
level depending on what you are protecting. Administrative data, funds
transfer, PII, or sensitive information used by governments in a variety of
application environments. That might be a better choice if we want to
have a broad worldwide aspect to the code.
It appeared that the international standard might by a compromise that both groups could
agree to. For the NGO community, they would have a tangible standard that provides
specified security standards. The business community would have a standard that applies
internationally allowing multinational companies to continue to conduct business where
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they please. Hamilton, of the IBIA, also noted a problem with the NIST standard in that
it may unintentionally pass testing costs onto commercial entities.
NIST performs module validation on hardware or software modules for
FIPS 140 compliance. There is a substantial cost to the developer of those
software or hardware modules in order to achieve a certification from
NIST that their module has been judged to be compliant with the specifics
of whatever level of the standard they are applying for….many of those
modules hardware or software, have a cost to the implementer to integrate
or incorporate them into a final system design. This code could
unintentionally require a subscriber to the code to actually go out and
make a commercial purchase…which might carry a cost aspect to it that
we might not want to impose on subscribers.
The NGO community then became concerned with how much of a burden they might
impose on commercial entities if they did in fact stick with their original NIST standard
proposal. NGO stakeholders were aware that imposing heavy costs on commercial
retailers would limit the adoption of the code of conduct. The group again looked to
Hamilton of the IBIA to provide guidance on the potential costs.
I don't think you’re talking major costs but it could be a component of like
a mobile telephone for example that has cryptographic security features in
it. The developer of the phone may have purchased from a third party a
crypto module that has been certified and approved by NIST 140-240 and
that module may cost .... I don’t know it could cost any amount of money.
40

FIPS 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html (McCallister, Grance, & Scarfone, 2010, p. 4-7).
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It’s hard to say. The cost to actually go through the process for the
developer of that thing could be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Setting forth an option that could cost companies thousands of dollars to implement was
not deemed as feasible by the group. The group is currently in the midst of striking a
compromise between the proposals.
I was going to offer a compromise option. I was going to say, Carl's point
that commercially reasonable may be more rigorous than NIST. At the
same time, clients would like to have some sort of safe harbor. Could we
take option A and add to it at a minimum “Parties should comply with
FIPPS 140-2 as modified from time to time” (Business).
Ultimately, Verdi offered the resources of the NTIA to determine the way in which NIST,
ISO, and commercially reasonable standards overlapped.
8.3.3. Data Access
Broad consensus was reached by the stakeholders regarding the need for strong
data security in the form of encryption, but data encryption is just one aspect of data
security. Another concern that needed to be addressed by the group was how the data
would be stored and who would have access to it. These issues have been tangentially
and less explicitly discussed by the group than the encryption issue.
Storage of de-identified data versus identified data41 became the next contentious
and problematic issue for the group as there is no uniform definition of PII nor is there a
standard for what constitutes de-identified data (Wolf, 2015, p. 207). Facial recognition

41

De-identified data is data that has the identity of an individual or individual identifiers removed from it.
Identified data is data about an individual where their identity, such as name or social security number, is
still attached.
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works when applied to photos, but photos are not considered biometric data and are not
protected as PII. However, without photos, FR cannot be conducted, so they are
important, yet unprotected, PII pieces of data that stakeholders could legitimately argue
for less protection in storage. Storage of an image is also a very important starting point
in the process of FR. Storage of an image may constitute enrollment into a FR system,
because it’s the image that comparisons are made from. Does this then mean that all
images recorded on surveillance systems constitute enrollment into an FR system? The
definitions group defined enrollment into a FR system as, “The process of storing and
maintaining Facial Recognition Data.” The question of enrollment was addressed in the
June 3, 2014 meeting by Bill Long of Business Performance Research Associates where
the difference between an image and a template were discussed:
Walter and I tried to distinguish in our definitions group between an image
and a template. An image is a picture, anybody can take anywhere with
any device, hidden or open as the cameras in this room are. That's just an
image. That's not biometric data. That’s an image. It’s not a template.
Anyone who wants to can create a template and store it in a database; then
we are talking about stuff in this room [enrollment]. But just the image
and storing it for 10 years, that's not part of the discussion (Business).
As discussed earlier in chapter five, photography is a First Amendment protected activity
when completed in the right circumstances. The people who take photos may also have a
copyright interest in them. These competing legal interests have yet to be clarified by the
courts in regards to FRT. Photos and the images in them are not biometric data and are
not considered PII. An image processed by FRT and used to create a template of an
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individual constitutes biometric information and is considered PII. The definitions
committee defined a facial template as, “A digital representation of distinct
characteristics of a Subject’s face, representing information extracted from a photograph
using a facial recognition algorithm.”
With the group defining differences between photos and face templates, specific
conversations could be had about the storage of templates, which are now defined as
biometric data. Walter Hamilton of the International Biometrics and Identification
Association shared the following best practices of biometric data companies with the
group at the November 6, 2014 meeting:
We also support the concept, to the extent practical, depending on the
application, disassociating biometric data from other personally
identifiable information; to provide another level of abstraction, if you
will, to minimize the effects of data breach. We also support the notion of
having databases with restricted access, meaning that there should be
some form of strong authentication to the users and administrators of that
data such that the data is protected by a means other than simple username
and password if possible.
Several important points are made in this comment. In addition to having the data
encrypted while in storage, face templates should be stored in a separate database without
identifying metadata. The implications of this are clear, potential hackers would need to
not only break into the database where the face templates are stored, but also break into a
separate database to gather the identifying metadata to associate with the template. A
facial template without its identifying information is not terribly useful. Consider this
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illustrative example: as humans, we leave fingerprints on all types of surfaces every day
and pay little consideration to it because our names and other relevant information are not
accompanying them. Walter also thought these databases should have limited access, not
everyone at the company should be able to view the information, protected by strong
authorization methods. Walter specifically identified a username and password as being
a weak form of authentication. He goes on to explain some components of strong
authentication during the same meeting:
I would like to include in that some form of strong authentication rather
than simple user name and password. That doesn't mean passwords can't
be used but strong passwords at a minimum but preferably two factor
authentication for access to sensitive data whether PII or biometric
information should be limited. I don't want to suggest a requirement for
biometric authentication for logical access control, that would be a form of
strong authentication but a token or a pin plus token there’s a number of
different approaches to that…we just need to make sure that access to the
data is restricted only to individuals that have an appropriate access
privilege.
The group in drafting language has been careful to describe robust practices that it deems
to be acceptable without being so granular that businesses lack the necessary flexibility to
accommodate their particular needs. With regard to appropriate access to data, the group
is also considering an auditing mechanism to ensure adherence to access requirements.
Existing industry practices were also presented by Alvaro Bedoya, of Senator Al
Franken’s office, at the same meeting to inform the group on secure storage methods:
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On security I do want to point out that the big players in the space have
very robust security practices. It's not just secure storage, it's also
encryption according to Facebook, Apple, and Samsung. Facebook said in
a letter to Congress42 that all of their facial templates are encrypted and
stored in a monitored and access restricted database. Apple has said with
respect to touch ID that the data is encrypted and securely stored in a
secure enclave. Samsung with their fingerprint scanner, it confirmed to
me that it's encrypted and they say also in this letter that the fingerprint
data is stored in a secure part of the smartphone. For security it's not just
encryption but also secure storage.
This was the first time that the notion of a monitored database was introduced to the
group. This monitored database seems similar to the group’s auditing mechanism idea.
There was no indication if the database referenced was monitored in real time or if there
was an audit system in place.
The location or accessibility of a storage vessel was also a topic of concern for the
group. Data may be stored on servers that have no connection to the Internet; companies
may also store information in the “cloud” to utilize cheaper storage spaces. NIST defined
cloud computing as:
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that

42

Facebook announced the encryption standards after receiving scrutiny from privacy advocates and
members of Congress when it was discovered that user identifying information was sent to third parties, the
response came in October of 2010 (Bentley, 2010).
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can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort
or service provider interaction (Brown, 2011, par. 2).
Concerns about offline and online storage are centered on issues of a data breach. Verdi
attempted to clarify the issue for the group stating at the November 6, 2014 meeting:
The cloud issue wasn't really raised but I think some of the examples that
were given were…think about a digital sign that performs full blown FR
trying to identify folks or trying to authenticate folks, but does not have a
network connection it stores the data locally. At some time is updated
either over a network or physically. So then you have questions about
transmittal and you have FR biometrics that are transmitted back and forth
whether that’s pursuant to sharing or a function of the system, that's an
open question. Then you have a question which is a system that does
both, both stores biometric data locally and is sort of having a constant or
periodic transmittal relationship in which biometric information is
exchanged and it is talking or calling back to a home server for updates or
to perform other functions.
Issues of cloud storage raise questions of data transmission. It was determined by the
group that data storage and data transmission both deserved robust encryption protection.
Hamilton of the IBIA at the same meeting noted that data would be unprotected for a
brief time:
The NIST standards previously referenced apply to both data at rest and in
transit. When data is in transmission it needs to be over a secure channel
or protected in some way for some cryptographic means. However, when
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the matching function occurs, the data necessarily will be decrypted both
the match candidate and the target enrollment record for that match to take
place. So there is an instant of time if you will where the data is in the
clear. I don't know that that represents a significant or even measureable
business or social risk to these discussions. Personally, I think we should
be satisfied by having a broad agreement [consensus] on the data
protection in transit and in rest using accepted cryptographic means.
As has been discussed, none of the outcomes from the NTIA MSH process
happen in a vacuum; many states have data breach laws that the code must comply with
in order for companies to be able to implement it. Stakeholders have acknowledged that
they cannot re-write laws; thus creating standards that follow existing legal requirements
is a productive way to proceed. Hamilton was reluctant to redefine PII stating at the
same November meeting:
I think there are already some statutes on that breach of PII and if the
definition of PII includes biometrics it would apply there as well. So I
don't know that this code should attempt to redefine or visit those existing
statutes…
The NGO community agreed and consensus started to form around the futility of trying
to redefine PII, Michelle De Mooy stated, “I agree. I think the states have handled data
breach notification very well in that realm.” In concert with those comments Bill Long,
victim of a recent data breach, spoke up about the notice that commercial entities
provided to him.
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Having recently been the victim of a data breach called Home Depot, the
rules and regulations about how to notify victims and enable large well
represented companies to not disclose very much. Home Depot never got
in touch with me individually. [I]f we are going to deal with breaches,
maybe we have done enough to require users of this technology to have
more secure authentication of users but hacking happens. When hacking
happens, is it ok to rely on the state of Maryland or Virginia or Utah to
ensure that if it's a Home Depot or a Target or a whoever shopping mall,
I'm not sure we can write language that will do any better.
Clear consensus could not be reached on data breach notification during the November 6,
2014 meeting. Groups came back to the table at the December 15, 2014 meeting with
two ways to proceed regarding data breach policy, addressing the issue or leaving it to
existing laws. Issues of templates and PII once again cropped up in an exchange between
stakeholders during the December 15, 2014 meeting. Szabo explained to the group:
There are two approaches here. First is option A. Which is that we should
not necessarily address data breach notification as there are already 47
different state laws that cover unauthorized acquisition of PII and
regardless whether an entity adopts the guidelines or not these state laws
apply. Finally when the federal government passes a national data breach
standard, if ever, this section can create confusing or conflicting
obligations for parties to the guidelines.
The business community must comply with state laws and the majority of states already
drafted laws for data breaches. Szabo felt that creating additional standards would create
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conflicts for businesses attempting to comply with the code of conduct if the standards
were different from the state laws that the businesses already have to comply with. It is
not unusual for business to avoid regulation (Kolk et al., 1999); however, it also seems
unlikely that Congress will act to create the legislation referenced. An interesting appeal
to the possible passage of a federal data breach law was used to argue for reduced
regulation. As De Mooy argued during the same meeting, most existing state laws did
not address biometric data in their data breach laws.
So for 47 state laws but only about 10 of them cover biometric data. So
what we did was combine language that we thought would be
straightforward and that's from the state of Wisconsin and it’s what we
think is fair for now, definition of biometric data.
Szabo countered noting, “There are only 4 states in the country that even mention
biometric in data breach law, none of which consider biometric anything that's facial
fingerprints, and iris as a form of PII.” The argument between the two participants
centers on what should be considered PII. As discussed previously, PII lacks a consistent
definition as, states define PII differently. For the purposes of data breach, group tried to
determine if un-identified biometric data should be considered PII or if only biometric
data with identifying information attached to it should be considered PII. Szabo
continued during the December 15, 2014 meeting noting:
In Wisconsin in order for it to be PII must be biometric data which is
combined with last name and a first initial. So that is the definition of
what is PII in the state of Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, and North Carolina.
I think that further hits home the idea that we have all been talking about a
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lot today and over the past couple of months of whether a face alone
constitutes PII. If we're going to rely on the state laws then the answer is
no. So if we want to change option B to be in parody with the Wisconsin
statute which would have biometric data including fingerprint, voice print,
retina or iris image, we must include at the preface last name plus first
initial or first full name would be my suggestion.
NGO participants similarly made appeals for code provisions by looking to the future and
noting the likelihood of increased accuracy and additional capabilities of FRT to argue
for increased protections. NGO participants are particularly concerned with the
sensitivity of biometric data collected by FRT, whether attached to a name or not; as
Acquisti had previously shown, it is likely that un-identified data can be identified with
relative ease. The NGO community strongly supported this assertion at the same
December 15, 2014 meeting:
Bedoya- Look, I think the idea that a faceprint is not PII is outside of the
mainstream. I'm happy to be corrected on that. I think the reason we are
all spending countless hours on this is because it is so extraordinarily
sensitive.
De Mooy- I think it would be really disingenuous of the process not to
address this. I think in fact it would be a huge opening for criticism of the
entire code to not address biometrics in this section and to sort of blankly
discuss state laws which we are very aware of the fact that they don't
cover biometrics. I think that would be not working with integrity in this
process and we would strongly object to that.
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NGOs continued to argue for strong protection in the code for data breach provisions,
suggesting the entire process would be criticized if they were not included. Business
participants felt that if the code was to address data breach of PII then it should include
the entire language in state law that protects PII rather than using partial language from
the laws. It was noted that using partial language could create conflicts for businesses
needing to comply with both state law and the provisions in a code of conduct as stated
by Szabo during the same meeting.
I’m not arguing that we would be disingenuous or operate without
integrity. I'm just suggesting that if we are going to take part of the state
law that we take all of it. …[W]e say look: if you are a business you must
follow the state laws because you already have to today.
Stakeholders then discussed the evolving nature of state and federal data breach laws.
The data breach discussion involved a comparison between state law and best business
practices. The purpose was for the code to cover any gaps in state law as noted by
Bedoya in the same meeting:
I just want to say that, there has to be some kind of breach protection for
this. A modified option B is if the state law covers it covers it and if it
doesn't you have to take certain action following breach and treat it as PII.
A new appeal was made to the group supporting the inclusion of a provision that
addresses a data breach of PII. Instead of looking to existing state laws, it was suggested
that the code should follow existing best practices set by the business community
interestingly this was suggested by Bedoya, an NGO stakeholder, in the December 15,
2014 meeting:
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I think here the guiding principle should be not looking at what the states
have done but looking at what companies do. I'll just… that Apple,
Samsung, Facebook, and Google protect the heck out of this data. They
certainly treat it as PII and as a result of that I would say it should be
treated as PII for purposes of breach. If you have a face template that's
been developed using 25, 50, or 100s of photos, you can use that template
quickly to figure out who that is using publicly available information. So I
think we need to protect it as PII without any connection to name or
anything else. It inherently connects to other things. So we need to have
some kind of breach standard. I think anything less is totally
unacceptable.
Business participants continued to push back on a provision in the code of conduct
addressing the data breach of PII, arguing that such provisions would open up those
companies who complied with the code to greater legal liability. It was also noted that
additional complexity to the code could create an unworkable document similar to the
one created in the MATP, which led to limited adoption by the business community.
Stakeholders continued to negotiate a fine line between providing robust consumer
protections while leaving enough discretion for companies to actually implement the
potential code of conduct. The paradox of this negotiation is that adding consumer
privacy protection opens businesses up to increased liability. Ultimately, it was
determined that there was an important missing stakeholder, CDT, and the discussion was
tabled to the next meeting; currently, as of this writing, that meeting has not transpired.

219

8.3.4. Data Retention
Data retention was an important topic addressed in conjunction with data storage,
primarily how long and why businesses store sensitive consumer data which was
determined to fall within the scope of the code of conduct. The data retention issue was
broached as the group tried to decide what would happen to the consumer’s data if the
consumer withdrew from a service. Other entities already defined best practices
regarding data retention, which were then presented to the group by Bedoya at the
November 6, 2014 meeting:
On retention, FCC and CDT have both issued best practices on retention.
FTC said that companies should implement a specified retention period
and dispose of stored images once they are no longer necessary for the
purpose for which they were collected. If a customer deletes his or her
account on the website the stored images are no longer necessary and
should be disposed of even if the stated retention period has not passed.
CDT echoed this, they said when a company does retain consumer
information, the retention should last no longer than the purpose for which
it was collected.
Providing consumers with choice about what happens to their data subsequent to a
withdrawal request was important to several participants, thus data retention was a best
practice identified in the FTC workshop preceding this process. Amanda Koulousias of
the FTC presented this to the group in the March 25, 2014 meeting:
And then the third recommendation for privacy by design was limited data
retention. So for example in the scenario that we laid out the company
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was not storing the images which we think is a best practice in this
instance because they don't need to store the images for their purpose.
And we would recommend that just generally, companies limit their data
retention to what is necessary.
At a superficial level, data retention seemed to be a practical principle for the code to
address, but a number of issues complicated the topic. One of the caveats to the data
retention principle was a consideration for minors. As noted previously, and discussed
by the group, minors have comparatively limited cognitive ability to grasp long term
rewards and consequences. Amanda Koulousias of the FTC expressed the following
recommendations after a workshop concerning the limited mental capacity of minors to
the group at the same meeting:
So, for example, those case studies did not deal with use on children or
teens. I recommend for more general guidance on those things the
commission’s 2012 privacy report43 does deal with some of those issues
and provides general guidance…companies might want to consider extra
protections for teens. Some of the things that were suggested might be
things like shorter data retention periods, privacy protective default
settings, and in terms of children’s data you know that was one of the
categories that was laid out in the privacy report as sensitive data. Where
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https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protectingconsumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf The report acknowledges
comments received, including privacy harms, the global nature of many businesses, and legislation to
complement self-regulatory initiatives. The report outlines a privacy framework with the following main
components: 1) Scope: to include online and offline companies dealing with sensitive data; 2) Privacy by
Design: implemented in all phases of business practices and addressing data accuracy, retention, and
security among other concepts; 3) Simplified Consumer Choice: consumers need choices for practices
inconsistent with context of business relationship; and 4) Transparency: notice, access, and education.
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it was recommended that affirmative express consent be obtained before
collecting that data.
Presumably, special consideration for minors seems appropriate given their use of social
media, as Common Sense Media presented to the group in the April 29, 2014 meeting:
And then you think what if: the images are used and then matched with
social media profiles or other data bases so you could identify the shopper.
Especially when it comes to teens, they are heavy users of social media,
91% of teens have posted a picture of themselves online, 92% use their
real names, 53% post their real email address, and 20% post their
cellphone number, according to Pew.
Special consideration for minors on data retention periods were not the only data
retention issues discussed. While this is a code of conduct designed to protect
consumers, legitimate business considerations must also be acknowledged. Many brick
and mortar retailers employ security cameras for loss prevention. Therefore, stakeholders
have discussed scenarios where businesses may have legitimate reasons to retain facial
templates despite an individual’s request that their data be deleted. Walter Hamilton of
the IBIA explained this view to the group (December 15, 2014):
[T]here was quite a bit of discussion about the need for potentially a
general exclusion or statement that the code does not apply to security or
loss prevention uses such as looking for known shoplifters in a retail
setting or access control into a secure area limited only to authorized
people where FR is being used. That those types of uses should not
provide a facility for that individual to easily request and promptly receive
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removal of their FR data from a database if it is used for those kinds of
purposes. There need[s] to be… some kind of preamble to this code that
talks about the security or loss prevention exclusion.
Stakeholders have recognized that businesses also want to harness the potential benefits
of FRT. There is legal precedent suggesting that criminals have limited rights after
committing certain crimes. For example, sex offenders have to register with the police
for the communities in which they live. The immediate problem is that sex offenders
have been processed through the judicial system and convicted of a crime, protecting
their constitutional right to due process. If retailers kept shoplifters face template without
their consent before being convicted of theft he or she would be denied due process by
the retailer.
While retail theft is a legitimate concern faced by the business community, these
crimes do not occur without potential selection bias. Williams made a presentation to
stakeholders (July 24, 2014) regarding racial profiling in the retail setting.
Retailers are deploying FRT to identify customers as a retention
technique. What will happen when a situation where there is
discrimination against consumers. People refer to it as shop and frisk.
Essentially you identify people and you pay more attention to them in the
store and also when they leave the store and using FRT to zero in on only
certain groups and perpetuate this behavior in the marketplace (Williams,
2014).
Use of FRT to address retail loss prevention brings up additional questions of profiling,
including profiling convicts who have paid their debt to society. However, FRT may still
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be used by retailers to protect their property, “There are uses and Alvaro has mentioned a
retailer might be using FR for looking at known or convicted shoplifters or people who
have tried to commit crimes in the store before” (Business). Profiling known criminals is
not the only concern for “facial profiling.” Stakeholders were also concerned about
disparate opportunities presented to individuals based on demographic characteristics or
other linked data. This notion was explained to the group by Bedoya in the February 25,
2014 meeting:
While inaccurate outcomes are of concern, accurate outcomes when they
are produced by non-consensual analysis can be equally problematic. So
for example if I walk into a car dealership and an identity service provider
can tell the owner of the dealership, “Hey someone just walked in… and
that person uh works at X place, earns Y and just got a promotion. I think
that's something that a lot of people would be uncomfortable with even if
it is an accurate outcome.
Facial profiling is a contentious issue amongst the group. Some stakeholders worry about
profiling based on demographic information, while others do not want to market
unwanted products to uninterested individuals. Businesses do not want to waste effort on
ads that are ineffective, “Whether its behavioral targeted advertising and they are taking
my data, they are tracking certain kinds of data to make sure the ads you see are ones you
are vaguely interested in as opposed to completely wasting your time” (Business). This
exchange highlights the fact that consumers do not want their time wasted with irrelevant
products and marketers do not want to waste valuable resources advertising products to
consumers who have no interest in them. Profiling is a contentious issue amongst
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stakeholders; some uses may discriminate while others are beneficial. Consequently,
stakeholders continue to grapple with the delineations between productive and harmful
uses of profiling.
8.4. Notice
Given the sensitivity of the data collected and generated by FRT, as well as its
multiplicity of uses, the group determined that notice of the operation of FRT was a key
component in helping to safeguard consumer privacy. One of the initial ideas for notice
came in the form of a sign. Unfortunately, the suggestion came from someone in the
room who did not identify themselves and their identity remains unknown:
And then the question becomes, yes, we can put a notice we can put a sign
saying CCTV with facial recognition in action in this area if you choose
not to enter, you can leave, you can do something… you can give me a
choice. We can create a sign maybe signage that would be iconic and
maybe part of the discussion.
Notice is a key concept in the code of conduct. Consumers need to be aware of FR usage
so that they can avoid the area if they choose, or take other measures to protect their
image, including wearing a hat, sunglasses, scarf, or other protective measures.
Most stakeholders felt that consumers should be notified before coming in contact
with FRT. If adequate notice could not be given, one stakeholder felt it should not be
deployed, “Just like my casino example, I wonder whether there is any effective way of
giving notice in that case. If there is not, then it strikes me that the best practice would be
just to not do it” (NGO). Contrarily, there may be legitimate uses of FR where notice
would not be beneficial for consumers. For example, airports that employ FRT to
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identify terrorists or wanted criminals would likely not notify patrons of its usage in an
effort to keep passengers safe. There may be a few exceptions to the idea of notice, but
for most applications of FRT notice is the expectation.
It is expected that notice of FRT will be provided to users before they interact
with the technology. Some stakeholders wondered what would happen if notice were
given after an interaction with FRT. Specifically, stakeholders wondered if notice after
interacting with FRT would be considered an unfair or deceptive practice that the FTC
could enforce under its Section 5 authority. Koulousias of the FTC had explained to the
group at the March 25, 2014 meeting that:
And so then your other question was if consent was obtained at some later
point would that be deceptive or unfair. In terms of deception or
unfairness, those are things that we in terms of determining Section 5
violations we look at all those cases on a case by case basis. Consider the
specific facts in a particular scenario. So it's not something that I can
hypothesize right now but I can tell you it's something that we would look
at on a fact specific basis.
Notice provided after interacting with the technology is counter to previously determined
best practices; however, there may be legitimate circumstances where it is necessary or
acceptable, especially when considering security interests in public places. The discourse
surrounding notice is important as it has been extensively discussed by the group and the
government recognized it as a previous best practice. Given this context it is likely to be
a principal decision in this code of conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).
However, no matter when it is provided, notice is still a controversial topic for NGO
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stakeholders. Additionally, the FTC would determine unfair or deceptive notices if
provided after the fact and would be decided on a case by case basis.
The type of FRT being employed is very important to stakeholders with regard to
notice. Stakeholders have begun to coalesce around the concept of multiple notices
depending on the use of FRT. Vocal business participant Szabo seemed amenable to the
proposal stating at the April 29, 2014 meeting:
[I]f I as a consumer opt-into the system, unless it's disclosed to me at the
outset you want to respect the information that is provided at the outset,
like we would on any website. If there is material change in the privacy
policy, typically most people would agree you need opt-in consent. If how
I opt-in to the system is by agreeing to a privacy policy with the federal
government that says they will only use this photograph for purposes of
authentication. If they changed to identification then perhaps they might
need a second round of authorization to do so.
If a FRT provider changes how they use the technology, stakeholders feel that consumers
should be provided a second notice, and an opportunity to consent to the use of FR data.
While most stakeholders recognize notice as an important rule to include in a
code of conduct, others were not convinced that notice would be taken seriously by
consumers or that it provided necessary protection to consumers.
I don’t think notice and concern mechanisms are enough. And let me be
clear I don't think notice and consent are bad per se, transparency controls
are important but…were part of a broader package of principles which
included different principles. If we only focus on those two without
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considering the others, it’s as if we try to build a house without strong
foundations. (Acquisti, 2014).
The worry that consumers might not take seriously the notice of FRT’s use was echoed
by another participant in an interview (September 22, 2014).
The reality is consumers have been trained to be like Pavlov’s dogs, they
want the app so they click yes yes yes. It’s also not been in the app
developer’s interest to say hey are you really sure you want to give me all
your personal contact information that I can use to market other products.
It needs to be more of a notice, but no one ever looks at [it] (NGO).
This comment was substantiated in the academic literature regarding end user license
agreements (EULAs). It appears that many end users do not read the EULA before
consenting to its terms. According to Earp, Anton, Aiman-Smith, and Stufflebeam
(2005) an overwhelming majority of Internet users expect to see privacy policies on
websites, yet only 60% of users admit to reading them. It is important to note that this
covers all websites, including those carrying sensitive medical information. Legal
scholars have observed a similar trend, but note that the agreement is nonetheless legally
binding: “Despite the reality that consumers tend not to read these agreements, courts
have consistently upheld online standard form contracts, finding sufficient assent”
(Preston & McCann, 2011, p. 18). Creating a code of conduct that truly protects
consumer privacy will require other principles besides a simple notification of FRT use.
8.5. Transparency
Providing consumers notice of FRT deployment is the first step to providing
consumers meaningful control over their biometric data. The literature also proves, as
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well as the NTIA meetings, that providing notice of FRT use to consumers is insufficient
to ensure their privacy is adequately protected. Stakeholders see notice as an important
first step to protecting consumer privacy, but businesses also need to be transparent about
what they do with consumers’ data. Will the business retain FR data? What are their
retention policies? Will the company share a consumer’s data? Data use questions are
very important, and yet stakeholders remain divided concerning what transparency
safeguards should be required of companies. One important principle of transparency is
that it should be easy for consumers to understand. Legalese was a concern espoused by
Susan Grant, of Consumer Federation of America, at the May 20, 2014 meeting:
I think where the more meaty transparency comes into play, the
explanation of how it's going to be used and government access and so on
is in fact when somebody is being enrolled in an FR system. While it
should be in plain language and not legalese, I don't think we need to
worry how that would fit on the building because that's not what we are
talking about.
Stakeholders are mindful that many consumers, including minors, will not understand the
legal jargon contained in privacy policies. Transparency requires lay language.
The goal of the group is to give the consumer control over their data through
notices and company transparency. As mentioned previously with data retention policies,
consumers should have the ability to delete their data regardless of how they entered into
a service. Chris Calabrese of the ACLU cited the practices of Google and Facebook
during the June 24, 2014 meeting.
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Google has said that you can opt-in and they will only collect your
faceprint when you opt-in. I think that's a powerful first principle. I think
it contrasts sharply with some things that are in the IBIA framework. Both
Google and Facebook allow you to withdraw your consent in the form of
deleting faceprints whenever you want, certainly a powerful way to keep
the technology under your control. Google and Facebook give a certain
level of access to prints; you can know when it's being used and control
how it's being used. Certainly it's not the robust audit control that we
would argue for, but it's an understanding that this is the consumer’s
information. It needs to be handled and the consumer needs to be
consulted on it.
The goal of providing a consumer with notice and transparency is to enable consumer
data control. Control has been a popular conception of privacy amongst the stakeholders.
When many stakeholders were asked about how they conceived of privacy, many of them
used the word control to sum up their view. Control is a popular conception of privacy
because it is one that can be “operationalized.” As noted, privacy is a complicated,
multifaceted, and subjective subject, whereas control is seen as something tangible that
can be given to consumers in detailed ways.
8.6. Conclusion
The complexity of the technology, the sensitive data it collects, the protection of
that data, and providing consumers with meaningful controls has the group grappling
with those issues. Security of the data generated by FRT has been the “low hanging
fruit” that the group has decided to address first. As shown, even though stakeholders
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agreed that strong security protections were warranted they are having difficulty agreeing
on the details of those protections. At the last meeting, which occurred December 15,
2014, the group was unable to achieve consensus on this issue. At this time, no other
meetings have been scheduled, so it remains unclear as to how these issues will be
resolved. The group still has many issues to decide, including how the technology will
be specifically regulated and if companies will adopt the regulatory regime for FRT.
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CHAPTER 9
HOW DOES FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE
CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY?
Facial recognition technology is an emerging technology that will likely force
academics to reconsider how they conceive of privacy. As explained previously, privacy
is a subjective and contentious concept. There are no agreed upon definitions of privacy
in the academic community. As such, many scholars have chosen to focus on specific
aspects of privacy rather than deal with the entire concept which consists of, but is not
limited to, physical privacy, data privacy, cognitive privacy, and information privacy.
The power of FRT links these varying conceptions together and challenges the merits of
splitting privacy into such narrow conceptions. This chapter will explore stakeholder
understandings of privacy as their understanding will influence how privacy is conceived
by a code of conduct. Also addressed, are the various academic conceptions of privacy
and how the technology has the ability to link the current fragmented conceptions of
privacy.
9.1. Understanding Stakeholders’ Conceptions of Privacy
Understanding how stakeholders conceive of privacy is an important precursor to
understanding how a code of conduct for FRT protects consumer privacy (Scollon & de
Saint-Georges, 2012). Stakeholders have varied conceptions of privacy, thanks to what
their organizations and constituencies value. Some constituencies are inherently privacy
protective while others are privacy intrusive. Stakeholder opinions of privacy were
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collected to determine what has been called “anticipatory discourse” or the sense that our
actions begin as “preparation for action” (de Saint-Georges, 2004, p. 73). One can best
understand an action after examining the sequence of motivations that led to its
accomplishment. Understanding stakeholder privacy opinions represents an important
step in understanding how a code of conduct will address the issue in regards to FRT.
When several interviewees were asked for their definition of privacy, they gave
uniform answers that could be summed up in a single word: control. An interview
conducted with a government official elicited this response: “Control. It [privacy] could
be other things to other people and that's fine, we can have good conversations about that.
But it’s about control, it’s not secrecy. It’s about control” (Government). A similarly
concise answer was given when another interviewee was asked about his/her definition of
privacy, which was “Control of the information” (Business). During another interview
the control theme was again espoused when asked about how he/she conceived of
privacy, the responder indicated that “Privacy is about information control… the
individual has the ability to know what is known about him or her, and control it. But
certainly I mean that's mine. Mine is much more about information control” (NGO).
In the literature informational privacy is a popular conception of privacy amongst
many others (Nissenbaum, 2009; Smith et al., 2011; White House, 2012). The uniformity
of this discourse suggests that data and information control will be an important topic of
discussion for stakeholders. Indeed, the first substantive issue addressed by the group in
the drafting process was data security. Part of having control over one’s information
includes assurances that the information is adequately protected and there is limited
access to it. Given the many understandings of privacy found in academic literature, the
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uniform understanding of privacy as control by stakeholders is counterintuitive. One
would expect a diversity of conceptualizations of privacy amongst stakeholders, but
perhaps since the purpose of the process is to develop a code of conduct, operationalizing
privacy as control does make sense.
Control appears to be a popular concept amongst stakeholders drafting a code of
conduct for FRT because “control” can be operationalized. The popular
conceptualization of control was substantiated later in actions by the group. The
stakeholders first drafted language about the high security protections and limited access
to this data the code should provide as an example of anticipatory discourse (de SaintGeorges, 2004).
It is virtually impossible to account for the subjective nature and the varied
conceptions of privacy in a single code of conduct and achieve a satisfactory outcome;
however, it is possible to provide users with tools of notice, transparency, and assurances
of security that provide consumers with some level of “control” over their information.
For instance, if a FRT commercial entity makes a material change in how it uses a
consumer’s FR data then it may have to receive affirmative consent from the consumer,
thereby providing the consumer a measure of control over how their data will be used. It
should be noted that control provides stakeholders the practicality of operationalization
through language in a code of conduct. However, despite its conveniences, the concept
of control does have some limitations despite its conveniences.
Equally clear during the first few interviews is the woeful inadequacy of the
concept of control as a conception of privacy. Data breaches have occurred recently at
Target, Home Depot, and Apple making it apparent that even though the consumer has
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entered into agreements with each commercial entity, they ultimately had no control over
how their data was accessed and used. With these events occurring during this MSH
process, it is of little surprise that the group placed a premium importance on data
security (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). Scandals at the IRS and NSA have also
illustrated that government entities can use a consumer’s or citizen’s data outside of his
or her control. Data breaches do not eliminate the usefulness of the concept of control
but point to a potential limit of its viability in practice. This code of conduct cannot
adequately address the limitation of data control, Internet service providers, the
architecture of the Internet, and users’ access to their data are all important points
affecting the control of data. One might simply suggest storing data on servers without
Internet access, but this would place limits on business practices and still would not deter
rogue employees with nefarious intentions. Even if users had perfect control over their
information they would still lack privacy because many individuals willingly divulge
personal information for various reasons, including monetary gain or increased celebrity
(Allen, 1999, p.867).
With these understandings in mind, the researcher continued conducting
interviews asking interviewees for their definitions of privacy and discussing how useful
the conceptualization of privacy as control actually is. A different conception of privacy
was voiced by an NGO interviewee (August 6, 2014),
I think that privacy is a right to be left alone, to be free from intrusion by
companies and by the government. There's a limited space where one can
be without being monitored or assessed and preserving the ability of an
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individual to have that space to feel unencumbered, uninhibited, without
fear of reprisal, assessment, or judgement (NGO).
The right to be let alone is another conception of privacy found frequently in the
academic literature (Rosen, 2000; Mill, 1988; Terilli & Splichal, 2011; Smith et al.,
2011); one that we typically think of in regard to physical privacy but can also include
our information being let alone as well. FRT can certainly intrude on one’s physical
privacy and informational privacy. One interviewee placed control as tangentially related
to privacy rather than central to privacy:
I think control is an aspect of what I think about it. Having control over
the space is part of it but the reason we have privacy is individuals really
feel the need to have part of their lives that they don't have to worry about
someone else seeing them or assessing them and using that against them
(NGO).
Control is thought of by this interviewee as an important component of privacy, but not
all encompassing. Another conception was articulated as, “data retention, awareness,
giving people consent. If I had to encapsulate it, it's about personal control” (NGO). In
this definition there are components that have been explicitly discussed in the meetings,
including notice, transparency, choice, and data retention, which may have been absorbed
by the interviewee from the meetings (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). However, the
concept of control once again materialized, in an interview occurring July 23, 2014, this
time with a very different understanding:
I think the point that people are making when they say that [control], or at
least the point that I am making, is sort of highlighting the fact that that
236

has been lost. Because we are talking about privacy in the sort of general
way, that needs to be returned to people (NGO).
This same interviewee perceived of privacy control as something that has largely been
lost. This participant felt that there has been a steady erosion of consumer control of
privacy, which is what NGOs are advocating against.
But what that does [advocating for big data] is make people feel like it's
too late, this is just what's happening, or it makes them say things like
"well I have nothing to hide" but that's never true, there are always things
to hide. So when you say privacy in the context of this conversation it
means having that control back, taking some of that back or having the
ability to take some of that back. So it can be transparency which the
companies would show you, this is what we are doing; this is what we are
taking from you without you knowing or having any possibility. So that's
the thing that advocates are trying to get to happen so we do have some
control over it (NGO).
Control, notice, and transparency seem to be important components of privacy that many
stakeholders can agree on; these conceptions have arisen from prior experiences of
stakeholders, conversations had during this process, and compliance with existing laws.
Stakeholders seem to agree on control as an important part of privacy. In an interview
with a business participant (September 22, 2014), he felt that might be a point of
consensus:
I've spent time with others in the room but it's hard to judge what their
perspective is. Again, I think like you said everyone does agree on
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transparency, on a level of control, again [it] depends on context, what’s
appropriate, and what’s sufficient (Business).
Two interviewees failed to provide an answer as to how they conceived of privacy.44
There are two broad understandings of privacy in the meetings: one is
representative of the business stakeholder group and the other from the NGOs. For
example, one academic said, “Industry has a very legalistic understanding of privacy for
pretty obvious reasons. Privacy groups have a much broader understanding of what it is
and what it should be.” Industry (Business) has a more legal understanding of privacy
because of their concern to reduce legal liability. Businesses want to minimize their
exposure to potential lawsuits that can arise from an invasion of privacy or the
mishandling of consumers’ data. NGOs likely have a broad understanding of privacy due
to their varied citizen’s privacy interests. Several NGOs have reported working on
numerous MSH processes involving a number issues surrounding privacy. Despite there
being some agreement amongst stakeholders about important aspects of privacy, it is
important to understand how stakeholders view FRT in terms of being inherently privacy
enhancing or privacy exploitive.
9.1.1. Big Data and Privacy
The increase of large data sets that include consumer information has been
concerning for some participants. More important is the distinction between collection
and use. Carl Szabo of NetChoice stated at this (June 24, 2014):
If you go back to the White House big data report, the PCAST45 report in
particular, which is the technology arm of the White House, they said with
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1) Don't have one. 2) I'd be happy to follow up with you on that.
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respect to big data don't worry about collection, worry about use. When it
comes to FR the use is really a sharing, the sharing of information with
somebody who otherwise wouldn't have that information. So we believe
that users should have the opportunity to control the sharing of personal
information with someone who otherwise wouldn't have that information.
It's control of sharing. That personal information in this instance is
derived from FR. That is control personal information, collected from FR
software.
The start of privacy intrusion begins with the collection of big data. Steven Aftergood
(2015) noted the glaring flaw in the statement “don’t worry about collection, worry about
use” when he stated,“[The problem with] secret collection of…records… is the … public
was denied any opportunity to grant or to withhold consent to this practice” (p. 20).
Citizens must be worried about the collection of their data as the government and big
business continues to prove that they are both incapable of protecting consumer data and
often abuse the data; the NSA and Facebook being the more recent and publicized
examples. As Bruce Schneier (2015) noted, “…Government surveillance piggybacks on
existing corporate capabilities” (p. 202). He goes on to explain that corporations equally
rely on the government to keep their own surveillance practices legal and unregulated.
The government and corporations “use each other’s laws to protect their own data
collection and get around rules that limit their actions” (Shneier, 2015, p. 202). Business
entities also contend that they need to collect personal data to provide consumers with

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), the report referenced can be
found here:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/amp20_report_final.pdf
45
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better services. The “Big Data” report has been tangentially discussed by the group,
mostly because FR creates new biometric data that adds to existing data about an
individual.
9.1.2. Technology and Privacy
There has been some discussion by stakeholders about whether FRT is a privacy
enhancing, privacy invading, or a privacy neutral technology. How stakeholders view the
technology in regards to privacy is important to understand what protections the code of
conduct may provide consumers. These discussions are likely to impact the final code of
conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). Regulation can change how the technology
is viewed in terms of privacy. As one business representative said: “As a matter of fact,
many technologies are privacy protective. Or technologies can be crafted in such a way
to be much more or much less privacy protective.” This sentiment was reaffirmed by
another interviewee (June 23, 2014):
I think in many ways technology facilitates privacy and in many ways
technology threatens privacy. I am largely of the camp that technology is
neutral. The means to which we put it as human beings and the ways in
which we use it determine whether or not it is privacy enhancing or
whether it is privacy reducing (Government).
The degree to which FRT is inherently privacy protective or privacy exploitative might
be considered extreme positions, “But those are edge cases. I think that the big fat
middle is folks get to pick in terms of how they implement them [privacy protective or
privacy intrusive]” (government). This middle ground where users get to choose how the
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technology is used seems to be a position with broad agreement amongst the group.
Walter Hamilton of the IBIA took this position at the June 24, 2014 meeting:
First any technology is inherently privacy neutral. It is only the
application or use of a technology that determines whether it is a protector
of privacy, or a privacy enhancing technology, or whether it's a threat to
personal privacy. It's very difficult for us to say that a technology is good
or bad or characterize it as something dangerous. It is privacy neutral.
Stakeholders understand that whether or not the technology enhances or degrades privacy
is largely dependent on the safeguards that they create in a code of conduct. For
example, broad authentication uses may increase the security with which an individual
accesses his or her bank accounts and other sensitive records; however, its uses may lead
to what has been called the democratization of surveillance, or when citizens play an
active role in surveilling their peers (Dupont, 2008). Equally important are the
underlying values attached to the technology and largely ignored by participants. FRT
has historically been funded by the government to be utilized for national defense. The
military’s defensive influence on the technology should not be dismissed by the
stakeholder participants who immediately state that the technology is neutral.
9.1.3. Privacy and Control
Since privacy has often been conceptualized as control by stakeholders, it is
important to understand this concept in greater depth. A business interviewee stated: “I
think [control] is an important concept. Control without [an] adequate understanding
about what the implications [privacy risks] are and what your other options [transparency
and notice] are can be kind of pointless.” These comments demonstrate stakeholder
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awareness of the limits of privacy as control. Consumers are unable to enact meaningful
control over their person or information in the absence of proper notification and
transparency provided by businesses. If businesses are not forthcoming about their
practices and the rights of consumers then will be unable to enact the protections
provided. However, as shown in the previous chapter on the regulation of technology,
providing consumers with too much notification can lead to a Pavlovian effect (please
refer to interviewee comments on p. 225) where consumers simply click “accept” without
reading through the terms of the agreement. Conversely, there is disagreement about the
level of notice provided to consumers, which leads to consumer control of their privacy.
One interviewee articulated some of the shortcomings of notice stating (September 17,
2014):
I don't think we have meaningful notice either. No one will read these
super long privacy policies. It's certainly a take it or leave it proposition in
some cases. When I was talking about when companies will enter data
along the lines of privacy it would be nice if these companies wanted to
give people more privacy and giving people choice and control. I don't
think that you have right now I don't feel like there are a lot of choices and
particularly when we are talking about facial [recognition] and where you
are walking down the street. It's kind of meaningless (NGO).
NGO participants have mostly expressed a lack of meaningful controls provided to the
consumer. However, industry participants disagree: “…[C]onsumers have in the end a
lot of control. But you have to give up certain amounts of control to receive various
things in return” (Business). Industry participants appear to consider the surrender of
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privacy as normal and possibly required to receive a particular product or service.
Nonetheless, even business participants are undecided on the level of control that should
be provided to a consumer as one interviewee stated September 9, 2014:
Trying to determine how much should a consumer consider giving up
control of X and privacy of Y in order to get product or service Z.
Whether it’s behavioral targeted advertising and they are taking my data,
they are tracking certain kinds of data to make sure the ads you see are
ones you are vaguely interested in as opposed to completely wasting your
time. Is that something you care about and giving someone choice makes
sense. I prefer to see the ads I care about rather than ads that disgust me or
don't interest me (Business).
Despite a lack of certainty concerning the needs of consumer control, business seems to
view intrusion on consumer privacy as a way to provide benefits or beneficial services to
the consumer. No discussion transpired concerning businesses harming consumer
privacy, nor was this issue even readily acknowledged by business participants. Notice
and transparency are precursors of control, and represent the ability for consumers to
keep their information private. However, providing too much notice can lead to the
erosion of privacy, as shown earlier. A deeper understanding about the “appropriate”
level of notice, transparency, and control is needed to protect consumer privacy and who
provides those levels.
9.1.4. Privacy and Business
The business community has a somewhat conflicted position with privacy.
Businesses must provide enough privacy protection assurances to consumers to gain
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consumer trust so they will use the service or product, yet they also have a vested interest
in exploiting consumer privacy to make money by offering relevant ads or better
customer service. However, where this balance lies remains unclear as one interviewee
articulated to me (September 25, 2014):
Companies can prove through the security context and data breach or the
impact it has on the bottom line or some sort of change in privacy policy
that really upsets consumers, so there is a real economic incentive tied to
having appropriate privacy protections and companies made of people
who hold that same fundamental belief. But doing that in a way that
doesn’t really jeopardize future growth can be difficult as we have seen
(Business).
The business community seems cognizant of the fact that if they do not have responsible
privacy policies, consumers may choose other services. As one business interviewee
stated (June 24, 2014):
One of the important things to note is that when industry creates selfregulation we do it because we think it’s good business. By that I mean
we want to instill confidence in the market and also instill confidence in
our users, especially in a post-Snowden era. That we will use their
information responsibly and not outside the guise of what we say we want
to do (Business).
Of course this recognition only works in business areas of competition. Where
competition is scarce or where monopolies exist, companies have less incentive to
prioritize consumer privacy. For example, Facebook is not very concerned about their
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users leaving the service for Myspace. As noted previously, businesses generally try to
avoid regulation, and, in order to do so, they must provide reasonable levels of privacy
protection. “I think the companies understand the need for privacy protections. I think
they don't want to be thought of as companies bad at privacy, which can be bad PR and
create lots of regulatory oversight” (NGO). From a business perspective, being, or
appearing to be, a business that protects consumer privacy can enhance the business’s
reputation, as well as its bottom line as Szabo pointed out at the May 20, 2014 meeting.
I think there are groups who will not be bound, who do not perform FR,
but are bound by reputational assets and reputational interests. So, I don't
want to pick Consumer Federation out, but if Consumer Federation's
decade long reputation as a defender of consumer rights is on the line, I
feel like that in fact is an important sign on to a code. Equally important, I
think if a company were to say we will be bound by the code as well
would to my mind be their buy in.
However, the business community was quick to push back on the notion that signing up
for the NTIA code would enhance its reputation and business interests. Hamilton of the
IBIA stated at the June 24, 2014 meeting:
We support privacy, we believe in privacy, we want biometrics to be seen
as a tool to enhance privacy. But we also want to recognize the
complexity of so many myriad of applications that there may be instances
where an organization shouldn't be shunned or branded as an outlier, if
they don't sign up to a code of conduct that professes to apply a biometric
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set of principles for privacy when in fact it just doesn't make sense for the
way in which the organization has applied them for its use.
It is true that any code of conduct will have a hard time responsibly covering all
legitimate business practices. Companies whose practices fall outside of the code should
not be punished by consumers because they were unable to sign on. To this end
corporate responsibility literature is informative. Corporate responsibility refers to
responsible business practices, something that is particularly important giving the
sensitivity of FR data. Simon Zadek (2007) noted that most companies learn corporate
responsibility in the following five stages:
1. It’s not our job to fix that
2. We’ll do just as much as we have to
3. It’s the business, stupid
4. It gives us a competitive advantage
5. We need to make sure everyone does it (p. 2).
With regard to privacy, many companies seem to be in the latter stages of the corporate
learning process. After publicized commercial data breaches, businesses have realized
that “It’s the business, stupid”; therefore, they need to adopt data protection and privacy
enhancing practices or face losing consumers. Early adopters of these methods may find
it provides a competitive advantage in the form of increased user trust and thus increased
consumer use. Finally, with regard to the code of conduct, the group is attempting to
standardize best practices that create fair competitive spaces for businesses to engage in.
Businesses may find it difficult to abide by the code of conduct which is to
address commercial uses of FRT. As David Lyon (2007) noted:
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[N]ot only have corporations outstripped the capacity of state
administration to undertake mass surveillance in the twenty-first century,
the surveillance activities of many corporations themselves have not
become part of a large ensemble of governance alongside and intertwined
with government administration (p. 163).
Companies may not be able to sign on to a code of conduct or abide by its privacy rules
due to entanglement with government entities. A code of conduct that is limited to
consumer uses of FR may not provide consumers with much protection because of
government involvement.
9.1.5. Privacy and Anonymity
As explained earlier, anonymity is not privacy nor is privacy anonymity. Instead,
“Anonymity allows the individual to have a voice without having a name” (Weicher,
2006, p.1) another interpretation states, “Anonymity is the ability to conceal a person’s
identity…” (Smith et al., 2011, p. 996). However, anonymity is often an important part
of privacy. Often the reason citizens feel safe to exercise their First Amendment rights is
that they feel that privacy will be protected through the relative anonymity that crowds
provide. Certain participants, and one interviewee (July 29, 2014), fear the surveillance
and identification powers of FRT, particularly the power it has to transform a world of
relative anonymity to a world where all persons are known at all times.
Even if a person is anonymous in some databases or has a pseudonym, he
can change a pseudonym but not their biometrics. That's what makes
surveillance, profiling, and discrimination possible and easier basically.
That's basically the problem with biometrics. Those problems occur
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without biometrics as the IBIA [International Biometrics Industry
Association] they submitted that biometrics isn't the biggest threat but big
data is. I agree that that is true. But biometrics facilitates using big data
because it can link all the databases without knowing the person’s name.
(Government).
Another potential threat to an individual’s privacy is that FRT does not have to occur in
real time. FRT can be applied to photos that were taken in the past if the photo is of
sufficient quality. These implications are threatening. If an individual attended a
political rally twenty years ago and now wants to run for political office, there could be
devastating consequences, as that photo may no longer represent how that person wishes
to be viewed. Previously, the photo may have looked ridiculous to others, but they would
not have had the ability to identify the individual in that photo. FRT threatens an
individual’s ability to conceal their identity or to have a voice without a name.
A position paper released regarding anonymity by the IBIA during the meetings46
was particularly troubling. The position paper states that to participate in society an
individual must forfeit their anonymity (p. 5). The IBIA faced severe criticism from
other participants for having such a strong position on anonymity during the June 24,
2014 meeting. Calabrese of the ACLU stated:
“Anonymity and privacy are not synonymous terms. The former is
forfeited if one chooses to live in society” [p.5]. Those are very very
strong words. I'm surprised by them but I assume you meant them since
46

The position paper can be found here:
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ibia_statement_to_ntia__best_practice_recommendations_6
-17-2014.pdf (IBIA, 2014b).
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you used them throughout the document. Can you talk about them?
Anonymity is a pretty fundamental value in American Society.
Hamilton of the IBIA responded stating:
We wanted to distinguish between privacy and anonymity. One of the
examples is that: I value my privacy, privacy meaning I don't want to be
intruded on or contacted by an organization…. the organization may know
who I am, they may have a telephone book, they may have my address,
they may have some of my demographics from other public data they have
aggregated and analyzed but that doesn't give them the right to invade my
privacy by disturbing or pushing unwanted things. We wanted to
distinguish between anonymity because there is very little anonymity in
our society if we are going to be productive members. What we are
saying is that you are constantly going to be required to identify yourself
or have your identity verified in order to receive services, privileges, drive
a car, open a bank account, do just about anything to live in our society.
The IBIA drew criticism for having such an extreme position on anonymity, saying that
to participate in society anonymity is forfeited. Individuals expect generalized anonymity
but also recognize that they may be identified at unexpected times by participating in a
public space. To state that being in public is to be identified is a violation of current
social norms as pointed out in the same meeting by Travis Hall of New York University:
It seems like the point is that anonymity should be or can be maintained
contextually. It's not that to function in society you have to give up your
identity at all times but in certain situations and circumstances you have to
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produce your identity. Contextually you should have the ability to protect
your identity.
Biometric data alone do not possess a substantial threat to anonymity. For example,
individuals leave fingerprints on many surfaces during the course of the day without the
expectation of those prints being used to identify that person. However, biometrics do
present a threat to anonymity because of their ability to link identified data. Hall
continued:
Biometric data the template by itself is also kind of useless. Biometric
data is useful in as much as it is linked and has access to other
information. It seems that the important crux here is the linkage of
information, of biometric data to other pieces of information, to things that
need to be protected…with FRT we have to make sure they can't be
identified or it’s not attached to biographic data, because for the most part
those things are typically linked because biometric data not attached to
other things is not terribly useful.
This exchange highlights the value that some stakeholders attach to anonymity and its
ability to help protect consumer privacy. It is also true that there are certain situations in
which we must be, or at least want to be, identified. The group has been tasked with
deciding in which contexts it is appropriate for FRT to identify someone. The IBIA
returned to the forum at the next meeting, July 24, 2014, and stated that privacy was not
anonymity, clarifying that they were there to discuss privacy; however, that was where
the conversation ended.
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We've offered some clarifying remarks which are posted to the
website…the comment I did want to make is that we would like to focus
the discussion around best practice recommendations that IBIA has
entered… rather than on our findings and perspectives of the state of the
world. We would rather close the debate on anonymity as it pertains to
this forum but we are happy to discuss it offline. Now we want to focus
on privacy matters that are germane to the scope of this work.
One participant had some clarifying remarks during an interview. The interviewee
offered the following behind the scenes email exchange with the IBIA.
The second part of their [IBIA]argument was, privacy is degraded but not
our fault. Anonymity, which is something you could argue biometrics
gets rid of…you don't actually have the right to that anymore. There's no
way that you can actually think that you have anonymity period. …they
were conflating the idea of anonymity at all times and in all places with
anonymity as people understand it. So they were trying to deny that you
have a right to anonymity but they were using the most extreme
understanding of what anonymity means to deny that desire for
generalized anonymity or anonymity period. They also were being
willfully ignorant of the role that biometrics can potentially play within
the broader context of privacy degrading technologies (Academic).
It is fair to say that participants, including the IBIA, have recognized the value of
anonymity in society while also recognizing the ability FRT has to impose on an
individual’s anonymity. Stakeholders are still discussing principles for a potential code
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of conduct, but it appears they will be mindful of protecting anonymity and the value it
provides to society.
9.2. Anonymity and Free Speech
It has been established that anonymity is not privacy, but that anonymity can help
maintain privacy; anonymity can also encourage free speech.
A frequently cited 1995 Supreme Court ruling in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission reads: Protections for anonymous speech are vital
to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees
them to express critical minority views . . . Anonymity is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill
of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular
individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society.
(Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015, par. 4)
If we lose anonymity because of FRT we may severely damage free speech in our
democracy. Using FRT for identification purposes is something that will have to be
seriously discussed by the group and possibly curtailed to ensure the free flow of ideas
and communication, especially unpopular ones. For now, the group recognizes the
heightened stakes of using FRT for identification, but has yet to decide on its application
or implementation.
9.3. Facial Recognition Technology as a Threat to Privacy
It has been proposed in this research that privacy needs to be reconceptualized
because of the proliferation of FRT. FRT challenges the current conceptions of privacy
in many ways, as will be explained in detail now. The first privacy challenge FRT poses
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is its ability to mimic a skill in which humans are very accurate, which is detecting,
remembering, and associating information with faces. FRT simulates a human skill. In
other words, why should a technology be regulated in restrictive ways for a task that can
be completed by humans and not subject to the same prohibitive restrictions?
9.3.1. Facial Recognition Technology Simulating Human Capabilities
During the course of the meetings, business entities have been quick to point out
that FRT merely mimics a skill that humans readily perform. Business stakeholders have
used this observation to advance their interests and argue for reduced regulation because
they could simply employ humans and avoid the FRT regulations as Szabo pointed out to
the group in the May 20, 2014 meeting.
Today a reporter can take a snapshot of a yearbook and at a pot rally and
identify people there. This can be done through Bing's image matching
search. Casino card cheat program as you walk in the “eye in the sky”
captures your image and right now it's somewhat manually done but it can
also be automated to identify card cheats and ask them to leave.
In short, businesses could simply employ 500 interns to start looking through high school
yearbooks to identify individuals of interest. Furthermore, there are legitimate public
interest exceptions that must be recognized, such as newspapers covering “newsworthy”
stories. NGO stakeholders have recognized these situations but are concerned about the
limit of such exceptions as Bedoya countered at the same meeting.
I totally understand where this…public interest, public information
exception [is coming from]. My concern is that this [public interest
exception] encompasses a few of the exact situations people are most
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concerned by. For example, if there is a political protest, or a political
rally, that is definitely public interest, that involves politics, public affairs,
certainly newsworthy. Should there be an exception that allows a news
organization to photograph that rally a news organization a company that
has decided to voluntarily comply with the code of conduct, should there
be something that allows them to identify by name the individuals in that
crowd because it is newsworthy.
The press has had an important role in promoting American democracy but there are also
legitimate fears that this technology will have a chilling effect on First Amendment
rights. Citizens expect a certain amount of anonymity, and that anonymity protects their
privacy and encourages them to express their views. Nonetheless, business participants
once again pushed back.
This isn't about companies identifying anonymous people. This is in
general, if it’s a matter of public interest, news, affairs, etcetera. I think
realistically if I took a picture of 30 people or 3,000 rallying on the steps
of the capital and I want to know what kind of people I could easily send
out 500 interns to compare images based on the groups that I have. This
can all be done by human eye. I mean we are talking about a difference
between an automated technology and what can be done without
automated technology (Business).
However, there is a very important difference in scale of what a human can perform and
what FRT is capable of, “Right but you would need 500 interns and probably 20 years.

254

FR could do that in a matter of minutes. That's what's different and that's why we are
here” (NGO). To give an idea concerning the difference in scale, Bedoya had this to say:
Basically the human mind according to most studies can remember 10,000
people at a maximum. As of 2012 the fastest FR algorithm was from
Hitachi that could process 36 million people in a second. Now the
technology exists that would allow the identification of every single
person at the rally. That tension of privacy and public is what makes this
interesting. People do have an expectation of privacy in public and FRT at
its extreme threatens to undermine that.
The potential capability of the technology versus the capability of humans is radically
different, especially when including both the time and money involved for similar
identification outcomes. Furthermore, the decisions that FRT may be involved in making
would be automated, which is potentially problematic as Chris Calabrese of the ACLU
articulated in the April 29, 2014 meeting.
So Pam Dickson and Bob Gellman47 did a great report on scoring and the
idea that we can use big data to score people. As we gather this kind of
information does it go into a score? Is this something my employability is
questioned because I was in a pot rally, we know that, and again the power
of this is that it's automated. No one has to go through and make these
judgments; they happen automatically.

47

Pam Dickson is the founder of the World Privacy Forum. Robert (Bob) Gellman is a privacy policy
consultant. The report referenced is titled Data Brokers and the Federal Government: A New Front in the
Battle for Privacy Opens (World Privacy Forum, 2014).
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There are legitimate concerns for the types of decisions FRT may make; therefore, a
compromise may need to be drawn that includes news agencies covering only public
events and public figures, but crowds would not be subject to identification via FRT.
Akin to FR, scientists are asking computers to report what they see in images, this is very
primitive currently. We need to ask what judgements FRT will make in the future and
what values or motives operators will attach to those judgements. Additionally, FRT has
incredible potential to link data that is already known about an individual, something that
currently takes considerably more effort. Ultimately, because the technology replicates a
skill that humans perform, it is difficult to regulate its actions. Of course the cost of
employing humans for such a task would be prohibitive. It is hard to create strict
regulations for a technology when the same task could be completed without the
technology and no regulations would apply. However, the speed, accuracy, and scale of
projects that can be completed via FRT ultimately warrant regulatory safeguards. The
distinction between technology and humans task completion will present the most
important impact on the creation of privacy safeguards.
9.3.2. Data
The data created by FRT is biometric. Biometric data poses specific threats to
privacy that other information such as usernames and passwords, do not. Biometric data
is permanent in nature and intimately linked with one’s identity. Even when considering
plastic surgery, the costs are usually prohibitive and the surgery is unlikely to change the
orbital socket which is an identifying feature that most FR systems utilize for
identification purposes. If biometric data was compromised in a data breach or other
theft, an individual will be unable to use it for authentication purposes. More
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importantly, as humans we are generally not allowed to hide our faces, imagine
conducting one’s banking business with a ski mask on. Since FRT utilizes our face for
the creation of biometric data we are limited in the ways that we can protect our face
from the technology.
You can change your name….[but it is] very hard to change your face.
And in fact even using facial hair, or funny haircuts, or glasses to fool
facial recognition is working now is probably not going to work 5-10
years out because researchers keep getting better and better at algorithms
which account for facial hair and so forth (Acquisti, 2014).
Not only is it very hard for an individual to meaningfully protect his/her face from the
technology, but the technology is commonly used to authenticate known identities which
contain a host of related biographic data as was shown at the March 25, 2014 meeting by
Mathew Young of Sotero Defense Solutions: “So at the time that you collect you’re the
picture right there of the ID and you capture your live face, are there other details that are
being collected such as a time stamp of when that actually happened?” King responded:
“Absolutely we do.” FRT scans and digital pictures contain a multitude of information,
some necessary for FR and some that is simply inherent to the picture. Photos reveal a
great deal of information about individuals, including race, age, gender, weight, height,
hair color, eye color, disability, and location, all of which can be guessed with relative
accuracy. As made clear in the previous exchange digital photos also contain a host of
information, including a time stamp, document origination, date of birth, and possibly
security clearances or other privileges. Many digital cameras capture what is called
Extended File Information (EXIF). EXIF data contains information about the camera
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that took the photo, such as file name, size, date, camera make, camera model, resolution,
whether the flash was used, focal length, and Jpeg process (Alvarez, 2004, p. 2). Apple’s
iPhone is also capable of embedding precise geo-coordinates with photos and videos
taken with the device (Friedland & Sommer, 2010, p. 1). Furthermore FR can be enacted
retroactively. Photos from years in the past, if of sufficient quality, can be utilized for
FR. More worrisome still, are the value judgements that either computers or humans can
add to the picture and the people in it. Put succinctly, the data that photos reveal about an
individual are much more detailed than when taken at face value, coupled with FR an
individual and their privacy can be completely violated.
9.3.3. Data Linkage
Businesses have been eager to utilize FRT for a variety of purposes. Much has
been made, during the course of the meetings, of the proprietary nature of the algorithms.
It was thought initially that different algorithms would produce different results and that
those results could not be compared due to their proprietary nature. However, one
government participant from the Privacy Commissioner’s Office in Canada, a
technologist by trade, explained to the group that:
There was a claim that two templates created from the same person by
different algorithms cannot be linked together; in fact they can be linked
together. So we tried to address and debunk that mess and published a
note and it's published on the NTIA website (Government).48

The full report, “Uniqueness of Face Recognition Templates” can be found at:
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uniqueness_of_face_recognition_templates_-_ipc_march2014.pdf (Chibba & Stoianov, 2014).
48
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One can imagine the complications that could arise from being able to link algorithms
conducted by two separate companies that were subscribed to by a consumer. For
instance, if one can link a Facebook profile, potentially containing personal information,
and a Match.com profile, where anonymity is valued, consumers could be put in a
precarious or compromised position. One interviewee explained the ability to link data as
follows (July 23, 2014).
I don't know how many consumers are aware of this. There is never just
one piece of data about you. There is a huge collection of data about you
brought together from different sources to create profiles. And these
profiles are secret, they are difficult for you to correct, amend, or find.
And of course people have no idea that this is happening so they aren't
able to give their consent. I personally think that is creepy and
unacceptable (NGO).
Other participants have been frustrated with looking at FRT in isolation. FRT does
require a camera of some sort, presumably on a phone, and needs to be coupled with
some sort of application to process the photo, and then finally compared to a database of
photos, more than likely social networks as they possess the most readily accessible
photo archive. “You really can't look at any of these technologies anymore in isolation,
that was has happened is an integrated offline and online 24/7 real-time advertising data
collection system” (NGO). The ability FRT has to link one’s existing data to make
predictions about an individual is quite powerful as Acquisti has shown.
Acquisti’s proof of concept experiment highlighted the technology’s power to link
data about an individual. Acquisti called the technology “first amongst peers” in terms of
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its ability to link information about an individual. Databases have been called,
“instruments of selection, separation and exclusion” (Bauman, 2000, p. 51). The ability
to link various databases that individuals may find themselves in greatly increases the
power of selection, separation, and exclusion. Similarly, the ability to link databases may
identify personal patterns or habits of the subjects. Taken to an extreme, it has been
suggested that this will lead to what is being called Personally Predictive Information
(PPI) instead of just PII. The ability to anticipate an individual’s routine could pose a
significant threat to an individual’s safety. Although many of the data linkages could be
made without the technology, the process would be more arduous and sluggish without
FRT. Olga Raskin of IBG presented to the group at the March 25, 2014 meeting:
Facebook is probably the largest consumer usage of biometrics. The one
thing about Facebook I would say that we considered relatively
threatening is that once you tag photos they now have the graph search
function which allows you to search photos more easily. So if there's
more tagged photos there's more photos indexed and those searches can be
conducted more easily… that can't be possible unless tagging is facilitated
through facial recognition technology, or it will work much more slowly
and the searches won't be as effective.
Speed, or immediacy, is not the real threat with the technology; rather it is the scale of
projects, searches, and linkages that can be made because of its speed. We have good
reasons to keep our data in separate piles; for example, there are things that we want to
share on Facebook that are inappropriate for LinkedIn. Linkage of data poses a threat to
privacy and some of those threats are yet unknown.
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9.3.4. Cognitive Intrusion
Many, but not all participants, consider the mind a private sanctuary free from
intrusion. We can choose to reveal our thoughts or keep them to ourselves. FRT is about
to change that. Kairos, a company that presented at the meetings, made this recent
announcement in an email press release:
Today was an important day for Kairos. We’ve expanded our offering
beyond facial recognition to include facial expression detection and
emotion analysis. We did that by acquiring a company that we admire and
who shares our values and vision of the future: IMRSV. With this
acquisition, Kairos becomes the only facial biometrics company in the
world offering both facial recognition and emotion analysis tools for
developers (Business).
FRT being used for emotional analysis has broad implications. As shown earlier, the
technology has already been employed to help facilitate deception detection. Marketers
will undoubtedly use the technology to gauge emotional affect and make educated
guesses concerning consumer opinion about products or services. Infrared FRT can tell if
an individual is intoxicated or under stress based on body temperature and blood travel.
When consumer data are linked (think about the products Amazon suggests based on
browser and past purchase history information) with the emotional analysis component of
FRT, the technology can make more accurate guesses about what the individual is likely
thinking. The technology, particularly the emotional analysis capability, is in its infancy;
however, the technology will continue to improve and make increasingly accurate
guesses concerning an individual’s thought process, thus violating cognitive processes.
261

In many ways, cognitive intrusion by the technology stands as the biggest threat
to not only privacy, but also to the democratic way of life. Cognition is the precursor to
expression. If the technology continues to improve in its ability to intrude on human
cognition, the chilling effect could be profound on our First Amendment rights.
9.4. Reconceptualizing Privacy
So far privacy has been discussed from a variety of perspectives, including legal,
societal, and as a right. H. Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev, and Heng Xu (2011) discussed
informational privacy by providing an extensive discussion on the many conceptions of
privacy. Should we consider privacy as a value or human right? Is privacy a commodity
that consumers can trade for benefits? Are we speaking of informational privacy or
physical privacy, the right to be left alone? Should privacy be seen as cognitive with
access to our thoughts? Can we come to a satisfactory definition of privacy through
negation of the terms that get conflated with it: surveillance, secrecy, and anonymity? Is
privacy simply the ability to control our information?
My aim is not to describe the many definitions of privacy. Previously, scholars
tried to distinguish between physical and informational privacy, privacy as a value or a
right, societal versus individual privacy, and many other conceptions. Unfortunately,
FRT makes these distinctions unworkable.
Physical privacy, the ability to be let alone, is challenged by FRT. Images that
have applied FRT reveal a great deal about the location of a person, including when he or
she was there and possibly even why. FRT can then be used to identify the individual in
the picture, revealing his or her physical information, such as age range, race, ethnicity,
time of day and potentially other aspects given the context of the inquiry. FRT
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challenges notions of physical privacy for these precise reasons. The photos that FRT is
applied to also allow individuals to speculate about an individual and his or her motives.
Oftentimes, information associated with an individual can be more damaging than
accurate information about an individual.
According to Smith et al., informational privacy is the ability to control personally
identifiable information (p. 990). FRT collects biometric data which are unique to each
individual. By definition this is personally identifiable information. Given the ability for
facial data to be collected secretly and the ubiquity of cameras, FRT challenges the
notions of informational privacy, as well as individual control over personal information.
Additionally, the compilation of an individual’s data has been called an individual’s
“data-double” (Lyon, 2007, p. 125). The data-double creates a virtual person that
replicates the physical person, especially with the collection of biometric data. The datadouble further blurs the distinction between physical and informational privacy and raises
concerns about where a data-double physically travels to and where it is stored at, which
could be multiple locations. These travel and storage concerns can impact a physical
person’s freedom or access to privileges.
As humans, we lie on almost a daily basis, sometimes for altruistic reasons. One
must ask, if physical privacy and informational privacy are pitted against one another,
which is more important? Information can be associated with an individual for a variety
of reasons but when an individual is physically located in space, time, and identity, that
information is much more difficult to explain away. As stated by Mark Andrejevic
(2002), “If, in other words, what people say is potentially inaccurate, uninterpretable, or
illusory, the body is offered as a guarantee of some surplus beyond the manipulations of
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discourse” (p. 481). FRT may show that we have manipulated or omitted information
and it will do so by confirming our physical location or attributes as proof.
Even cognitive conceptions of privacy, the solitude of our minds to hold opinions
and thoughts, are quickly becoming outdated and ineffective. We like to believe that we
have “control” over when to reveal our thoughts and opinions to others. FRT has the
ability to track eye movement, gauge an individual’s temperature, via infrared FRT, and
monitor emotional affect based on pupil dilation, and other physical facial markers such
as smiling or frowning. As the technology continues to improve, it will be deployed in
more locations, and has more images to compare an individual’s affect; soon the human
face may betray emotions, providing insight into human cognition.
Privacy has also been thought of as a commodity (Papacharissi, 2010). Private
information can be given to retailers and other organizations in order to obtain some
perceived benefit like targeted advertisements or possible discounts. The problem with
this view of privacy, although it arguably allows for the most individual autonomy, is that
there are public interest exceptions. Pictures are taken by the press, as photography is a
First Amendment protected activity, and individuals are all but required to have state
issued photo ID’s, all of which can detract from an individual’s ability to capitalize on
commodifying one’s privacy.
Since FRT links or challenges individual conceptions of privacy, the academic
community should stop making these distinctions. Privacy must once again be thought of
in its entirety. How scholarship can wrestle this complex topic is less certain. I believe
that scholars should start to conceive of privacy in relation to interference of privacy.
Interference is another subjective and context dependent term that is hard to pin down.
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However, interference allows important research about privacy to continue. Researchers
can start by polling data to identify privacy interference as defined by individuals; they
can then try to understand why individuals feel this way and work on pragmatic solutions
to address the interference. Since privacy must be addressed in its entirety, and because
it remains a subjective and context dependent term, scholarship will need interference to
address privacy considering it also accounts for the subjective and context dependent
nature of privacy. Another benefit of thinking about privacy in terms of interference is
that no new definitions of privacy are created or added to the numerous definitions
already in circulation.
FRT at the time of this writing had yet to seriously impact the general public’s
views on privacy. It is anticipated that as the technology becomes more prevalent in use,
more accurate in its capabilities of both authentication and identification, as well as
increasingly adopted by the public (democratization of surveillance), those individuals
interested in protecting their privacy, will be forced to adopt some methods of FRT
resistance.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
This research has presented several findings that merit further exploration and
comment. The primary research interest in this data was the developing regulatory
regime for facial recognition technology and how it impacts consumer privacy.
However, a rarity occurred during this process in that, numerous stakeholders present in a
previous process regarding consumer privacy were also involved in the process for facial
recognition technology. The multistakeholder literature noted this paucity, stating “Little
information is available with regard to how processes build on or learn from previous
experiences” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 119). The academic community is offered an
opportunity to inquire into this area as the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration is now charged with holding another MSH process on drone privacy
(Mershon, 2014).
It is important to note that the same criticisms leveled against the MSH process
for FRT are already being made against the NTIA MSH process for drones. Individuals
are still concerned that these processes do not involve government or law enforcement
use of the technology, which is seen as a major obstacle for public acceptance of the
regulation. Similarly, the code of conduct to be created is voluntary, which opens the
process up to further criticism. Finally, the convener has once again been questioned as
to his or her expertise in the area with some holding the opinion that the Federal Aviation
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Administration would be a more appropriate convener. Despite perceived or real
shortcomings this new set of meetings provide an exciting opportunity for academics in
the MSH field to interrogate how these processes can build on one another.
Regarding the process for FRT, this process has been limited in scope to strictly
commercial uses of the technology. With citizens being all but required to have
identification credentials with their face on them, such as a driver’s license or state issued
identification card, government uses of the technology should concern all citizens and not
just consumers. Scandals at the Internal Revenue Service and National Security Agency,
as well as successful hacking attempts on federal government databases and the White
House, call into question the trust citizens have with the government. The government
stores sensitive face data in their databases and have shown that they are not capable of
adequately protecting it or providing the necessary oversight so that the data is not
misused. Government and law enforcement uses not being covered in a code of conduct
for FRT is an important limitation of this process.
FRT presents a threat not only to consumers but also to citizens. As has been
shown FRT presents serious threats to how we currently view and interpret the First and
Fourth Amendments. FRT will likely present challenges to the First Amendment in the
form of photography and free speech. Who owns images and how those images are
subsequently used, even for public interest exceptions, may require new interpretations of
the First Amendment. Depending on how the technology is regulated, FRT has the
potential to stifle free speech. Citizens may be less willing to exercise their First
Amendment right, especially for controversial speech, if they feel that they will be
identified by the technology. As has been previously discussed, facial images can be
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collected surreptitiously. When these images are collected by the state, Fourth
Amendment protections may be implicated. Since facial images can be collected without
the awareness of the target, the Fourth Amendment may need clarification from the
United States Supreme Court as to what constitutes a burdensome search.
During this MSH process for FRT business interests have been prominently on
display. Consumers have a right to be skeptical about the privacy protections provided
by a voluntary code of conduct. The code of conduct is further called into question by
the fact that the NTIA is housed in the Department of Commerce, an entity with a
mandate to promote U.S. business. As shown previously, the mission statement of the
Department of Commerce does not contain a single mention of the word privacy, calling
into question the value they place on such an important human right. It is also ironic the
amount of privacy that the business stakeholder group has requested during this process.
The IBIA and other business entities prefer to discuss sensitive parts of a voluntary code
of conduct offline (protecting their privacy) while simultaneously working to limit the
many of the privacy protections proposed for consumers in the code of conduct such as
notice of the technology’s use. Despite these limitations the data collected may provide
insight into other research questions.
Further exploration of this data may reveal important findings about the learning
process in the MSH format and may hold important data for those seeking to interrogate
how MSH processes can build on one another. Stakeholders are generally either new to
the MSH format or new to the topic of the MSH process. Carryover stakeholders in this
process were familiar with both the topic of the process, consumer privacy, and also the
MSH format. Many of the stakeholders interviewed in the first process admitted it was
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complicated, frustrating, and disappointing. It is worth noting that despite large amounts
of animosity in the first process, that many of the carryover stakeholders found
productive and respectful ways of communicating with each other during the subsequent
process. This suggests that stakeholders are able to start new beginnings for new
processes despite aggravating results from previous processes. In isolation, this case
study suggests that there are positive benefits to be obtained during subsequent processes
from negative experiences in previous processes. This case suggests that stakeholders are
willing to avoid similar negative experiences and find productive and respectful ways to
interact.
The social constructivist paradigm has been adopted for this project. The MSH
meetings for FRT have been tasked with creating a voluntary code of conduct which will
dictate appropriate uses of the technology and the privacy protections that must be
observed. This group will dictate how the technology is used. Humans are not subject to
determinism by technology, instead we are involved in the daily creation and production
of our world. As noted previously, cultural choices shape the use of technology, not the
other way around (Nye, 2006).
This dissertation has asked three distinct research questions which merit further
discussion. The first research question is: “How is the regulatory regime of FRT
emerging in the U.S.?” The regulatory regime of FRT is emerging in the U.S. via the
multistakeholder process. As of now only a set of best practice recommendations from
the FTC exist for common commercial uses of FRT. The creation of a voluntary code of
conduct for FRT has been under development at the NTIA for a year and a half with no
tangible language yet in existence. Stakeholders have expressed frustration with the
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length of the process, lack of input from important business participants, the limited
scope of the process, and the proposed regulations in the code itself. It is unclear if this
process will conclude with the creation of a voluntary code of conduct. It is apparent to
this researcher that voluntary codes of conduct that apply strictly for consumer uses of
FRT provide inadequate privacy protection to both consumers and citizens at large. It is
hoped by this researcher that this process will conclude successfully with the creation of a
code of conduct. Meaningful legislation can then be passed that will provide robust
privacy protection to both consumers and citizens that reflect the nuanced language
achieved through this process to allow for responsible innovation and use of the
technology.
The second research question asked was: “What are the roles of the various
stakeholders in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?” There have been four
primary stakeholder groups identified during this process: academics, government,
business, and non-governmental organizations. It is important to note that none of these
groups are homogenous in their interests or values. Academics have played an important
role in providing information to the group on topics ranging from how the technology
works to how the technology can be misused. Both business and NGO stakeholder
groups have had academics present information that reflects their values. During this
process, business entities have often been reluctant to discuss how they currently use the
technology or what their plans for future use are. Business participants have argued for
minimal regulation to allow for continued innovation of the technology. NGO
participants have argued for increased privacy safeguards. NGO interests range from
supporting Congressional legislation, providing special safeguards for minors, to concern
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about the potential for discrimination. While these positions have been advocated for it
remains to be seen how they will be accounted for in any potential code of conduct.
Finally, government participants have had an important role in the process. The NTIA
has convened the meetings and have had a hands off approach facilitating the process.
The NTIA has exercised influence over the process by encouraging stakeholders to not
consider government and law enforcement uses of the technology. The only other
identified government participant has been the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s
office of Ontario Canada. This participant has largely observed the process but has also
influenced the process by explaining that reverse engineering of FRT data is possible,
increasing the privacy protections of the potential code of conduct.
The third research question asked was: “How does FRT challenge our current
conceptions of privacy?” Depending on whether or not an individual has a property right
interest in images, facial templates, and the integers created by the application of FRT,
liberal notions of privacy may change. As previously discussed academics have
discussed privacy in the narrowed conceptions of informational, physical, and cognitive
privacy. FRT conflates all of these conceptions rendering them less useful than in the
past. It has been argued that privacy should be thought of in terms of interference to
account for these conceptions and the subjective and contextual nature of privacy itself.
Should courts decide that an individual has a property right in the their image, facial
template, or the integers created as a result of the application of FRT, consumers and
citizens may have stronger legal recourse in protecting their privacy interests. Much
remains to be seen for the future of privacy in the context of FRT depending on the
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potential creation of a code of conduct, legal rulings, and possible congressional
legislation.
This research contributes to the academic literature in the following ways.


FRT conflates previous distinctions of privacy made by scholars
(informational, physical, and cognitive); these distinctions are no longer
pragmatic ways of viewing privacy and its violation.



Since FRT conflates privacy distinctions, academics need to re-conceptualize
privacy as interference to allow for the subjective and contextual nature of
privacy.



The emerging regulatory regime for FRT is being created via a voluntary code
of conduct. The MSH process represents a novel way to regulate
communication technology.



Voluntary codes of conduct, while flexible enough to allow innovation for the
technology, provide insufficient privacy protection due to their voluntary
nature.



The series of NTIA MSH meetings regarding consumer privacy protection
offers researchers a unique opportunity to understand how MSH processes and
its participants build upon one another in both positive and negative ways,
which currently stands as an under researched academic area.



Academic literature does not use the term “Regulation of Technology” yet
such a field does exist.

Further exploration is needed to substantiate what amount to my musings on a
tangentially related findings from this research. It remains unclear if the negative
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experiences from the first process led to more productive interactions or if simple
experience are responsible for the increased camaraderie and productivity. Since no new
code of conduct has been created, it remains to be seen if the added experience will lead
to higher rates of adoption or a code that has more intended benefits. These aspects of
the MSH process warrant further exploration.
Secondly, this project has proposed and shown some of the merits of reconceptualizing privacy as interference. This conception is untested and merits further
consideration or study from privacy scholars. I contend that conceptualizing privacy as
interference will lead the study of privacy in a more pragmatic direction, encouraging
scholars to detect and solve privacy grievances rather than create definitions of privacy
ad infinitum or merely point out the limits or problems of current conceptions of privacy.
While I believe in the merits of interference I have not personally tested this conception
nor have I received challenges on this conception, therefore, I cautiously suggest this
alternative way to study privacy.
Finally, this research promised to track the developing regulatory regime for FRT
via a voluntary code of conduct to protect consumer privacy. This process has been
lengthy, in excess of a year and a half, and with no clear ending or tangible code of
conduct in sight. The next meeting is scheduled for June 11, 2015. The regulatory
regime for FRT is hampered by the voluntary nature of any code of conduct created, if
there is one at all. The voluntary nature of the code of conduct is ultimately the biggest
limitation of this process. If companies do not wish to, or cannot, comply they simply
will not ascribe to the code. This provides the consumer with potentially very little
protection even if a code of conduct is created. Consumers are also well within their
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right to be skeptical of this process as it has been facilitated by the Department of
Commerce, a department with no history of privacy protection and whose sole charge is
to promote American business interests. Codes of conduct are simply no replacement for
legislation and research has shown that the American public vastly prefers legislation to
alternative proposals:
A February 2002 Harris Poll showed that 63% of respondents thought
current law inadequate to protect privacy. A June 2001 Gallup poll
indicated that two-thirds of respondents favored new federal legislation to
protect privacy online. A July 2001 Markle Foundation study concluded
that 64% favored rules to protect consumers on the Internet, and 58%
reported that self-regulation wasn't enough to ensure adequate
accountability. A March 2000 BusinessWeek/Harris Poll found that 57%
of respondents favored laws that would regulate how personal information
is used. In that same poll, only 15% supported self-regulation (Electronic
Privacy Information Center, 2015a).
Ultimately, if the current administration wants to be taken seriously by the American
public with regard to privacy protection, stronger protections will need to be enacted.
I would be remiss to dismiss the benefits that a voluntary code of conduct presents
to the business community, as well as the technology. If a voluntary code of conduct is
created, its voluntary nature will promote innovation of the technology in potentially
productive and imaginative ways, most of which will benefit the business community
financially. Legislation is often strict in scope and purpose and would most likely
eliminate certain uses of the technology, even those that are beneficial to society. Given
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the nascent nature of the technology, caution should be exercised before advocating for
comprehensive legislation regarding FRT.
Appendix A
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Privacy Principles

Principle
Legality

Legitimate Aim

Necessity

Definition
Government’s legal authority
to invade an individual’s
privacy as well as the legal
restrictions involved in doing
so.
Only certain communications
can be surveilled by specified
state actors for legitimate
reasons
Gathering only the
information necessary to build
the government’s case

Adequacy

Appropriate levels of
surveillance are to be used

Proportionality

Recognition that the
government has
disproportionate power to
invade a citizen’s privacy
rather than vice versa.
Impartial judicial authority
must be obtained prior to
surveilling communications

Competent Judicial Authority

Due Process

User Notification

Transparency

Ensures a fair, impartial, and
public hearing for any human
right infringement
Users must be notified their
communications are being
surveilled unless there are
exigent circumstances
Citizens should be provided
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Context of Use
Search warrants used to
search communications must
specify what information is
being sought
Not all state actors have
surveillance powers and those
should only be used pursuant
to a search warrant
Only communications
detailing illegal or sought
after activity should be
collected
The minimum amount of
surveillance necessary to
achieve goals should be used.
Searching individuals not
associated with a crime is
prohibited. i.e. friends and
family
Citizens do not possess mass
surveillance capabilities as the
government does.
Government must limit scope
of their inquiries
Appropriate and unbiased
judicial authority must be
sought for legitimate invasion
of privacy

Search warrants must specify
what is being sought from the
individual.
Details of the surveillance

Public Oversight

Integrity of Communication
Systems

Safeguards for International
Cooperation

Safeguards Against
Illegitimate Access

notice about when, the extent
to which, and the tools used
to invade privacy
Ensures legitimacy and
transparency of the
government
The government cannot
compel software/hardware
providers to build in
surveillance capabilities
Where state and national laws
overlap, the ones with the
higher individual protections
should be used
Legislation ensuring against
illegal government or private
communication surveillance
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must be provided for the
individual to appropriately
defend themselves in court
e.g. The EU has public
oversight offices to protect
against government
corruption or zealotry
Private firms cannot be
compelled to aid in
government surveillance
The highest privacy
protections for citizens should
be used to balance the
disproportionate powers of
the government
e.g. Bill of Rights, or
Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights

Appendix B
List of Interviewees
Alex Propes

Interactive Advertising Bureau

Alex Stoianov

Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario

Amanda Koulousias Federal Trade Commission
Ariel Fox-Johnson

Common Sense Media

Carl Szabo

NetChoice

Chris Calabrese

American Civil Liberties Union

Craig Spiezle

Online Trust Alliance

Gautam Hans

Center for Democracy and Technology

Hauwa Otori

Internet Association

Howard Fienberg

Marketing Research Association

Jeff Chester

Center for Digital Democracy

Jennifer Lynch

Electronic Frontier Foundation

John Verdi

National Telecommunications and Information Administration

Michelle De Mooy

Consumer Action

Travis Hall

American University
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Appendix C
Definitions for NTIA Privacy Multistakeholder Facial Recognition
Draft – July 21 - 2014
Algorithm: A limited sequence of instructions or steps that directs a computer system
how to solve a particular problem or perform a function.49
Custodian: The entity or individual that holds Facial Recognition Data
Database: The facial recognition system’s database or set of known subjects. May
include Facial Templates.
Delete: To make unreadable Facial Recognition Data so that after deletion it cannot be
used by reasonable means.50
OR
To remove (something, such as words, pictures, or computer files) from a document,
recording, computer, etc.51
Encryption: The protection of data using reasonable means that have been generally
accepted by experts in the field of information security, which renders such data
unintelligible or unreadable.
Enroll: The process of storing and maintaining Facial Recognition Data.
Entity using Facial Recognition: An entity that uses Facial Recognition Systems to
Collect and/or Use Facial Recognition Data about Subjects.
Existing Privacy Laws and Regulations: Any state or federal law or regulation that
governs the collection or use of personal data from a Subject, where Facial Recognition
Data could be considered one type of such data. These laws and regulations may include,
but are not limited to, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, the Children's Online Privacy Protection, the California Online
Privacy Protection Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and state UDAP (“Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices”) laws.

National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary definition
of “Algorithm”: “A limited sequence of instructions or steps that tells a computer system how to solve a
particular problem. A biometric system will have multiple algorithms, for example: image processing,
template generation, comparisons, etc.”
50
Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary
definition of “Identification:” “A task where the biometric system searches a database for a reference
matching a submitted biometric sample, and if found, returns a corresponding identity. A biometric is
collected and compared to all the references in a database. Identification is “closed-set” if the person is
known to exist in the database. In “open-set” identification, sometimes referred to as a “watchlist,” the
person is not guaranteed to exist in the database. The system must determine whether the person is in the
database, then return the identity.”
51
Merrian Webster definition of “delete”: “to remove (something, such as words, pictures, or computer
files) from a document, recording, computer, etc.”
49
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Facial Authentication: A task where the Facial Recognition System attempts to confirm
an individual’s claimed identity by comparing the template generated from a submitted
face image with a specific known template generated from a previously enrolled face
image. This process is also called one-to-one verification.52
Facial Detection: A task where the Facial Recognition System distinguishes the
presence of a human face and/or facial characteristics without necessarily creating or
deriving a Facial Template.53
Facial Detection Software: Software used to detect the presence of a human face.54
Facial Identification: Searching a database for a reference matching a submitted Facial
Template and returning a corresponding identity.55
Facial Recognition Data: Data derived from the application of Facial Recognition
Software, including Facial Template and associated metadata.
Facial Recognition Software: Software used to compare the visible physical structure
of an individual’s face with a stored Facial Template.56
Facial Recognition System: A system that uses Facial Recognition Software.
Facial Template: A digital representation of distinct characteristics of a Subject’s face,
representing information extracted from a photograph using a facial recognition
algorithm.57
Facial Image: A photograph or video frame or other image that shows the visible
physical structure of an individual’s face
Operation of Facial Detection Software: Facial Detection Software is considered “in
operation” when the process of Facial Detection is occurring.
Secure Storage of Information: Using commercially reasonable measures to secure
information.58

52

Definition based on comments from Walter Hamilton and John Dowden.
Change based on definition of Facial Profiling created and submitted by Ariel Johnson and the FTC’s
report refers in the Case Study section to “the detection or recognition of demographic characteristics” (p.
13)
54
Definition based on comments from stakeholders during May 20, 2014 meeting.
55
Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary
definition of “Identification” and “Detection Rate”: “The rate at which individuals, who are in a database,
are properly identified in an open-set identification (watchlist) application. See also open-set identification,
watchlist.”
53

Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary
definition of “Template”: “a digital representation of an individual’s distinct characteristics, representing
information extracted from a biometric sample. Templates are used during biometric authentication as the
basis for comparison. See also extraction, feature, model.”
57
Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary
definition of “Template”: “a digital representation of an individual’s distinct characteristics, representing
information extracted from a biometric sample. Templates are used during biometric authentication as the
basis for comparison. See also extraction, feature, model.”
57
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Share Information: The disclosure of information to an entity other than the Entity
using Facial Recognition or Subject.
Subject: The individual represented in a Facial Recognition System and/or a facial
recognition database.59
Threshold: A user setting for Facial Recognition Systems for authentication, verification
or identification. The acceptance or rejection of a Facial Template match is dependent on
the match score falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is adjustable within
the Facial Recognition System.60

Based, in part, Article 4A-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) requirements for bank
transfers: “If a bank and its customer have agreed that the authenticity of payment orders . . . will be
verified pursuant to a security procedure, a payment order . . . is effective as the order of the customer . . .if:
(a) The security procedure is a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized
payment orders;”
59
Based on the National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics
Glossary definition of “User”: “A person, such as an administrator, who interacts with or controls end
users’ interactions with a biometric system. See also cooperative user, end user, indifferent user, noncooperative user, uncooperative user” However, separated out to clarify the subject and the user are
different.
60
Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary
definition of “Threshold”: “A user setting for biometric systems operating in the verification or open-set
identification (watchlist) tasks. The acceptance or rejection of biometric data is dependent on the match
score falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is adjustable so that the biometric system can be
more or less strict, depending on the requirements of any given biometric application. See also comparison,
match, matching.”
58
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Appendix D
Mission Statement of the Department of Commerce

Mission Statement
The mission of the Department is to create the conditions for economic growth and
opportunity.
As part of the Obama administration’s economic team, the Secretary of Commerce serves
as the voice of U.S. business within the President’s Cabinet. The Department works with
businesses, universities, communities, and the Nation’s workers to promote job creation,
economic growth, sustainable development, and improved standards of living for
Americans. Through its 12 bureaus and nearly 47,000 employees located in all 50 states
and territories and more than 86 countries worldwide, the Department administers critical
programs that touch the lives of every American. The Department’s workforce is as
diverse as its mission. It is made of up economists, Nobel winning scientists, foreign
service officers, patent attorneys, law enforcement officers, and specialists in everything
from international trade to aerospace engineering.
The Department is comprised of 12 bureaus that work together to drive progress in four
business facing key goal areas:
 Trade and Investment
 Innovation
 Environment
 Data
The underlying strength of the Department is the ability for its bureaus to work together
and leverage expertise in all of these goal areas to drive economic growth.
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Appendix E
List of Acronyms Used
ACA
ACLU
AI
CDT
CPBR
DA
DNS
EU
EXIF
FBI
FIPPS
FR
FRT
FTC
HIPAA
IBIA
ICANN
IGF
IRS
ITU
MATP
MDA
MSH
NGO
NIST
NSA
NTIA
OECD
OLG
PII
PPI
RFID
SSN
TQM
UCC
USSC
WTO

Affordable Care Act
American Civil Liberties Union
Artificial Intelligence
Center for Democracy and Technology
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
Discourse Analysis
Domain Name System
European Union
Extended File Information
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fair Information Practice Principles
Facial Recognition
Facial Recognition Technology
Federal Trade Commission
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
International Biometrics Industry Association
International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
Internet Governance Forum
Internal Revenue Service
International Telecommunications Union
Mobile Application Transparency Process
Mediated Discourse Analysis
Multistakeholder
Non-government Organization
National Institute for Standards and Technology
National Security Agency
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation
Personally Identifiable Information
Personally Predictive Information
Radio Frequency Identification Chip
Social Security Number
Total Quality Management
Uniform Commercial Code
United States Supreme Court
World Trade Organization
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Appendix F
Provisions of the NTIA
Provisions of the Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data61
•

Accurate, up to date, relevant, and not excessive data

•

Used only for legitimate purposes for which it was originally collected

•

Stored in a form that does not permit identification for longer than the original
purpose for which it was collected

•

Data can be processed only with the consent of the individual, when legally
required, or to protect the public interest or legitimate private interests

•

Processing of sensitive data such as race, political opinion, religious beliefs and
others are severely limited and generally require written consent from the
individual

•

Disclosure must be provided to the individual about the purposes for processing

personal data, if any response is needed, the right to access and correct data, as well as
provide notice when information has been collected without his/her consent
•

The right to obtain data without excessive constraint, expense, or delay data

relating to the individual
•

The right to correct or delete information that is incomplete or inaccurate

•

The right to data security against accidental or unlawful destruction, alteration,

access, and disclosure.

61

(Cate, 1994)
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•

Each state will establish an independent public authority to monitor data
protection

•

Data processors must also notify relevant national authorities before data
processing

•

The right not to be subject to legal decisions made about him/her from
automated processing

•

Laws must be established to provide for civil liabilities against data
controllers for unlawful processing

•

Establish laws prohibiting the transfer of data to non-member states that fail
to provide adequate data protection (emphasis added)
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Appendix G
Interview Protocol
Research Question
How is the regulatory
regime of FRT emerging in
the U.S.?

Interview Question
How did you get involved in
this process?

Have you been involved in
similar MSH processes?

During the meetings, some
civil society stakeholders have
criticized the validity of the
MSH process. Do you agree or
disagree with this view?
In your opinion, is there any
consensus emerging about the
following issues: regulatory
safeguards, privacy
safeguards, regulation of
innovative technologies.

Follow Up Question
It is claimed the MSH process is
a novelty in public policy
creation. What is your view on
MSH?
If yes. How can you compare
experiences in this process as
compared with others?
(Internet governance, Internet
neutrality)
If yes. What are your
objections?

Which groups have been most
influential in forming
consensus?

How were process mechanisms
managed for consensus
building?

What are the roles of the
various stakeholders in
shaping the commercial
regulation of FRT?

Which are the areas of
discussion where you learned
the most?
In your opinion, what are the
benefits or deficits of
innovating a code of conduct
via the MSH process versus a
professional association or a
private company?
Describe your role in the FRT
MSH process.

Can you specify topics that
you’ve learned the most about?

Were there stakeholders who
were more vocal at the
meetings than others?
Other than increased
participation, were there

Were there any behind the
scenes meetings?
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Were there some stakeholders
who were more helpful or more
of a hindrance to the process.

What other factors impacted
the influence that stakeholders

How does FRT challenge
current conceptions of
privacy?

other reasons why
stakeholders may have had
more or less influence on the
meetings?
Has the size of stakeholder
organizations or their
reputation influenced the
MSH process?
What has been the role of the
civil society in this process?

had on the meeting?

Do you think the convener of
the NTIA MSH meetings had a
particular influence on the
process and outcomes?

If yes. Which processes or
outcomes were impacted?

Privacy is defined differently
by different people. Does FRT
challenge our conceptions of
data privacy, personal privacy,
or in other ways?
What is your definition of
privacy?

Are privacy concerns more
heightened because of this
technology or is this an old
problem revisited because of
new technology?
From you observation, would
it be accurate to say that all
stakeholders understand
privacy in similar terms? If
not, what are the distinct
interpretations of privacy?
If we define privacy
differently, are there new
safeguards we must consider?
What are the most important
considerations we must now
think through for a new
definition of privacy?
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Was there an impact on the
process?

Have they been successful in
voicing concerns of users? If yes.
Who and on what points?

How were these processes or
outcomes impacted?
In your view, how should we
think about this issue
differently?

If yes. What facets of FRT are
presenting challenges and why?

Why are these safeguards
important?

"Security vs. Privacy" is the
usual argument when issues
of surveillance by the
government are discussed.
Are there any alternative
arguments proposed during
the NTIA multistakeholder
process on the FRT
regulation?
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Appendix H
Table of Codes
Developing Policy
A) Data
1)Data Linkage
2)De-Identified Data
3)Reverse Engineering Data
B) Policy Formation
1)Consensus Formation
2)Conflict
3)FTC Enforcement
4)Industry v. Advocate Tension
5)Motive of Stakeholder Involvement
6)Procedure Preference for Code
7)Scope of Code of Conduct
8) Stakeholder Participation
C) Privacy
1)Privacy and Anonymity
2)Privacy and Business
3)Privacy and Control
4)Privacy Opinions
5)Technology and Privacy
D) Security Protocol
1)Notice to Consumer of FRT
2)Security Measures and Standards
E) FRT Uses and Applications
1)Evasion of FRT
2)Facial Profiling
3)Human Simulations of FRT
4)Stages of FRT
5)Surveillance
6)Technology Uses

Multistakeholder Process
A) Advocacy Limited Resources
B) Alternatives to Codes of Conduct
1)Behind Scenes Meetings
2)Criticism of Multistakeholder Process
3)Praise for Multistakeholder Process
4)Skepticism of Legislation
5)Sunset Plan to Revisit Code of Conduct
C) Convener
1)Convener Influence
D) History
1)History: Previous Processes and Results
E) Stakeholder Opinions and Participation
1)Feelings about Moderator
2)Stakeholder Learning
3)Stakeholder Participation
F) Venue
1)Venue Preference or Description
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